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Abstract
The recent financial turmoil has stressed the need to assess
the risk contribution of market players to the sustainability
of financial systems. Systemic risk detection is a current field
of research which includes a variety of techniques borrowed
from different methodologies. These approaches are designed
to both evaluate how financial institutions contribute to the
stability of the system and to measure how they are resilient
against financial distress that might propagate throughout
their connections. Cornerstone of systemic risk assessment
is the representation of the system as a complex environment
where agents are mutually interconnected. The aim of this
thesis is to provide different perspectives on the study of sys-
temic risk and financial stability. The first chapter introduces
the assessment of co-dependencies in over-the-counter sub-
markets, providing a novel investigation on very detailed tran-
sactions data that have been available thanks to the new regu-
latory framework. Next, I exploit network theory tools to de-
pict banking system and to analyze how the emergence of ho-
mogeneous clusters of financial institutions characterized the
last decade, showing that regional communities converged to
more similar banking practices after the outbreak of financial
markets. Finally, I propose a rare-events logistic regression
model to assess the risk of distress in a wide and globally
distributed sample of financial institutions; this chapter is in-
tended to provide evidence in support of a target risk moni-
toring for institutions with different business models.
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The outbreak of financial systems of 2007-08 underlined the weaknesses
of international regulations concerning banking risk supervision. Past
regulations on banking capital requirements were focused on a micro-
prudential approach where banks were evaluated on the basis of their
financial statement structures in order to determine the corresponding
regulatory capital cushions that had to be large enough to face their risk
levels. Conversely, the onset of the financial crisis stressed the impor-
tance of measuring the risk contribution of each institution to the finan-
cial stability of the system, thus suggesting to replace the classical prin-
ciple “too big to fail” into a “too interconnected to fail” perspective (e.g.
Acemoglu et al. 2010, Acharya et al. 2009 and Hautsch et al. 2014).
Banking sector represents a cornerstone in the analysis of systemic
risk due to its important role in the propagation of shocks to global mar-
kets and wider economy. As emphasized by the current crisis, banks
failures weaken financial sector and spread financial distress through-
out the system. Therefore, institutions whose bankrupt may trigger the
default of other institutions need more rigorous supervision by regula-
tors and should in principle fulfil higher levels of capital requirements.
Hence, the need to set up an effective regulatory capital also for the sys-
temic risk motivated the new Basel III framework to address these points
(BIS 2013). Nevertheless, a huge debate over systemic risk measurement
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methodologies, capital requirements and effectiveness of the rules is tak-
ing place in both banking and academic communities. This leads to a
growing literature concerning the identification of the key features of fi-
nancial stability useful to disentangle bank’s systemic risk contribution
(Bisias et al. 2012, Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2012 and De Bandt et al.
2009).
One of the most promising attempts concerns the exploitation of net-
work theory approach to build and analyse financial systems (Allen and
Babus 2008, Haldane 2013, Upper 2011). Once the relationships among
institutions are modeled as a network, where institutions are the nodes
and their bilateral exposures are the oriented links (e.g. inter-banking
transactions, OTC derivatives exposures, payment systems positions),
we can exploit network theory tools and indicators to assess systemic risk
and possibly identify the systemically important financial institutions
(Billio et al. 2012, Boss et al. 2004, Degryse and Nguyen 2007, Elsinger
et al. 2006, Haldane and May 2011, Iori et al. 2008, Langfield et al. 2014,
Markose et al. 2012 and Mistrulli 2011 among others). This involves the
use of simulation techniques (e.g. Eisenberg and Noe 2001 and Furfine
2003) to study cascade effects and contagion patterns to detect the config-
uration of the system more resilent to distress. In the international debate,
the resilience of banking systems has been largely scrutinized. What hap-
pens for instance to the remaining institutions of the system when a large
bank fails? Systemic features of a financial institution relate, therefore, to
the losses that it can cause to the rest of the system by some contagion
mechanisms determined by its default. This, in turns, leads to the inves-
tigation of the structures that are more prone to spread financial distress.
After the pioneering works of Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al.
(2000), literature usually indicates two potential benchmarks: a network
with a small number of large institutions with a hub & spoke topology or
a network with a large number of medium-small institutions and a more
uniform distribution of exposures. This stimulates more recent studies
on the robust-yet-fragile configuration of the system which are pointing
to both the presence of non-linearities and the need to stress complex
trade-offs among risk sharing, diversification, risk monitoring and mar-
2
ket practices (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2010, Battiston et al. 2012, Duffie and
Zhu 2011, Elliott et al. 2014, Gai and Kapadia 2010).
As emphasized by Bisias et al. (2012), literature on systemic risk de-
tection relies on a wide range of approaches borrowed from different
methodologies. Along with the complex system perspective briefly out-
lined above, the list of systemic risk measures includes macro-economic
indicators (i.e. assets and house prices’ cycles and credit-gap indicators),
stress-test scores (i.e. GDP stress test or a 10-by-10-by-10 approach),
cross-sectional measures (i.e. CoVarR, DIP, Co-Risk, MES) as well as
forward-looking risk measures (i.e. Contingent Claim Analysis, Option
iPoD, Principal Components Analysis).
Besides the introduction, this dissertation consists of three chapters,
which represent individual articles. Consequently, appendices are given
at the end of the corresponding chapter. Given the multidisciplinary pe-
rimeter identified by literature on systemic risk and financial stability,
each of them aims to disentangle the impact of financial distress apply-
ing different perspectives and methodologies.
Chapter 2 investigates the relationships among financial sub-markets
as a way to identify a potential situation of financial instability through
increased co-movements among them. To study how sub-markets are
mutually co-dependent, we combine the provision of granular data on
Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives by trade repositories and the Joint
Probability of Distress (JPoD) copula approach recently introduced by
the International Monetary Fund (Segoviano and Goodhart 2009). In do-
ing this, we define an indicator which combines some distress drivers
and we observe that results on co-dependencies are close to the practi-
cal intuition: similarities between financial and contractual terms seem
to be responsible for stronger co-movements among sub-markets. How-
ever, high values for JPoD even in correspondence of quite dissimilar
sub-markets suggest the presence of other drivers which need to be in-
vestigated in future research.
Chapter 3 is motivated by the fact that Network Theory has been
widely spotted in the latest years to study financial crisis. Since litera-
ture shows how network topology and the dynamics running on top of
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it can trigger the outbreak of large systemic crisis and impact on the con-
figuration of the system, following this methodological perspective I in-
troduce here the Accounting Network, i.e. the network can be extracted
through vector similarities’ techniques from banks’ financial statements.
Accounting Networks are built on a large database of worldwide banks
in the period 2001-2013, covering the onset of the global financial crisis
of mid-2007. These networks are analysed both in terms of their topo-
logical properties and for the emergence of homogeneous communities
of banks. Remarkably, enough sensible regional aggregations show up
with the Japanese and the US clusters dominating the community struc-
ture, although the presence of a geographically mixed community points
to a gradual convergence of financial institutions to similar supranational
banking practices. In the last part of the chapter, Principal Components
Analysis is applied to reveal the main economic dimensions that influ-
ence communities’ heterogeneity. Even using the most basic vector simi-
larity hypotheses on the composition of the financial statements, the sig-
nature of the financial crisis clearly arises across the years around 2008.
Chapter 4 is partially a follow up of Chapter 3 since it investigates
similarities of banks’ business models by employing a structural clus-
tering approach based on banks’ balance sheet information. This chap-
ter applies the same clustering methodology discussed in Chapter 3, al-
though here we consider a wider set of institutions with slightly different
available financial statement items. The resulting clusters identify major
important banking peer groups characterised by the assets and liabilities
structure. We performed the peer-group assessment on more than 10k
banks covering more than 180 countries during the period 2005-14. Main
large peer groups are quite stable over time, with a couple of main struc-
tural breaks coinciding with the introduction of new accounting stan-
dards and the 2007-08 global financial crisis. Both individual banks’
membership to a particular business model and the geographic repre-
sentation is investigated. The peer-group membership is then tested as
explanatory variable to study banks distress events after the breakdown
of 2007. The analysis confirms the importance of CAMELS (i.e. finan-
cial statements indicators) dimensions in explaining the likelihood of
4
distress of financial institutions during the recent crisis and provides a
solid ground for taking the true banks’ business models into considera-
tion for a more accurate risk assessment and monitoring. Two additional
dimensions emerge in this framework: the characteristics of the business
model adopted by institutions and the volatility of that model member-
ship over time. For the first dimension, CAMELS variables along with
macro and sectoral features contribute differently, sometimes with op-
posite sign, to the likelihood of distress among institutions with a dif-
ferent business model. For those institutions which tend to switch mo-
dels very often, identifying the second dimension of the problem, we
observe that business models instability exacerbates vulnerability espe-
cially when moving across wholesale-oriented and deposit-oriented mo-
del categories. A bank supervisor would definitely benefit from monitor-
ing these true business model features for a more accurate and targeted
intervention in stabilizing the banking sector.
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Chapter 2
Assessing Financial
Distress Dependencies in
OTC Markets: a New
Approach using Trade
Repositories Data
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis was mostly due to liquidity and credit (coun-
terparty) risks within the banking system. Although liquidity and OTC
(Over-the-Counter) derivatives were among the main causes of distress,
one of the most surprising effects was the contagion to other financial
players and to other markets and sectors. Consequently, this motivated
the introduction of Systemic risk as a new building block in the regulatory
framework, such as the Basel III regulation (see e.g. BIS (2013) and FSB
(2015)). Financial instability and systemic risk assessment are receiving
a growing interest among researchers and regulators, and many differ-
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ent approaches and techniques have been proposed so far1. In particu-
lar, recent literature on financial systems2 focused on the payments sys-
tem, the interbanking deposit markets and the OTC derivatives markets.
However, the latter is one of the most difficult to investigate due to the
complexity of the “underlying” transactions, i.e. the derivatives’ payoffs
with their highly customized structures, and the scarce availability of de-
tailed data especially for past transactions. Aggregated statistics on OTC
derivatives markets are usually released by international organizations
such as BIS (Bank for International Settlement) and OCC (US Office of
Comptroller of the Currency), or banking associations like ISDA (Inter-
national Securities and Derivatives Association). The collapse of 2007-08
stressed the need for a better provision of data in order to assess sys-
temic risk and prevent market abuse. Therefore, changes in regulatory
frameworks pointed to a more detailed description of the deals, thus de-
picting a more representative and updated picture of derivatives mar-
kets (see e.g. Duffie et al. (2010) and Russo (2010)). In US, prior to the
Dodd-Frank Act (US 111th Congress (2010)), financial institutions had
less obligations regarding the amount of financial leverage, counterparty
risk exposures, market share, and other data to be reported to any regu-
latory agency. Conversely, new rules introduced also requirements on
OTC exposures and assigned to specific agencies the role of collecting
and sharing data. Similarly, in Europe the creation of the European Se-
curities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB) were motivated also by the need to enforce the availability
of data to improve the supervision and the restraint of systemic risk (EC
2013a; EC 2013b). In addition, the European Parliament established the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) with Regulation No.
648/2012 (EUP 2012). Both the EMIR in Europe and the Dodd-Frank Act
in US aim to disclose a more detailed description of the derivatives mar-
1We omit the review of this strand of literature, recommending the interested reader
to refer to Bisias et al. (2012) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) and the references
therein for a detailed analysis of financial stability measures and models used for assessing
systemic risk.
2For instance a useful review on the application of network theory tools and method-
ologies can be found in Upper (2011).
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kets. Although only authorities are allowed to exploit the highest level
of granularity, market players can benefit from this flow of data through
trade repository services (TRs), which collect and match data and allow
the public access to this information3. In Europe this corresponds to an
intermediate level where data are aggregated according to e.g. different
asset classes and maturity features, while in US transaction data are re-
ported almost in real-time and only confidential data are not available4.
Therefore, nowadays an increasingly need for transparency is required:
for what it may concern OTC derivatives and central counterparties, use-
ful analyses are in Cecchetti et al. (2009) and Hull (2014), while for the in-
terest rate derivatives markets some insights can be found in Avellaneda
and Cont (2010) and Fleming et al. (2012).
In this work we attempt to describe how segments of the OTC deriva-
tives market are related to each other. In particular, we focus on reci-
procal co-movements during distressed market conditions using a novel
database on OTC transactions which is based on trade repositories data.
Hence, to study how sub-markets are mutually influenced we deal with
the following issues. First, we identify a suitable set of OTC sub-markets
within the IRS instruments by aggregating deals according to financial
and contractual terms. We circumscribe our analysis on the most com-
mon type of IRS contracts, i.e. the Fix-to-Floating instruments, taking into
account deals where the underlying rate is USD-LIBOR-BBA, contrac-
tual start is Spot and currency is US Dollar. This represents the most
significant subset in our dataset (which is supplied by IASON ltd5). The
identification of sub-markets is then driven by the maturity of the con-
tract, the frequencies of the swap legs and the presence of clearing agree-
ments. Second, we construct an indicator for assessing the level of dis-
tress present in these sub-markets. This distress indicator combines sev-
3For a detailed description of trade repositories activities, see e.g. DTCC (2013) and
DTCC (2014).
4For a deeper study on the divergences between EU and US in financial markets’ reg-
ulations, we suggest for instance Acharya et al. (2010), Lannoo (2013) and Valiante (2010),
while a valuable reference for a better understanding of the key requirements involved in
the aggregation of TRs data are provided by FSB (2014).
5Iason ltd is a consulting firm operating in risk management tools and applications. For
references see http://www.iasonltd.com/.
8
eral dimensions useful to measure market conditions, such as a proxies
for the bid-ask spread of the prices, their volatility, the number of deals
and the average traded volumes. Basically, although we are aware of
the fact that market distress might be related to a wide set of factors,
which might present interacting effects, we prefer to focus on a simple
and intuitive framework that can synthesise the main forces affecting
market dynamics. Therefore, the aim of this indicator is to reflect some
of the most evident and relevant dimensions that influence the ordinary
course of business within OTC sub-markets. Third, we analyse the dis-
tress dependence between pairs of sub-markets by means of the copula
theory and we investigate the joint distribution of the increments of their
distress indicator. Copula functions provide mathematical tools for the
modelization of multivariate stochastic dependence structures, that are
able to capture various forms of stochastic dependence, not only linear
dependencies. In particular, we estimate the Kendall’s tau correlation
coefficients and the joint upper-tail probabilities (henceforth Joint Prob-
abilities of Distress). Our approach is similar to the one introduced in
the IMF Banking Stability Measure report by Segoviano and Goodhart
(2009) to describe the distress interdependent structure between finan-
cial institutions. However, it is worth noting that our context of appli-
cation is completely different and, therefore, we need to face technical
issues that are specific of our case-study (for instance, we do not have
“default” thresholds and so the CIMDO methodology used in Segoviano
and Goodhart (2009) is not feasible in our case).
Although our approach exploits standard methods used in risk ma-
nagement, to the best of our knowledge the present work is one of the
first empirical studies based on micro-founded trade repositories’ data.
Related literature comprises e.g. Slive et al. (2012) who analyse central
clearing effects in credit default swaps (CDS) markets through Intercon-
tinental Exchange (ICE) Trust and Clear Europe data and Markose et al.
2012 who investigate the role of Systemically Important Financial Insti-
tutions (SIFIs) within US CDS market using Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) data. A very recent paper which exploits data from
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) is Gehde-Trapp
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et al. (2015); however it focuses on CDS rather than on IRS. A compari-
son between official BIS statistics and detailed trade repositories data is
in Bonollo et al. (2015) who describe how OTC derivatives market seg-
mentation can be implemented through the provision of more granular
flows of information related to the new regulatory framework. The nov-
elties of our analysis are both the originality of the dataset that we exploit
to identify specific sub-markets and the distress indicator that we intro-
duce. We note that, despite the several difficulties to be faced due to the
pioneering nature of our work (for instance the quality of the TRs data,
the sub-markets identification and the new distress indicator definition),
our outcomes are consistent with the practical intuition. While analysing
in a micro-prudential approach the portfolio and the risks of a bank is a
complex but rather sharp task, to infer from global market data the risks
of a financial system as a whole portfolio is a current frontier of the re-
search. In the past, lack of detailed data and the difficulty to converge
towards an accepted definition of systemic risk (see e.g. IMF-BIS-FSB
(2009) and FSB (2010)) made very challenging the measurement of dis-
tress signals arising from financial markets. This work aims to introduce
in the debate on systemic risk assessment and financial stability a way to
exploit trade repositories data to detect distress and crisis phenomena.
The paper is organized as follows: after a detailed description of
both the dataset and the procedure applied for sub-markets identifica-
tion (Section 2.2), we introduce the indicator used to investigate distress
dependencies among sub-markets (Section 2.3). Then, Section 2.4 ex-
plains in detail the methodology that we have utilised to estimate co-
dependencies. Finally, the results of our analysis are illustrated and dis-
cussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes and makes some remarks
about future lines of research.
2.2 Description of the Dataset
International statistics on OTC markets are usually provided by some
organizations such as BIS and OCC, or banking associations like ISDA.
These statistics are based on some main reporting dealers, for instance
10
the largest (a few dozens) commercial and investment banks that re-
gularly send some low granular data on their own derivatives deals to
these central organizations which publish them once having applied data
cleaning procedures to avoid e.g. double counting issues. Although this
flow of data covers a high percentage of the global OTC markets, the in-
formation related to both asset classes and payoffs is not very detailed
and may be not comparable among different data providers. Mark-to-
market consensus prices may differ from pre-trade indicative prices and
from the actual trade prices at which derivatives are exchanged. For
these reasons, we rely on a trade repository dataset retrieved from GTR-
Analytics6, which collects trades’ information from several trade repos-
itories and for many types of instruments, controlling for manifest in-
consistencies and mismatches. The latter process limits potential biases
due to data misreporting and fragmentation which arise from merging
datasets from different sources and across many regulations.
Our study focuses on the interest rates derivatives market which at
the end of December 2014 accounts for the 80% and the 75% of the global
OTC derivatives market in terms of the outstanding notional amount and
the gross market value, respectively. Since the swaps market was $381
trillion compared with $505 of the total outstanding notional amount of
the interest rate market7, this motivates our choice to study the swaps
segments as a representative case-study for the global OTC derivatives
market. In particular, for each deal (identified by an ID) our database
specifies the asset class of the instrument and reports a set of informa-
tion regarding contractual terms, including for instance: the execution
time, the effective date and the contractual expiry of the deal, the set-
tlement and both the underlying assets currencies, payment frequencies,
day count convention, and, obviously, the notional and the price. In ad-
dition, we can also exploit information on clearing agreements and col-
lateral positions which enrich the description of market trends and im-
prove risk assessment. As a matter of fact, it is worth outlining that we
6This is a software developed by the consulting firm IASON ltd. For references see
http://www.financial-machineries.com/gtr-analytics.htm
7Data refer to BIS statistics and to single currency contracts only. For further references,
see http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.
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refer to prices and volumes of actual traded deals in the market, which
consequently extend the traditional use of offered rates (bid/ask quotes
shown by brokers or data providers) and consensus data (quotes/prices
submitted by market contributors).
2.2.1 Sub-Markets Identification
The identification of a robust sub-market concept is not straightforward.
Along with some financial drivers that can support us for clustering the
whole market, we take into account also the availability and the qua-
lity of a wide set of deals for different financial instruments. However,
although the methodology we propose is still somehow heuristic, we be-
lieve that at this first stage of the study this is a reasonable approach for
the analysis of OTC sub-markets’ co-movements.
To ensure comparability, we circumscribe our study to Fix-to-Floating
instruments. For the same reason, we consider contracts where the un-
derlying rate is USD-LIBOR-BBA, contractual start is Spot and currency
is US Dollar. This represents the most significant subset in our dataset.
In particular, the identification of sub-markets is driven by the maturity
of the contract, the frequencies of the swap legs and the presence of clear-
ing agreements. Data investigation suggests to consider Fix-to-Floating
instruments with leg frequencies equal to (3m vs 3m) and (6m vs 3m). In
addition, we aggregate deals according to three main maturities, i.e. less
or equal to 2 years (Short), between 2 years and 10 years (Medium) and
greater or equal to 10 years (Long). Finally, we distinguish contracts be-
tween those for which there are clearing agreements (C) from those for
which uncleared (UC) conditions are present (see Table 1).
The frequency of the leg payments became a relevant factor after the
financial crisis, when it was clear that the timelines of cash flows changed
both the liquidity (funding) risk and the counterparty risk for the two in-
volved financial agents. This is well known as the multiple curve new
framework8. In other words, one cannot evaluate financial instruments
without considering the frequency of cash flows since ceteris paribus the
8See Pallavicini and Brigo (2013).
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Table 1: Sub-Markets Definition. Fix-to-Floating refers to contracts with
swaps legs frequencies equal to (3m vs 3m) or (6m vs 3m). Short, Medium and
Long refer to deals with maturities less or equal to 2 years (Short), between 2
years and 10 years (Medium) and greater or equal to 10 years (Long). Finally,
data are further partitioned according to the presence (C) or absence (UC)
of clearing agreements.
Sub-mkt Fix-to-Floating Maturity Clearing
1 (3m vs 3m) Short C
2 (3m vs 3m) Medium C
3 (3m vs 3m) Long C
4 (6m vs 3m) Short C
5 (6m vs 3m) Medium C
6 (6m vs 3m) Long C
7 (6m vs 3m) Short UC
8 (6m vs 3m) Medium UC
9 (6m vs 3m) Long UC
IRS fair values will be slightly different. Also the netting flag is a very
informative variable. For instance, both the Dodd-Frank act and the
ESMA regulations ask financial institutions to compulsorily apply net-
ting agreements in the transaction management to keep as low as possi-
ble the credit exposures. In addition, even enterprises are obliged to this
practice for deals above some relevant thresholds (e.g. 3 bn of Euro in
terms of outstanding notional for interest rate derivatives in the ESMA
regulation). For this reason, we can assume that the Yes/Not clearing
agreement digit can be used as a proxy for the counterparty class, i.e.
financial institutions vs. enterprises.
Although information on traded deals is available also for the first
part of 2013, for the following analysis we consider only data from Septem-
ber 2013 to April 2015 since the amount and quality of reported deals
at the beginning of 2013 is not satisfactory. This choice ensures a good
availability of data along the reference period. Table 2 shows descriptive
statistics for each sub-market9.
9We apply a further check for double counting in the deals by controlling for contrac-
tual terms. We consider as duplicated deals those transactions that are equal in terms of:
dissemination id, contractual expiry, effective date, end date, price and notional amount.
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Table 2: Number of Deals and Volumes for each Sub-Market. Descriptive
statistics refer to the number of deals and their notional amounts (in million
of Us Dollar) during the whole interval from September 2013 to April 2015.
In the upper part we show data for contracts with swaps legs frequencies
equal to (6m vs 3m), while in the lower part we consider deals with swaps
legs frequencies equal to (3m vs 3m). Short, Medium and Long refer to
deals with maturities less or equal to 2 years (Short), between 2 years and
10 years (Medium) and greater or equal to 10 years (Long), respectively. Fi-
nally, contracts are further partitioned according to the presence of clearing
agreements (Cleared vs. Uncleared).
IRS (3m x 3m)
Short Medium Long Total
Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared
Number of deals 1,170 154 9,028 706 9,406 133 19,604 993
Notional amount 175,226 8,359 874,483 34,479 412,779 4,131 1,462,488 46,969
IRS (6m x 3m)
Short Medium Long Total
Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared Cleared Uncleared
Number of deals 14,063 2,128 100,555 9,547 92,008 9,405 206,626 21,080
Notional amount 2,301,060 294,994 9,258,744 745,467 4,134,122 396,999 15,693,926 1,437,460
Results suggest that deals involving Fix-to-Floating instruments with
leg frequencies equal to (6m vs 3m) are more frequent than those with leg
frequencies equal to (3m vs 3m). This is more evident once we consider
deals characterised by the absence of clearing agreements. In particular,
short maturities are less diffused, while figures are comparable for the
Medium and the Long sub-sets (given a certain swap legs frequency). In
order to identify sub-markets, these descriptive statistics suggest to dis-
card un-cleared deals of Fix-to-Floating instruments with leg frequencies
equal to (3m vs 3m) due to data limitations. Therefore, our final list of
sub-markets is composed by six sub-sets with leg frequencies equal to
(6m vs 3m) and three sub-sets with leg frequencies equal to (3m vs 3m),
the latter characterised by the presence of clearing agreements.
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2.2.2 Comparisons with other Data Sources
Official BIS descriptive statistics provide information for OTC deriva-
tives by currency. At end-December 201410, US Dollar interest rate swaps
were 124 trillion in terms of outstanding notional amount, while in our
dataset (Fix-to-Floating 3m3m plus 6m3m) the amount is about 14.6 tril-
lion of US Dollar, i.e. close to the 12% of the whole USD IRS market. Al-
though a direct comparison between BIS statistics and our sample would
require a more detailed partition of the deals, not yet available in the
BIS statistics, however we observe a satisfactory coverage of IRS markets
provided by our dataset.
In addition, in Figure 1 (top in the panel) we compare IRS prices of
the short maturity bucket in the cleared case (sub-market n. 4) from the
GTRA database vs. data we obtain from Bloomberg corresponding to the
USD 2Y curve. Time series trends are very similar during the entire refe-
rence period with only few exceptions, most of which due to a sharper re-
ported price from our data provider. Similarly, the comparison between
the USD 5Y curve and the medium maturity bucket (sub-market n. 5)
that is shown at the bottom of the panel of Figure 1 confirms an overall
coherence among both sources. In this case we can observe some differ-
ences especially in the first period, although on average both sources of
data depict a similar picture. Those differences might be due to a group-
ing effect, since even if the medium bucket is mainly influenced by the
5Y tenor, the presence of other maturities in the bucket (e.g. 3Y, 4Y, 7Y)
may affect the aggregated level.
Finally, in Figure 2 we focus on the time series for the un-cleared case
with short maturity (sub-market n. 7). We can observe a quite erratic
dynamics. We recall that the “un-cleared” flag represents a signal for the
fact that the counterparty is more likely to be a corporate instead of an-
other financial institution. Therefore, different factors could determine
an apparently strange behaviour of price series:
10For references, see statistics in http://www.bis.org/statistics/dt07.pdf.
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Figure 1: Comparison between GTRA and Bloomberg Time Series. IRS
GTRA refers to the aggregated time series for deals belonging to sub-market
4 (top panel) and sub-market 5 (bottom panel). Bloomberg curves refer to
USD 2Y and USD 5Y, respectively. Prices are in percentage.
• an up-front is stated in the deal, i.e. one of the two counterparties
receives immediately a cash amount. To balance it, the IRS fixed
leg might be shifted to offset the upfront;
• the IRS pay-off could be very customized, hence it requires a dif-
ferent fixed level;
• there is less liquidity in the IRS segment for the enterprises. Banks
may apply some relevant mark-up to off-set the counterparty risk;
• a combination of the above factors.
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Figure 2: GTRA Price Time Series for Sub-Market n. 7. Time series refers
to deals belonging to sub-market 7. Daily prices are computed according to
the weighted average of the prices of the contracts, where weights are based
on the notional traded amount of the deals. Prices are in percentage.
2.3 Distress indicator
Given a certain set of sub-markets representative for the global OTC
market of swap instruments, we propose a way to measure their mar-
ket conditions and to identify whether pairs of sub-markets are recipro-
cally co-dependent. In particular, we are interested in sub-markets’ co-
movements that point to distressed scenarios. Therefore, we are willing
to introduce an indicator of distress which synthesizes several dimen-
sions of market conditions. Before exposing how this measure is defined,
it is worth stressing that we do not rely on traditional concepts of default
since markets cannot go bankrupt in a strict sense, although the absence
of transactions can be interpreted in a similar way.
In order to assess the level of financial distress within each sub-market,
we propose an indicator of distress able to capture several aspects related
to the financial stability. We assume that the main forces affecting the
level of distress of a sub-market are represented by i) the bid-ask spread
of the prices, ii) the volatility of the prices, iii) the number of deals and iv)
the volumes of the notional traded amount. These hypotheses reflect the
perception that a wider bid-ask spread stands for deteriorated liquidity
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conditions as well as a higher price volatility may suggest the presence of
a distressed scenario. Similarly, a lower number of deals (or modest aver-
age notional traded amounts) may be a signal of slowness in the process
of adjusting prices, which may impact on the capacity to close positions.
In addition, these forces may present interacting effects. However, in our
work we prefer to rely on a simple approach, thus focusing only on the
direct contributions of the four aforementioned measures. For point i),
since we cannot directly deal with bid-ask quotes and we are not aware
of the parts involved in the transactions, we rely on the ratio between the
maximum and the minimum of daily prices as an acceptable proxy for
the bid-ask spread within a certain sub-market. This choice is motivated
by the fact that a tight daily deviation between the maximum and the
minimum is likely to imply that traded deals have been priced within
a close interval. Although our choice represents a basic approximation
of the bid-ask spread, it is worth underlining that recent works on the
estimation of the bid-ask spread point also to high/low prices as a way
to measure bid and ask quotes in financial markets (Corwin and Schultz
2012; Deuskar et al. 2011). For point ii) we compute the dispersion in
terms of the standard deviation of daily prices, while for points iii) and
iv) we determine the daily number of deals (cardinality) and the daily
average of the traded notional amounts, respectively. Finally, in order
to get less noised estimates we aggregate these measures on a weekly
interval11.
To gauge the presence of distressed conditions, we recall that even
in the Basel Vasiceck-Gordy model, although single default probabilities
are present, the use of the 99.9% quantile for the capital charge is not re-
lated to a specific event, since it is just a very regulatory confidence level
for the estimation of the losses in the credit portfolio. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to avoid the selection of a given threshold above which we
state that a certain sub-market experiences distress. Indeed, we suggest
to analyse sub-markets’ reciprocal behaviours in the tail corresponding
11If missing values are present due to lack of data, we replace them by the cubic spline
interpolation of the available points. In order to limit potential biases due to outliers, for
each sub-market we cut off 0.025 of the area in each tail of the reference sample distribution.
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to detrimental conditions. Obviously, a threshold level could be set up in
some further research to design for instance a proper backtesting proce-
dure for the model. Finally, we recall that the IRS price level represents
an average of the forward (expected) interest rates over the IRS matu-
rity. Hence, any turmoil in the IRS price and/or observed volumes could
jointly reflect market, counterparty and liquidity aspects.
In Tables from 3 to 6 we provide a summary description of the single
components involved in the definition of the distress indicator. In par-
ticular, for each sub-market we show the average (quarterly or monthly)
of daily prices observations for respectively: the logarithm of the ratio
between the maximum and the minimum, the dispersion, the number of
deals and the average notional traded amount. These statistics allow us
to depict how sub-markets have evolved over time, thus suggesting the
emergence of some common pattern that might have affected the overall
behaviour as well as the presence of specific features that characterize
certain sub-markets.
Descriptive statistics provide some insights on sub-markets’ behavi-
ours during the sample period. As regarding the (ln) max/min devia-
tions, for some sub-markets (1, 2, 3, 4) the first part of 2014 coincides
with lower mean values, while in the recent period they reach wider de-
viations. Conversely, other sub-markets (5, 6, 8, 9) show flattening or
even declining trends during the reference period. These patterns are
on average confirmed when we consider the estimates for dispersions.
In addition, one might be interested in disentangle whether sub-markets
with common contractual terms share similar trends. For instance, the
absence of clearing agreements (sub-markets 7, 8, 9) seems to slightly
affect the overall picture, since pairs of sub-markets (e.g. 5-8 and 6-9),
which have the same maturity and the same swap frequencies legs but
present different clearing agreements, exhibit close estimates. Further-
more, as we expect for sub-markets with high volumes of transactions,
those with cleared conditions (from 4 to 6) show a smaller price disper-
sion than the respective un-cleared sub-markets (from 7 to 9). Finally,
even for sub-markets with different swap leg frequencies but with the
same maturity, we can observe that the price dispersion are quite close
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in some cases, e.g. sub-market 2 and the parallel sub-market 5 in the
second part of the sample period. Moreover, it may be the case that a
sub-market has a high max-min deviation but low dispersion (e.g. sub-
market 4).
Table 3: Deviation between Maximum and Minimum. The value in a cer-
tain cell stands for the natural logarithm of the ratio between the maximum
and the minimum of deals’ prices for the corresponding sub-market and
period. Values are averaged among daily observations, separately for each
sub-market. Column names refer to the period (monthly or quarterly) con-
sidered to calculate mean values.
Sub-mkt SEP 2013 IV Q 2013 I Q 2014 II Q 2014 III Q 2014 IV Q 2014 I Q 2015 APR 2015
1 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.37 0.37 0.49 0.37
2 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.58 0.71 0.65 0.54 0.55
3 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.27
4 0.55 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.75 0.86 0.81 0.64
5 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.00 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.76
6 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.42 0.36
7 0.54 0.51 0.80 0.57 0.72 0.66 0.79 0.30
8 1.10 0.98 1.09 0.99 0.83 0.79 0.68 0.62
9 0.53 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.40
Table 4: Price Dispersion. The value in a certain cell stands for the stan-
dard deviation of the prices for the contracts belonging to the correspond-
ing sub-market and period. Values are averaged among daily observations,
separately for each sub-market. Column names refer to the period (monthly
or quarterly) considered to calculate mean values.
Sub-mkt SEP 2013 IV Q 2013 I Q 2014 II Q 2014 III Q 2014 IV Q 2014 I Q 2015 APR 2015
1 0.34 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.12
2 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.21 0.21
3 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.20
4 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08
5 0.43 0.40 0.46 0.43 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.24
6 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.19
7 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.10
8 0.53 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.28
9 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.34
The last two measures point out a picture characterised by increas-
ing trends in both the number of deals and the average notional traded
amounts, although estimates for the last period seem to indicate a re-
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Table 5: Number of Traded Deals. The value in a certain cell stands for the
number of deals corresponding to that sub-market and period. Values are
averaged among daily observations, separately for each sub-market. Col-
umn names refer to the period (monthly or quarterly) considered to calcu-
late mean values.
Sub-mkt SEP 2013 IV Q 2013 I Q 2014 II Q 2014 III Q 2014 IV Q 2014 I Q 2015 APR 2015
1 2.29 1.73 1.48 4.20 5.74 7.45 5.13 4.35
2 3.09 3.02 2.66 24.23 51.01 46.22 35.94 31.58
3 1.80 1.96 2.64 25.29 46.41 47.21 46.97 37.61
4 24.71 28.55 39.15 33.18 40.83 57.19 50.27 48.36
5 183.16 252.00 292.24 257.18 294.99 332.27 309.83 244.12
6 195.48 241.54 228.13 223.52 272.65 311.14 320.49 251.65
7 6.41 5.25 6.34 5.17 7.24 9.59 8.47 4.48
8 25.41 21.04 25.61 24.43 33.17 40.68 22.50 16.50
9 30.15 25.04 21.62 18.39 35.75 44.10 21.27 13.60
Table 6: Notional Traded Amounts. The value in a certain cell stands for the
average notional traded amount (in million of US Dollar) corresponding to
that sub-market and period. Values are averaged among daily observations,
separately for each sub-market. Column names refer to the period (monthly
or quarterly) considered to calculate mean values.
Sub-mkt SEP 2013 IV Q 2013 I Q 2014 II Q 2014 III Q 2014 IV Q 2014 I Q 2015 APR 2015
1 20.00 65.10 62.70 129.40 164.19 167.57 175.55 169.81
2 30.38 32.43 43.83 76.00 98.28 102.73 98.68 104.40
3 30.88 31.95 39.39 37.31 41.92 46.80 44.95 40.85
4 153.77 166.49 152.82 157.93 144.77 161.41 186.18 178.76
5 77.18 95.51 94.38 93.21 91.00 93.86 89.74 87.40
6 43.00 49.11 46.08 45.13 43.53 45.36 42.82 42.54
7 84.48 142.72 138.34 148.59 136.43 129.29 153.99 205.69
8 55.93 67.25 83.19 78.58 72.23 81.10 83.98 98.13
9 36.21 40.05 50.21 42.99 38.39 41.08 43.28 46.95
newed decrease in the number of transactions. In some cases (e.g. sub-
markets 5-6) although the average cardinalities are similar, the average
notional traded amounts are quite different. Sub-markets’ heterogeneous
dynamics across different dimensions suggest to consider a comprehen-
sive set of measures instead of a single one to disentangle and character-
ize the level of distress present in a certain sub-market. Therefore, the
overall picture provided by these figures indicate that a reasonable indi-
cator of sub-market’s conditions should rely on a combination of these
measures.
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For these reasons, we propose the following indicator of distress:
Ii,t = ln
(
maxi,t
mini,t
)
× σi,t
(Avgvolumei,t ×Numi,t) (2.1)
where i and t are the indexes for the sub-markets and the weekly
observations, respectively. Symbols max and min denote the maximum
and the minimum of the weekly prices for each sub-market i at time t,
respectively. Quantity ln
(
maxi,t
mini,t
)
is lower-bounded and increases when
the deviation between the max and the min becomes larger. The symbol σ
stands for the standard deviation of the prices: its impact on the indicator
of distress is positive, as greater volatility might be associated with dis-
tressed market conditions. Conversely, Num (i.e. the number of deals)
has a negative effect since it is assumed that more traded deals imply that
it is easier to find a counterparty, thus limiting liquidity risk. Lastly, the
use of mean volumes (Avgvolume) indicates the average notional traded
value of the deals and it is introduced for liquidity purposes. Therefore,
we decide to consider explicitly each driver (i.e. the deviation max/min,
the dispersion, the cardinality and the average traded amount) in the for-
mula for the sake of clarity, although we are aware that there are some re-
dundant issues related to the use of Num in the estimates of both disper-
sion and average volumes. Although market and liquidity risk drivers
play an important role in the assessment of sub-market conditions, we
prefer to provide a combined indicator of distress that aggregates a more
comprehensive mix of effects. In addition, the choice to rely on these
building block components reflects the idea that the deviation between
the max and the min is a rough measure of liquidity conditions since it
simply represents a couple of extreme points while ignores the stream
of prices in the middle. Therefore, we decide to correct this estimate by
introducing the price dispersion to mimic the effective distribution of the
prices. Then, we further adjust this indicator by adding other two com-
ponents in order to take into account the presence/lack of a sufficient
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number of deals (and/or average notional traded amount) and differ-
entiate (ceteris paribus ln
(
max
min
)
and σ) between cases where the market
is characterized by few deals (and/or with low average notional traded
amount) and cases where we observe more deals and/or higher average
notional traded amount12.
We believe that is reasonable to rely on this simple indicator that cap-
tures in a qualitative way (increasing or decreasing indications) the im-
pacts of the different distress factors, thus focusing on the discussion of
the preliminary empirical results. Below, we show in Table 7 the aver-
age (monthly or quarterly) of the weekly observations of the indicator
of distress as defined above to present how sub-markets’ distresses have
evolved over time. These estimates reflect the joint contributions of the
single measures introduced above. In order to assess the level of distress
within a sub-market one should in principle observe the magnitude of
this measure, since by construction higher values correspond to deterio-
rated market conditions under our assumptions.
Table 7: Indicator of Distress. The value in a certain cell stands for the
indicator of distress (values multiplied by 109) corresponding to that sub-
market and period. Values are averaged among weekly observations, sepa-
rately for each sub-market. Column names refer to the period (monthly or
quarterly) considered to calculate mean values.
Sub-mkt SEP 2013 IV Q 2013 I Q 2014 II Q 2014 III Q 2014 IV Q 2014 I Q 2015 APR 2015
1 12.21 1.63 0.44 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.10
2 9.61 1.97 1.88 0.28 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.04
3 0.09 0.32 0.05 0.28 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04
4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
5 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
6 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
7 0.29 0.51 0.42 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.30 0.05
8 0.46 0.62 0.32 0.34 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15
9 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.28
12In addition, one could argue that formula (1) can be improved by generalizing it with
some parameters to be calibrated in some optimal way, such as:
Ii,t (α, β, γ, δ) = ln
(
maxi,t
mini,t
)α
×
σβi,
(Avgvolumeγi,t ×Numδi,t)
. (2.2)
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With regard to Table 7, we observe some stylized relevant facts13. The
distress indicator by its construction does not have a practical or physical
meaning although it allows some qualitative insights by looking at the
ranking between the different markets. Hence it is worth noting that sub-
markets from 4 to 6 (which involve bank-to-bank most liquid sub-markets)
show a very low distress level. If we analyse the other sub-markets (from
7 to 9) with the same swap leg frequencies, it seems that the un-cleared
ones (usually deals between bank-to-enterprise) exhibit more risky figures
(this is mainly due to the lack of liquidity and/or large max-min range).
Basically, this indicator allows us to capture in a formal and intuitive
way the causal forces that could move the sub-markets towards a dis-
tressed state. To switch from an useful but still descriptive representation
into the investigation of how sub-markets are reciprocal influenced, we
analyse how pairs of sub-markets are jointly dependent, i.e. how sub-
markets’ distresses co-move. Therefore, we attempt to study the depen-
dence structure of the co-movements by computing, for each sub-market,
the following increments of the indicator of distress:
Xi,t+1 =
Ii,t+1 − Ii,t
Ii,t
(2.3)
for i = 1, ..., S and t = 0, ..., T − 1. Hence, a sub-market that exhibits
positive increments implies that it experiences deteriorated conditions
which became more serious if these variations become larger. For these
reasons, our analysis is focused more on the right tail of the distributions
of the increments, which corresponds to distressed market conditions.
13Estimates for September 2013 might even reflect the backload process of the deals. For
instance, in EU the EMIR regulation was practically applied from February, 2014. At that
time also the deals already alive were uploaded by a massive backload process. Hence we
can doubt about the quality of the oldest data. In fact from the effective trade repository
feed running process the distress indicators become lower and more stable. As a further
remark, let us note that the VIX popular index, i.e. the volatility index of the S&P index
level, did not reach at the end of 2014 any abnormal levels. In September 2013 the average
level was 14.65%, just 50 bps higher than the average level of 2014, 14.14%.
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2.4 Methodology
“Distress” is an extreme event, which can be seen as an upper tail event
related to the process that describes the movement of the sub-market’s
status. In particular, we aim at providing, for each pair of sub-markets, a
Joint Probability of Distress (JPoD)14, that is the joint probability that both
sub-markets simultaneously exhibit increments of the distress indicator
above a certain threshold. This approach is similar to the one in Sego-
viano and Goodhart (2009), where the indicators known as Banking Sta-
bility Measures are presented. In fact, our sub-markets concept replaces
their portfolio of financial institutions and, similarly to their study, we
provide a distress interdependence structure which is able to capture not
only linear correlations but also nonlinear distress dependencies among
the players in the system.
To compute the joint probabilities of distress, we split the analysis
into three parts. Firstly, once sub-markets have been set up, we study the
form of association between each pair of sub-markets and how strong
this relationship is. We exploit the family of Archimedean bivariate cop-
ulas (more precisely: Clayton, Frank and Gumbel copulas). The general
theory of copulas15 states that a joint distribution of some random vari-
ables can be decomposed into a function (called copula), that describes
the interdependence structure among the considered variables, and their
marginal distributions. The reason to narrow the choice of copula func-
tions among Archimedean ones lies in the fact that we want the possi-
ble dependencies to be comparable. The Archimedean family provides,
through a unique parameter (i.e. θ), a proxy for the dependence degree
between the two sub-markets. Secondly, after having identified the de-
pendence structures for each pair of sub-markets, we produce a ranking
based on the Kendall’s tau correlation coefficients. Finally, we compute
joint probabilities of distress at different marginal threshold levels.
14The meaning of joint distress of couples of sub-markets, as well as the related terminol-
ogy, are referred to concepts introduced in this paragraph and in Section 2.3. Hereinafter,
any reference to existing expressions has to be considered contextualized to our work.
15As a reference to the copula theory, we rely on the well-known results provided in Sklar
(1959), Nelsen (2006) and Trivedi and Zimmer (2007).
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Note that in this work we exploit bivariate copulas to study depen-
dencies among pairs of sub-markets. This choice is due to the small num-
ber of available sub-markets. Obviously, generalizations to multidimen-
sional structures are possible and in Appendix A.2 we briefly discuss the
case with copula dimension equal to 3.
In the following three subsections, we illustrate the technical details
of the three steps of our study: the identification of the copula function
for each possible pair of sub-markets, the global ranking classification
based on Kendall’s tau, and the computation of the JPoD for pairs of sub-
markets (see Appendix A.1 for details). According to the latter probabi-
lities, a final ranking classification of pairs of sub-markets is provided
too.
2.4.1 The Preliminary Copula-based Procedure
Given S sub-markets and, for each sub-market, T time-observations of
the random variable of interest X (described above by formula (2.3)),
we can represent data by means of a real-valued matrix X of dimension
S × T ,
X =

x11 · · · x1t · · · x1T
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
xi1 · · · xit · · · xiT
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
xS1 · · · xSt · · · xST
 =

x1·
...
xi·
...
xS·

where xit represents the value of the observation t for the sub-market
i and xi· is the row-vector that contains all the values related to sub-
market i.
The preliminary procedure we propose takes as input this matrix and
returns for each pair of sub-markets the most appropriate Archimedean
copula and the corresponding parameter θ:
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1. The procedure derives the marginal distribution for each sub-market
i by finding the empirical cumulative distribution function F̂i based
on the corresponding T -dimensional row xi·. For each sub-market
i, we are assuming the values xi1, . . . , xiT as i.i.d. realizations drawn
from the same univariate distribution.
2. Given a pair of different sub-markets, say (i, j), for each copula
type (Cl =Clayton, Fr =Frank,Gu =Gumbel), the procedure com-
putes the maximum value of the copula loglikelihood and the cor-
responding estimated value of the dependence parameter. For-
mally, it maximizes the function defined as θ 7→ `(i,j),type(θ) =∑T
t=1 ln ctype
(
F̂i(xit), F̂j(xjt); θ
)
+
∑T
t=1 (ln fi(xit) + ln fj(xjt)) ,
(note that the second term does not depend on θ, nor on type)
where ctype(u1, u2; θ) denotes the parametric expression of the den-
sity for the chosen copula (type ∈ {Cl, Fr,Gu}), and it records the
values `∗(i,j),type and θ
∗
(i,j),type such that
`∗(i,j),type = `(i,j),type(θ
∗
(i,j),type) = max
θ∈Θ
`(i,j),type(θ) .
Note that we are considering pairs {(xit, xjt) : t = 1, . . . , T} as T
i.i.d. realizations drawn from the same bidimensional distribution.
3. For each possible pair (i, j) of different sub-markets, the procedure
finds `∗(i,j), θ
∗
(i,j), and type
∗
(i,j) such that
`∗(i,j) = max
type∈{Cl,Gu,Fr}
`∗(i,j),type (2.4)
and θ∗(i,j) and type
∗
(i,j) are the corresponding estimated parameter
and the corresponding selected copula-type, respectively.
The maximization (2.4) corresponds to select the copula that pro-
vides the best fit according to both AIC and SIC criteria16. Indeed,
we have the best fit at the lowest value of the quantity
16For further references see Mahfoud (2012).
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AIC = −2× (loglikelihood) + 2× (n. parameters)
= −2× (loglikelihood) + 2
SIC = −2× (loglikelihood) + ln(n. observations)× (n. parameters)
= −2× (loglikelihood) + ln(T ),
respectively, and so at the highest value of the loglikelihood.
2.4.2 The Correlation Ranking
For each possible pair (i, j) of different sub-markets, the first step of
the procedure selects the copula function, i.e. the type of the copula
(type∗(i,j)) and the respective parameter (θ
∗
(i,j)). The goal of the second
step is to produce a classification of the most dependent pairs of sub-
markets. One possible choice to measure the strength of the depen-
dence between two sub-markets relies on their parameter θ∗(i,j); for the
Archimedean family of copulas, indeed, it gives a measure of depen-
dence between (i, j). However, the theta parameter is related to the
functional form of the copula and so values of the theta parameter for
different copula functions are not directly comparable. Therefore, in or-
der to circumscribe this issue, we use the value of Kendall’s tau16 for
each pair as the criterion for the ranking. Denoting by τ∗(i,j) the value of
the Kendall’s tau coefficient as a function of θ∗(i,j) (see Appendix A.1.2),
our procedure considers each possible pair of different sub-markets and
splits the final ranking of the pairs of sub-markets into two groups: the
pairs with positive Kendall’s tau dependence coefficient (i.e. τ∗(i,j) ≥ 0)
and the ones with negative dependence coefficient (i.e. τ∗(i,j) < 0). Fi-
nally, it returns: a decreasing ranking of the pairs of sub-markets based
on τ∗(i,j) for the first group, and, for the second group, an increasing rank-
ing of the pairs based on the (negative) value of τ∗(i,j). (Note that negative
dependence parameter is possible only for type ∈ {Cl, Fr}.)
Together with the two classes of rankings (positive and negative), the
procedure returns for each pair (i, j):
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• type∗(i,j) (based on the following code: 1 = Fr, 2 = Gu, 3 = Cl);
• the value of the difference diff theta(i,j) = (θ∗(i,j)−θtype∗(i,j),ind) where
θtype∗
(i,j)
,ind is the value for the chosen copula type∗(i,j) correspond-
ing to the independence case17,
• the estimated value for the Kendall’s tau τ∗(i,j) as a function of the
theta parameter for the selected copula;
• the empirical value e τ∗(i,j) of the Kendall’s tau.
2.4.3 Joint Probability of Distress (JPoD)
Once checked the appropriateness of the selected copula model, the ana-
lysis is carried out on computing, for each pair of sub-markets, the joint
probability that both of them simultaneously exhibit increments of the
distress indicator above some given threshold, i.e. the joint probability
of distress. We calculate this probability at different marginal threshold
levels. In our context, we prefer to avoid the selection of a specific “dis-
tress threshold” and we decide to analyse sub-markets’ joint behaviours
in the right tail at different marginal levels. More precisely, if we denote
by Xi and Xj the increments of the distress indicator (defined in Section
2.3) for sub-markets i and j respectively, then, for each pair (x, y) of real
numbers, we have:
P (Xi > x,Xj > y) = 1− P (Xi ≤ x orXj ≤ y)
= 1− Fi(x)− Fj(y) + P (Xi ≤ x,Xj ≤ y)
= 1− Fi(x)− Fj(y) + F (x, y)
= 1− Fi(x)− Fj(y) + C(Fi(x), Fj(y)),
17The parameters which correspond to the independence case are: 0 (asymptotic value)
for the Frank and the Clayton copulas, 1 for the Gumbel copula.
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where Fi and Fj are the marginal cumulative distribution functions,
F is the joint cumulative distribution function of the pair (i, j) and the
last equality is due the Sklar’s Theorem (see Appendix A.1). Conse-
quently, we define our Joint Probability of Distress (JPoD) as:
JPoD(i,j) = 1− ui − uj + Ctype∗(i,j)(ui, uj ; θ∗(i,j))
where ui, uj ∈ [0, 1] are the levels for the marginal cumulative distri-
bution functions Fi, Fj , typically chosen equal to 90%, 95% and 99%.
2.5 Results
In the next Tables, sub-markets are referred to the previous classification
(see Table 1). Copula types are expressed as: 1 (Frank), 2 (Gumbel), and 3
(Clayton). In addition, “diff theta” refers to the theta parameter returned
once a copula type is chosen minus the value of the theta parameter for
the independence case for this type of copula. Moreover, the “e” be-
fore the parameter refers to the empirical estimates (when no type of co-
pula is imposed but estimates are computed on raw data). Our perimeter
is composed by 25 pairs of sub-markets which show positive estimated
Kendall’s tau correlations and 11 sub-markets with negative values. For
the sake of clarity, we consider only about the first half of the rankings,
i.e. the first 10 and 5 pairs for positive and negative Kendall’s tau, respec-
tively. Therefore, we focus on those pairs of sub-markets which show
estimates more distant from the independent case.
Positive Kendall’s tau estimates show a very interesting behaviour if
we focus on the pairs of sub-markets in the first positions of the rank-
ing. In particular, we can rewrite the 9 sub-markets by an integer triple
Mj , j = 1...9 as follows:
Mj = (fj , tj , cj) (2.5)
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where:
• f = frequency, 0 = 3m-3m, 1 = 6m-3m
• t = tenor range, 0 = short, 1 = medium, 2 = long
• c = clearing, 0 = cleared, 1 = un-cleared.
Hence, sub-markets span a very simple discrete space where we could
define between each pair a Manhattan-like distance, such as:
d(Mi,Mj) ≡ |fj − fi|+ |tj − ti|+ |cj − ci| . (2.6)
Given this simple framework we can study more in depth the posi-
tive estimates of Kendall’s tau values. In particular, we can observe that
all the first four (with respect to the Kendall’s tau metrics) pairs have
the minimum distance between their components, i.e. d(Mi,Mj) = 1.
This an appealing empirical fact, since despite several issues related to
the difficulty to identify sub-markets, such as the pioneering work on
TRs data and the new distress indicator definition, these preliminary out-
comes are near to the practical intuition. In addition, as shown by Table
9 even negative estimates can occur. This is the case of pairs of sub-
markets with quite different maturities and clearing conditions. Hence,
sub-markets with different features are more prone to show opposite co-
movements, while as expected similarities in financial contractual terms
are more likely to determine positive and high co-movements.
Finally, as shown in Tables 8 and 9 for both positive and negative
Kendall’s tau rankings, we observe that there is a very high correlation
among the empirical Kendall’s tau (e τ∗(i,j)), which is calculated on the
two vectors not processed through the copula procedure we decided to
apply, and the Kendall’s tau (τ∗(i,j)), which we obtain according to the
type of copula chosen for the pair of sub-markets (i, j) and its estimated
parameter θ∗(i,j). In particular, this correlation is equal to 0.991 for the
positive ranking table and to 0.955 for the negative one. This suggests
that the copula selection procedure provides a good fit.
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Table 8: Distress Indicator: Positive Kendall’s Tau. Ranking of reciprocal
co-movements. Ranking is shown in a descending ordering based on posi-
tive Kendall’s tau. Columns I Sub-mkt and II Sub-mkt stand for the pair of
sub-markets selected by our procedure. Column Copula refers to the cho-
sen copula type (1 (Frank), 2 (Gumbel), and 3 (Clayton)). Column diff theta
stands for the theta parameter returned once a copula type is chosen mi-
nus the value of the theta parameter for the independence case. Finally, the
empirical Kendall’s tau is shown in the last column.
Ranking I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt Copula diff theta Kendall’s tau e Kendall’s tau
1 5 6 2 0.48 0.32 0.32
2 5 8 3 0.65 0.24 0.24
3 2 3 3 0.48 0.19 0.20
4 4 5 3 0.45 0.18 0.16
5 1 6 3 0.36 0.15 0.14
6 8 9 1 1.09 0.12 0.12
7 2 7 3 0.25 0.11 0.09
8 1 8 2 0.12 0.11 0.11
9 4 8 1 0.99 0.11 0.11
10 1 5 3 0.23 0.10 0.08
Table 9: Distress Indicator: Negative Kendall’s Tau. Ranking of reciprocal
co-movements. Ranking is shown in a ascending ordering based on nega-
tive Kendall’s tau. Columns I Sub-mkt and II Sub-mkt stand for the pair of
sub-markets selected by our procedure. Column Copula refers to the cho-
sen copula type (1 (Frank), 2 (Gumbel), and 3 (Clayton)). Column diff theta
stands for the theta parameter returned once a copula type is chosen mi-
nus the value of the theta parameter for the independence case. Finally, the
empirical Kendall’s tau is shown in the last column.
Ranking I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt Copula diff theta Kendall’s tau e Kendall’s tau
1 5 7 1 -2.23 -0.24 -0.23
2 3 8 3 -0.33 -0.20 -0.24
3 1 3 1 -1.52 -0.16 -0.17
4 7 8 3 -0.22 -0.12 -0.06
5 6 7 1 -0.98 -0.11 -0.10
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Moreover, in the last three columns of Table 10 we report the JPoD
at marginal levels for Fi and Fj both equal to 90%, 95% and 99%, re-
spectively. In particular, since we attempt to study the joint probability
of distress, we focus on those pairs of sub-markets which exhibit po-
sitive Kendall’s tau values (see Tables 8). In addition, the selection of
these thresholds is intended to provide some insights of these relation-
ships at the tail of the distribution corresponding to deteriorated market
conditions. Preliminary results suggest that for the first two pairs the
JPoD assumes quite relevant values, while for the other positions esti-
mates are almost comparable. For instance, the first pair of sub-markets
in the ranking position is (i, j) = (5, 6), meaning that this pair of sub-
markets has the most correlated increases in terms of percentage of the
distress indicators (Ii, Ij) at 90%, 95%, 99% levels for the marginal cumu-
lative distribution functions. These sub-markets shares the same swap
legs (6m3m), the same cleared conditions (cleared contracts in both sub-
markets), but have different maturities (Medium vs Long). In addition,
they represent the two most active segments in the IRS market, as re-
ported in Table 2. Therefore, it seems that the two most important sub-
markets in terms of number of deals and traded notional amounts are
also highly co-dependent. At first glance, if we look at the following
positions we can observe slightly different rankings compared to those
shown in Tables 8. However, it is worth highlighting that JPoD and
Kendall’s tau rankings are coherent once we focus on a certain type of
copula, i.e. given the same copula we observe that the ordering for
pairs of sub-markets is the same for both types of rankings. Finally,
we briefly analyse the second position in Table 10, that is (1, 8). This
pair of sub-markets has different swap legs (3m3m vs 6m3m), differ-
ent cleared conditions (cleared vs un-cleared), and different maturities
(Short vs Medium). Still, they share a high probability of joint distress,
thus supporting the need of further investigation on the features that can
impact on the reciprocal influence between sub-markets apparently very
distant. Hence, similarities between financial and contractual terms seem
to be responsible for stronger co-dependences in many cases, although
the emergence of high values for JPoD in correspondence of quite dif-
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ferent sub-markets (pair 1,8) suggests the presence of other reasons than
contractual terms. In particular, this underlines the need to identify the
key players operating in these OTC IRS markets, since their roles may
influence co-movements between apparently different sub-markets.
Table 10: JPoD at Different Marginal Threshold Levels. Ranking based
on JPoD estimates for different levels of thresholds. Ranking is shown in
a descending ordering based on JPoDs. Columns I Sub-mkt and II Sub-mkt
refer to the pairs of sub-markets selected by our procedure. Column Copula
stands for the chosen type of copula (1 (Frank), 2 (Gumbel), and 3 (Clayton)).
Column Tau Ranking refers to the ranking based on the procedure exploited
to select the type of copula for each pair of sub-markets. Finally, the last
three columns refer to the JPoD associated to different levels of the threshold
(90%, 95% and 99%).
JPoD Tau I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt Copula JPoD JPoD JPoD
Ranking Ranking 90% 95% 99%
1 1 5 6 2 4.4963% 2.1259% 0.4059%
2 8 1 8 2 2.2563% 0.9288% 0.1540%
3 2 5 8 3 1.5457% 0.3985% 0.0164%
4 6 8 9 1 1.4875% 0.3901% 0.0163%
5 9 4 8 1 1.4381% 0.3755% 0.0156%
6 3 2 3 3 1.4142% 0.3619% 0.0148%
7 4 4 5 3 1.3843% 0.3537% 0.0144%
8 5 1 6 3 1.3089% 0.3330% 0.0135%
9 7 2 7 3 1.2176% 0.3082% 0.0124%
10 10 1 5 3 1.2032% 0.3043% 0.0123%
2.6 Conclusions and Future Research
The financial crisis of the last decade motivated a growing literature on
how to model and to predict the financial distress. Some concepts such
as the systemic risk, the contagion effect and the cascade defaults received
an increasing attention. Nevertheless, a “new normal” for the risk ma-
nagement field has not yet been established. If we consider the financial
system as a whole, several challenging aspects have yet to be solved,
such as: the huge number of risk factors and financial products, their
dependence structures, the lack of complete and granular data about the
financial system, the quality of available data, the measures to be used to
capture and predict markets’ co-movements.
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To partially address these issues, we exploited and combined in an
innovative way some new ingredients, namely the OTC derivatives data
provided by trade repositories along with the JPoD approach recently in-
troduced by the International Monetary Fund. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first attempt that exploits micro-founded data from trade
repositories to study co-dependence phenomena between financial sub-
markets. In particular, we focused on the interest rate derivatives as
a significant fraction of the OTC market and we defined a distress in-
dicator by combining four different distress drivers, such as liquidity,
average traded volumes, volatility and bid-ask proxies. Hence, we at-
tempted to study by this framework the distress dependencies of some
OTC sub-markets that we built according to contractual and financial
features. By analysing both the descriptive results and the Joint Proba-
bilities of Distress, the proposed technique seems to be quite promising
for assessing markets’ co-movements in a financial stability perspective.
Despite its complex work flow, preliminary results are close to the prac-
tical intuition. Similarities between financial and contractual terms seem
to be responsible for stronger co-dependences, although high values for
JPoD even in correspondence of quite dissimilar sub-markets suggest
the presence of other drivers which need to be investigated in future
research (such as the role of key market players active across different
sub-markets that cannot be identified in our dataset).
We also remark the need for a sharp distress definition to calibrate a
more general distress indicator formula which can be applied for back-
testing procedures, i.e. to assess its prediction properties. Furthermore,
in the future other asset classes (equity, credit, forex, etc..) could be ex-
ploited to implement a financial “classical” top-down sub-markets seg-
mentation. Finally, some deeper knowledge about the TRs effective in-
ternal data quality is required.
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Appendix A
A.1 Copula Methodology
Copula functions provides a mathematical tool for the modelization of
the multivariate stochastic dependence structure. In particular, copu-
las take into account various kinds of stochastic dependence structures
among actors, without any assumption on the one-dimensional marginal
distributions. The concept of copula was introduced during the forties
and the fifties with Sklar (1959), but the evidence of a growing inter-
est in this kind of functions in statistics started only in the nineties (see
Hoeffding (1994) and Nelsen (2006)). Copulas are functions that join
or “couple” multivariate distribution functions to their one-dimensional
marginal distributions. The advantage of the copula functions and the
reason why they are used in the dependence modeling is related to the
Sklar’s theorem (see Sklar (1959)). It essentially states that every mul-
tivariate cumulative distribution function can be rewritten in terms of
the margins, i.e. the marginal cumulative distribution functions, and a
copula. More precisely, we have the following definition and results.
A d-dimensional copula C(u) = C(u1, ..., ud) is a function defined on
[0, 1]d with values in [0, 1], which satisfies the following three properties:
1. C(1, ...1, ui, 1, ..., 1) = ui for every i ∈ {1, ..., d} and ui ∈ [0, 1];
2. if ui = 0 for at least one i, then C(u1, . . . , ud) = 0;
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3. for every (a1, ..., ad), (b1, ....bd) ∈ [0, 1]d with ai ≤ bi for all i,
2∑
j1=1
...
2∑
jd=1
(−1)j1+...+jdC(u1,j1 , ..., ud,jd) ≥ 0
where, for each i, ui,1 = ai and ui,2 = bi.
Let F be a multivariate cumulative distribution function with mar-
gins F1, ..., Fd. Then there exists a copula C : [0, 1]d → [0, 1] such that, for
every x1, ..., xd ∈ R = [−∞,+∞], we have
F (x1, ..., xd) = C(F1(x1), ..., Fd(xd)). (A.1)
If the margins F1, . . . , Fd are all continuous, then C is unique; otherwise
C is uniquely determined on F1(R)× · · · × Fd(R).
Conversely, if C is a copula and F1, . . . , Fd are cumulative distribu-
tion functions, then F defined by (A.1) is a multivariate cumulative dis-
tribution function with margins F1, . . . , Fd.
In the case when f and f1, . . . , fd are the marginal probability density
functions associated to F and F1, . . . , Fd, respectively, the copula density
c satisfies
f(x1, . . . , xd) = c
(
F1(x1), . . . , Fd(xd)
) d∏
i=1
fi(xi).
There are different families of copula functions that capture different
aspects of the dependence structure: positive and negative dependence,
symmetry, heaviness of tail dependence and so on. In our work, we limit
ourselves to the principal copula functions of the Archimedean family
(namely, Gumbel, Clayton and Frank copulas), which describe, through
a unique parameter θ, situations with different degrees of dependence.
For more details on copula theory, we refer to the various excellent
monographs existing in literature, such as Joe (1997), Nelsen (2006) and
Trivedi and Zimmer (2007).
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A.1.1 Archimedean family of copulas
Here we just recall, in the bivariate case, the principal copula functions
belonging to the Archimedean family that we employ in our analysis
(Huynh et al. 2014).
• Frank copula:
CFr(u1, u2; θ) = −1
θ
ln
(
1 +
(e−θu1 − 1)(e−θu2 − 1)
exp(−θ)− 1
)
,
θ ∈ Θ = (−∞,+∞) \ {0}.
The parameter θ tunes the degree of the dependence. The limiting
cases θ → θFr,ind = 0 correspond to independence.
• Gumbel copula:
CGu(u1, u2; θ) = exp
{
− [(− lnu1)θ + (− lnu2)θ] 1θ} ,
θ ∈ Θ = [1,+∞).
The parameter θ tunes the degree of the dependence. In particular,
the value θ = θGu,ind = 1 corresponds to independence (indeed,
we get CGu(u; 1) =
∏d
i=1 ui).
• Clayton copula:
CCl(u1, u2; θ) =
(
u−θ1 + u
−θ
2 − 1
)− 1θ ,
θ ∈ Θ = [−1,+∞) \ {0}.
The parameter θ controls the degree of the dependence. The limit-
ing case θ → θCl,ind = 0 corresponds to independence.
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A.1.2 Kendall’s tau
Consider two random variables X , Y with continuous marginals F1, F2
and joint cumulative distribution function F 1. The Kendall’s tau corre-
lation coefficient is defined as:
τ(X,Y ) = P {(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y2) > 0} − P {(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y2) < 0}
where (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) are two independent pairs of random
variables from the joint distribution F . It can be written in terms of the
copula function as follows:
τ(X,Y ) = 4
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
C(u1, u2) dC(u1, u2)− 1.
In particular, for the Archimedean copulas, the Kendall’s tau can be
expressed as a function of the dependence parameter θ:
τ(X,Y ) =

1 + 4θ−1[θ−1
∫ θ
0
t/(et − 1) dt− 1] Frank
1− θ−1 Gumbel
θ/(θ + 2) Clayton.
(A.2)
1For further details, see Trivedi and Zimmer (2007).
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A.2 Multivariate Example
In the paper we focused on copula dimension equal to 2. Obviously, gen-
eralizations to higher dimensions are feasible although it is worthwhile
to recall that in our case we are dealing with only 9 sub-markets. Below
we briefly report the trivariate case and we present similar estimates to
the ones shown in Table 8. The algorithm still gives the possibility to
choose among three different copulas (Frank, Gumbel and Clayton). We
estimated all possible triple results, namely 84 positions (84 are indeed
the combinations of 9 sub-market), although for the sake of conciseness
we report only the first ten positions. Both tables show the value of the
parameter estimated by our procedure minus the parameter for the inde-
pendence case (diff theta). In particular, Table 12 is ordered by decreasing
maximum likelihood, while Table 11 is obtained by ordering the triples
by decreasing diff theta.
Terns which appear in the first ten positions of both tables should
be pointed out in order to make a financial analysis of the sub-markets,
since those should represent the most trustful results being evidenced
from two different ordering criteria. We observe that the triples (4,5,8),
(5,6,8) and (1,5,6) appear in both Table 11 and 12. The first two pairs
share similar contractual terms, i.e. they refer to swaps frequency legs
equal to (6m3m) and present a short Manhattan-like distance (it is 4 in
both cases, computing by summing distances among each couple in the
tern). Conversely, tern (1,5,6) shows quite different features and presents
a higher distance (it is 6). Thus, even in the trivariate case dissimilarity
among contractual and financial terms can imply high co-movements.
Below we analyse the tables more in detail providing a comparison with
the sub-markets which appeared to be co-dependent in the bivariate case
as shown in Table 8.
Ranking in Table 11 is based on diff theta. Estimates are coherent to
those exhibited in Table 8: in the first positions we observe combina-
tions of pairs (5,6), (5,8), (2,3) and (8,9), i.e. pairs of sub-markets that are
strongly co-dependent in the bivariate case are more likely to influence
co-movements also in the trivariate case. Hence, relevant relationships
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among sub-markets seem to emerge regardless the dimension of the co-
pula. In addition, we can also revise results analogies with the ones pro-
vided by Table 10, which gives the output of JPoD (not implemented in
the trivariate case): we find again that sub-markets (5,6), (5,8), (2,3) and
(8,9) characterize the top positions in the ranking. Finally, in Table 12
we show how sub-markets are ranked based on the maximization of the
log-likelihood. Even in this case (similarly as discussed above in Sec-
tion 2.5), results are coherent among Tables 11 and 12 once we consider
the estimates within the chosen type of copula. Overall, this is a fur-
ther evidence of the robustness of our procedure; however, increasing
too much the copula dimension may result meaningless when having
few sub-markets.
Table 11: Ranking based on Diff Theta (Top 10 Positions). Ranking of
co-movements when copula dimension is equal to 3. Ranking is shown in
a descending ordering based on positive diff theta. Columns I Sub-mkt, II
Sub-mkt and III Sub-mkt stand for the triple of sub-markets selected by our
procedure. Column Copula refers to the chosen copula type (1 (Frank), 2
(Gumbel), and 3 (Clayton)). Column diff theta stands for the theta parameter
returned once a copula type is chosen minus the value of the theta param-
eter for the independence case. Column Ranking ML refers to the ranking
based on maximization of loglikelihood. Finally, we report for each combi-
nation the respective max loglikelihood.
Ranking ML I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt III Sub-mkt Loglikelihood Copula diff theta
18 2 5 6 3.81 1 1.11
19 3 5 6 3.60 1 1.07
21 2 3 6 3.21 1 1.02
24 4 8 9 2.79 1 0.91
36 1 8 9 1.65 1 0.70
1 4 5 8 10.54 3 0.48
2 5 6 8 9.69 3 0.44
57 3 5 9 0.60 1 0.42
61 2 4 7 0.47 1 0.37
3 1 5 6 7.70 3 0.37
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Table 12: Ranking based on Max Log-Likelihood (Top 10 Positions).
Ranking of co-movements when copula dimension is equal to 3. Ranking
is shown in a descending ordering based on the maximized loglikelihood.
Columns I Sub-mkt, II Sub-mkt and III Sub-mkt stand for the triple of sub-
markets selected by our procedure. Column Copula refers to the chosen co-
pula type (1 (Frank), 2 (Gumbel), and 3 (Clayton)). Column diff theta stands
for the theta parameter returned once a copula type is chosen minus the
value of the theta parameter for the independence case.
Ranking I Sub-mkt II Sub-mkt III Sub-mkt Loglikelihood Copula diff theta
1 4 5 8 10.54 3 0.48
2 5 6 8 9.69 3 0.44
3 1 5 6 7.70 3 0.37
4 1 5 7 7.70 1 0.37
5 4 5 6 7.23 3 0.36
6 4 5 7 7.23 1 0.36
7 5 8 9 7.21 3 0.37
8 6 7 8 7.21 1 0.37
9 6 7 9 7.21 1 0.37
10 1 5 8 6.08 3 0.33
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Chapter 3
The Accounting Network:
how Financial Institutions
react to Systemic Crisis
3.1 Introduction
Network Theory has been used to establish how contagion, through a
variety of channels (mutual exposures, social networks of board mem-
bers, moral hazard from permissive regulations, financial instruments
like swaps and derivatives, etc.), triggered the outbreak of the 2007-08
crisis. Scholars suggest that financial systems may affect positively eco-
nomic development and its stability (Beck 2009; Beck 2011; Levine 2005),
although they may represent a source of distress which leads to bank
failures and currency crises, or greater contraction for those sectors that
depend more on external finance during banking crisis (Dell’Ariccia et
al. 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). As a response to the recent financial
turmoil, banking sector has been affected by a substantial reorganization
(BIS 2014). For instance, as highlighted by the European Central Bank
for the Euro area the main findings reflect the efforts by banks to rational-
ize banking businesses, pressure to cut costs, and the deleveraging process that
the banking sector has been undergoing since the start of the financial crisis
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in 2008 (ECB 2013). This implies that market pressure and regulatory
amendments induce banks to reduce their levels of debt, through cost
containment and stricter capital requirements. In addition, a gradual
improvement in banks’ capital positions aims to enhance the capacity
of the system to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic dis-
tresses. This limits the risk of spillover effects from the financial sector
to the real economy and put the financial system in a better condition
to reap the benefits of economic recovery. In particular, as the financial
boom turned to a bust, banks’ stability deteriorated abruptly and the
economy entered a balance sheet recession, which depressed spending le-
vels through a reduction in consumption by households and investments
by firms. Therefore, although at an uneven pace across regulations, the
need to strengthen fundamentals has influenced banking sector, and dif-
ferences in banks’ portfolio allocations, financial performances, and cap-
italizations can be interpreted as the combined results of policy decisions
and sectoral responses to changes in the regulatory framework (see e.g.
Allen, Gu, et al. (2012), Diamond and Rajan 2009).
This paper relates to the literature on banking development and per-
formance evaluation during the recent crisis (see e.g. Adrian and Shin
2008, Berger and Bouwman 2013 and Brunnermeier 2009). We consider a
dataset of almost one thousand worldwide banks retrieved from Bloom-
berg, focusing on financial statements spanning from 2001 to 2013. We
introduce a network based on similarities between banks’ financial state-
ment compositions (hereinafter Accounting Network). Due to data limi-
tations, the reference sample is restricted to banks for which a contin-
uum and stable set of variables is available for the entire period. The
introduction of a methodology (Quality Ratios) to measure banks’ data
coverage aims to prevent that missing values for some variables or lack
of annual financial statements for some banks affect the overall picture.
We then exploit the maximum amount of available information from fi-
nancial statements without further reducing the set of variables through
an arbitrary selection of financial statements fields. This choice aims to
avoid any selection bias. Moreover, total assets (as a proxy for size) for
each bank is applied to normalize banks’ financial statements measures
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to prevent the emergence of “size effects” as the sizes of institutions are
spanning for various orders of magnitude.
The introduction of Accounting Networks establishes a bridge between
the external perspective arising from market data and the internal one
based on banking activities indicators. We study how Accounting Net-
works can be exploited to provide a description of the banking system
during the crisis. This part sheds light on whether banks under differ-
ent regulatory frameworks and diversification degrees have reacted to
the crisis by strengthening their business peculiarities or by converging
towards similar practices (Beltratti and Stultz 2012, Demirgu¨c-Kunt and
Huizinga 2010). We rely on the assumption that market data alone, de-
spite highly representative of investors’ perception of the banking sec-
tor, might be dis-informative during periods of distressed market condi-
tions. This, in turn, stimulates a broader exploitation of the information
on banking activities, thus pointing to a more comprehensive investiga-
tion which takes into account also the internal perspective arising from
financial statements data. In addition, the use of accounting data allows
a partition of business activities where banks are involved in, provid-
ing therefore an approximation of the state of the system related to sev-
eral potential channels through which financial distress might propagate.
This is appealing also for regulators, since authorities are interested in a
wide set of economic indicators in order to prevent the systemic rele-
vance of financial institutions and they introduce specific requirements
and constraints which affect directly financial statements measures. For
these reasons, we believe that enriching the debate on financial stability
by means of the Accounting Networks might give new clues about the re-
silience of the banking system.
Another important result is the possibility of getting a neutral par-
tition of banks in “network communities” that result from the analysis
of the network through community detection algorithms like the Lou-
vain modularity maximization (Blondel et al. 2008). Results in Subsection
3.3.1 indicate that regional communities evolve in time and the crisis has
a clear role in weakening geographically determined structures. Further-
more, we focus on proxies for leverage, size and performance to verify if
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these variables have played a key role among the set of economic mea-
sures usually applied to classify banks (see e.g. Blundell-Wignall and
Roulet 2013, Huizinga and Laeven 2012). Hence, Subsection 3.3.2 aims to
answer the question whether the collapse of financial markets has weak-
ened these relationships, limiting therefore the power of traditional indi-
cators to identify groups of homogeneous banks. Correlation diagrams
applied to show how network variables are related to economic mea-
sures suggest a turning point in correspondence of the outbreak of the
crisis, which influenced the role of proxies for leverage, size or perfor-
mance to group similar banks. This preliminary results motivated Sub-
section 3.3.3, where by means of Principal Components Analysis we in-
vestigate which economic features are more likely to characterise com-
munities’ heterogeneity before, during and after the collapse of 2007-08.
The remaining part of the work discusses open issues and future lines
of research (Section 3.4), such as open questions on how to improve the
building of the Accounting Networks. In particular, the effectiveness of
this approach can be enhanced by means of a careful variables selection
based on the best financial practices applied in the evaluation of the fi-
nancial statements structures. In addition, a more accurate normaliza-
tion of the variables and caring about national regulations may increase
the usefulness of the methodology. Furthermore, matrix filtering tech-
niques and missing data reconstruction for financial statements informa-
tion can enhance the extraction of meaningful clusters. Then, more ad-
vanced and focused tools could be conceived to analyse banks evolution
towards similar business configurations or, alternatively, their divergent
patterns as a response to changing market conditions.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Dataset Preparation
The dataset we analysed covers the set of banks provided by Bloomberg
which were active (i.e. with traded instruments) at the end of the first
quarter of 2014. Although quarterly information is available, we prefer
to focus on annual balance sheets and income statements for accounting
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standard reasons, as countries have different obligations in terms of the
provision of quarterly financial statements and this can lead to a mis-
match and a poor variables coverage. Data are collected during the refe-
rence period from 2001 to end of 2013.
As regards financial statements data, we select a large set of variables
among those available in Bloomberg and related to the current regula-
tory framework (BCBS 2011a). We rely on the existing literature for the
selection process, providing a neutral approach which does not weight
differently the financial statements items. We focus the analysis on prox-
ies for banking business models (see e.g. Altunbas et al. 2011, Calomiris
and Nissim 2014). In particular, balance sheet data provide a year-by-
year picture of stock variables in terms of assets and liabilities for dif-
ferent instruments and maturities, while income statement data describe
annual economic performances by partitioning profits and losses accord-
ing to banking activities ranging for instance from interests to fees. Since
national regulations allow firms to fix a different end of fiscal year, we
extend the “end of year” definition and the relative financial statements
according to a window in the range between three months before and
after the end of the solar year. Solving overlapping issues in variables
definitions, as well as the base currency choice, constitute the first step in
the data pre-processing procedure. Firstly we discard total and sub-total
measures (as they are redundant measures), and secondly we choose US
dollars as currency base, thus facilitating banks comparisons (for the list
of variables see Appendix 14).
Working with financial statements data often leads to limitations in
data coverage and completeness. Therefore, the starting point of our
analysis is represented by the selection of a stable set of banks in terms
of data availability during the sample period. In particular, banks might
change the composition of their financial statements or they might be
excluded by the Bloomberg provider due to several reasons, such as for
instance a new regulation or a change in the bank’s economic activities.
This, in turn, might cause missing values for some variables or lack of fi-
nancial statements for several banks in certain years. In order to limit the
impact of these issues on our findings, we define a methodology to mea-
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sure the coverage of available variables for each bank in the reference
period. We refer to the Quality Ratios (QRs) as the proportion of available
and usable variables VOK over the maximum of all possible ones VALL
in the sample period: QR = VOK/VALL. The tuning of this indicator,
combined with two more filters on the frequency of financial reporting,
provides a stable set of banks identified by their QRs. The two addi-
tional criteria are: a minimum number of financial statements of ten out
of thirteen possible fiscal years and a maximum gap period between two
consecutive annual reports equal to seven hundred days. Once selected
those banks that report almost continuously their financial statements,
we study them according to their respective QR.
Figure 3: Quality Ratios Distribution. These pictures show the number
of nodes (on the left) and edges (on the right) along the sample period for
different QR values.
Individual QRs, as empirically computed on the entire perimeter, lie
in the range between 0.3 (low accuracy/coverage) and 0.8 (high accu-
racy/coverage). Interestingly, many measures calculated on the sets of
banks obtained by fixing the QR do not seem to be significantly affected
by its choice (except, as expected, for high QRs, where the size of the sam-
ple reduces significantly). With greater values of the QR parameter we
have less available banks to be considered, since only few of them have
a large set of variables present in many of their financial statements. As
estimates are stable in a reasonable QR range, in this work we decide to
use the set arising from the case of QR = 0.5 that, even if arbitrary, still
represents a good compromise between the accuracy of the estimate and
the size of the sample (see Figure 3).
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3.2.2 Accounting Networks
For every year a vector of financial statement variables is assigned to
each bank and used to compute the cosine similarities between pairs of
banks/nodes. Here the intuition is that the most similar banks (as from
their financial statements) must stay closer in the network and form a
cluster. Then, the measure “cosine similarity” is transformed into a met-
rics. The definition is the following: we compute the cosine of the angle
between each pair of vectors with the dot product and then we apply the
simple transformationwi,j = 1−
√
1− C2i,j , wherewi,j ∈ [0, 1] andCi,j is
the cosine similarity between i and j. In network terms wi,j is the weight.
This transformation (see Dongen and Enright 2012 for an introduction to
similarity measures and relative metrics) is used to move from the cosine
similarities defined in the space [-1, +1] to weights in the interval [0, +1].
Actually, in our networks cosine similarities range mainly between 0 and
+1, therefore with this transformation the more two nodes are similar the
larger is the weight, while a weight of 0 is assigned to dissimilar pair of
nodes having basically orthogonal financial statements’ vectors.
In addition, before the computation of the metrics, we need to take
care of banks’ size distribution, as it spans over several orders of magni-
tude. To avoid a bias toward large institutions, for each bank we divide
all variables in its vector by the respective total assets in such a way that
the attributes of the vector refer to economic and financial ratios. This op-
eration ensures that clusters will be formed by banks with similar busi-
ness activities regardless their size levels.
An important methodological choice of our study is the “neutral” ap-
proach used for the selection of the variables within the financial state-
ments. A part from removing related and redundant measures (total and
subtotal items), we used all the available information applying the same
weight to each variable in the vectors. This agnostic approach is in line
with the goal of the paper, i.e. introducing the concept of Accounting
Network, although we are aware that practitioners can give a different
importance to each variable of the financial statement to assess the true
business model. In our perspective we expect that the relevant informa-
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tion will emerge in a bottom up process, as a spontaneous feature selec-
tion carried by our methodology.
Finally, we introduce a confidence level (95%) during the link for-
mation. By using a Montecarlo sampling test, if the cosine similarity is
statistically significant with 95% of confidence we retain the link other-
wise we discard it. As a result of this filtering procedure, we observe that
networks tend to be very dense and almost complete. The most of the in-
formation is carried by the weights of the links and less by the simple
topology (degrees and other structural features).
3.2.3 Community Detection
A classical method to investigate the structure of a network is the search
of communities, i.e. regions of the network with larger internal links den-
sity. Intuitively, these regions are formed by clusters of nodes with higher
degrees or, for weighted networks, with larger strengths. Several meth-
ods have been proposed to find network communities without imposing
a priori the number of communities but letting them emerging from the
network itself. Among others we cite the optimization of the modularity
that is a measure of how much the link structure differs from the random
network where links are assigned with uniform probability and internal
communities are not present (a part from fluctuation). For weighted net-
works, the modularity is defined by the following formula:
Qw =
1
2W
·
∑
ij
(
wij − sisj
2W
)
δ(ci, cj) (3.1)
where si =
∑
j wij and sj =
∑
i wij are the strengths (sum of weights)
of the nodes i and j respectively, W is half the sum of the weights in the
network and the function δ(ci, cj) is equal to 1 if (i, j) belong to the same
community or 0 if they are members of different communities. The max-
imum modularity value is 1 (an ideal case for which the communities
are isolated) and can also take negative values. The 0 value coincides
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with a single partition that will correspond to the whole graph. A nega-
tive value means that there is no particular advantage in separating the
nodes in those particular clusters and so there is not community struc-
ture whatsoever.
To study the presence of communities it is often necessary to prune
the network cutting the links if their weight is below a certain threshold.
In our case we intend to consider only links formed by nodes having a
large similarity/weight w of their financial statement vectors. The prun-
ing procedure can be guided by the use of the tools related to the com-
munity detection methodology (Fortunato 2010). In particular, working
with the modularity optimization function (Newman and Girvan 2004),
with the Louvain technique (Blondel et al. 2008), it is possible to look at
the significance associated to the threshold (as in Traag et al. 2013), where
the modularity is introduced as a parameter to check for the best resolved
community structure. We use this parameter to help finding a reasonable
pruning threshold range of values for the networks. A rule of thumb in
this process is indeed avoiding network fragmentation, i.e. keeping the
graph connected while removing not significant links. We made exten-
sive tests computing quality/significance of the partitions using different
pruning thresholds (i.e. removing links having a low weight), determin-
ing a range of weights thresholds (0.35 < wi,j < 0.6) that helps to prune
the original networks to an optimal level (see Appendix B.1). In this in-
terval, communities are stable and the interpretation of each region can
be seen as a result of financial statement similarities across banks in dif-
ferent countries.
3.2.4 Network Measures vs. Economic Indicators
Comparisons among network measures and economic indicators are pro-
vided to describe the correlation between nodes’ network topology and
economic behavior. We study these features by means of extensive linear
correlation tests (Pearson correlation) for the overall set of banks for each
year and we verify the significance of the estimates by means of para-
metric tests. These estimates are based on the filtered networks, which
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are themselves based on the significance and the quality of the commu-
nity detection configuration. This analysis shows how nodes’ network
properties (e.g. Strength or Average Clustering Coefficient) are associated
to basic economic indicators (e.g. Return on Assets, Total Assets and Total
Debts to Total Assets), thus showing whether nodes’ topological proper-
ties are positively or negatively related to certain economic features and
how these relationships have weakened or reinforced during the crisis.
The average clustering coefficient is the mean of the measure of the
local tendency of the nodes to form small regions of fully connected
nodes. The in- (out-)strength of a node is the weighted sum of its in-
(out-)coming links. Return on assets (ROA) is the net income over total
assets and is a measure of bank performance. Total debts to total assets
is an indicator of the leverage of the bank and it is computed as the ratio
between total debts and its size (measured by total assets).
3.2.5 Principal Components Analysis
Once communities are identified, we attempt to describe which financial
statement variables are more likely to characterise these clusters. In or-
der to facilitate comparability, we focus on those indicators more popular
within the set of variables utilised to compute the cosine similarities (i.e.
those indicators appearing with higher frequencies in the entire dataset).
In fact the inclusion of very poorly represented measures across different
banks would have made the comparisons less effective with potential
biases related to e.g. different regulations frameworks or geographical
memberships. Hence, since we are interested in disentangling poten-
tial similarities/peculiarities across different communities, we prefer to
rely on common and well-diffused measures of banking activities among
those present in banks’ financial statements. In addition, we enrich this
set by means of indicators such as ratios (e.g. Return on cap and Total
debts to total assets) and aggregated measures (e.g. Total assets). Commu-
nity detection identifies four main clusters, whose constituents are more
numerous and stable in time. For the sake of conciseness, Subsection
3.3.3 will focus mainly on these communities. In particular, for each year
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we describe by means of Principal Components Analysis (PCA) which
economic features are more (less) able to contribute to the explained vari-
ability of communities’ members.
PCA is a multivariate technique that analyses observations described
by several inter-correlated variables. It extracts the important informa-
tion from the data and expresses it as a set of new orthogonal variables
(principal components). In our exercise, since measures present different
ranges of dispersion (e.g. by construction some ratios are bounded) we
rely on a scaled version of PCA; finally, we consider only principal com-
ponents with eigenvalues greater than 1 (in almost all cases they corre-
spond to the first 3 components). Then, we compute the proportion of
the variance of each original economic measure that can be explained by
the selected principal components. This, in turn, leads to a ranking of the
original economic measures in terms of their ability to describe a certain
community’s variability. In particular, since we are interested in how the
onset of financial crisis has affected the banking system, we split this ana-
lysis in three periods: from 2001 to 2006 (before the crisis), from 2007 to
2009 (the onset of the crisis), and from 2010 to 2013 (after the breakdown
of the markets). For each period we decided to characterise each com-
munity by the top and the bottom three measures, thus analysing how
these ranks have evolved over time and across communities.
3.3 Results
This Section shows how Accounting Networks represent a complementary
approach to traditional financial networks1 for the study of banking sys-
tem. While financial networks reflect the view from the market, related
to for instance the pairwise correlations of banks’ stock prices, Accounting
Networks capture the effects of business decisions on financial statements
measures and on business models of different institutions. An “ideal” in-
1There is a huge and growing literature on financial networks built on market data,
where links are computed for instance according to stock prices correlations. Payment
system represents another well-studied channel for contagion and cascade effects, while
the exploitation of derivatives (e.g. CDS) data is a cornerstone of many works on systemic
risk.
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vestigation of the financial system would involve also a detailed analysis
of the money flows among institutions, which determine the so called
“mutual exposures” (an important contagion channel). Unfortunately,
these high granular and detailed data are usually not available. How-
ever, financial statements provide an aggregated view of mutual expo-
sures and obligations for different maturities and types of financial in-
struments. This is an important point in favour of Accounting Networks
as they report summarised information for e.g. phenomena occurring
with different time scales and contractual terms, as opposite to financial
networks that rely only on homogeneous (daily or intraday) market data.
3.3.1 Community Detection Results
In this Subsection we focus our attention on the bottom up clusteriza-
tion of the network from the application of the community detection al-
gorithm and on the presence of geographical structures arising when we
label each bank with its country of origin. We describe whether banks be-
longing to different countries (as a proxy for different regulations and/or
level playing fields) have shown the tendency to be part of separate or,
alternatively, common clusters and we verify, by analysing communities’
evolution over time, whether the crisis influenced these configurations.
In particular, our community detection analysis on Accounting Networks
shows these main results (see Appendix B.3 for details on communities
membership).
It exhibits the presence over time of a clear community represent-
ing US banks and another one composed by Japanese banks, although
for both regions there is also an additional smaller second group quite
persistent in time. By contrast, it is not possible to identify a single
and an unambiguous European community, since institutions belong-
ing to European countries seem to be more likely to form national or
sub-regional communities or to be included in a vast and geographically
heterogeneous cluster (hereinafter the Mixed community). Asian banks
are fragmented in several sub-regions where, in particular, the Arab and
the Indian-Pakistan groups emerge. Therefore, the detection of commu-
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nities within Accounting Networks reveals the presence of two homoge-
neous clusters corresponding to US and Japanese banks surrounded by
a more diversified cloud of institutions belonging to different countries;
remarkably, European banks are not able to clusterise together in a sin-
gle and distinct community, while it persists over time a certain level of
separation based also on national borders. Hence, an interesting con-
tribution of the paper points to the presence of a large and geographi-
cally heterogeneous community, which can be related to the fact that the
globally established regulatory framework might have indeed acceler-
ated the tendency of banking activities of different countries to converge
into more uniform banking practices (see e.g. BCBS 2011a; BIS 2014; ECB
2013). This is shown for instance in Figure 4 where we also observe that
the outbreak of financial markets contributed to make the Mixed com-
munity more cohesive; furthermore, although still representing separate
communities, both US and JP clusters result topologically closer to the
Mixed community after the breakdown of 2007-08, thus supporting the
interpretation of a gradual convergence of different areas into more sim-
ilar banking behaviours. Moreover, the application of the community
detection on Accounting Networks allows to identify even small commu-
nities, such as those related to African or Scandinavian banks. This rep-
resents a quite promising aspect of the methodology, since it ensures the
detection of local reliable communities although the approach taken so
far is eminently agnostic.
It is not simple to explain the reasons behind the emergence and evo-
lution of these communities, however it is possible to advance some in-
tuitions based on the impact of globally recognized accounting standards
(for a time line see e.g. FASB 2016), the establishment of supranational
supervisory and regulatory authorities, and on the role of the harmoniza-
tion process of banking practices which have been implemented through,
for instance, the various Basel regulations (BCBS 2011a). These contribu-
tions point to a common level playing field, which might have facili-
tated the emergence of a large and geographically heterogeneous com-
munity and its increasing topological proximity to both US and JP clus-
ters. However, latter communities highlight the persistence of regional
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Figure 4: Community Detection Results. In the upper plots we show the
Community Structures which arise from the application of the Louvain algo-
rithm (see subsection 3.2.3). In the radar plots we exhibit the most important
financial statements components by the PCA analysis (see subsection 3.2.5).
We consider years 2004, 2008 and 2012 corresponding to the sub-periods
Pre-Crisis, Crisis and Post-Crisis. Both representations indicate an increas-
ing similarity in the system after the crisis: graphs show more cohesive com-
munities which point to the Mixed cluster; radar plots exhibit communities’
peculiarities which became more overlapped in 2012.
peculiarities. In Japan a deregulation process, known as the ’Japanese
Big Bang’, was formulated during the 1990s to transform the traditional
bank-centered system into a market-centered financial system charac-
terised by more transparent and liberalised financial markets (Hoshi and
Kashyap 1999). In fact, peculiar features of Japanese banking sector were
the over-reliance on intermediated bank lending, the absence of a suf-
ficient corporate bond market and a marginal role for non-bank finan-
cial institutions, whose main consequences were an abundance of non-
performing loans, excess in liquidity, scarce investments and low banks
profitability (see e.g. Batten and Szilagyi 2003). Although this program
was intended to cover the period 1996-2001, the goals have not been ach-
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ieved yet and policy makers’ continuing reform efforts to remove past
practices by market participants confirm the slowing convergence of the
Japanese regulatory framework to a capital-market based financial sys-
tem (Aronson 2011). Thus, the presence of the JP community which
gradually tends to the Mixed cluster is in line with evidences from the
Japanese financial sector’s reforms aimed to change its reliance on in-
direct finance into a system of direct finance related to capital markets.
Furthermore, it is remarkable the presence of a US community quite sta-
ble over time, which seems to be progressively attracted by the Mixed
cluster. The US financial system presents peculiar features compared
to other geographical areas. It is characterised by a relatively greater
role of capital market-based intermediation, a higher importance of the
’shadow banking system’, and differences in the accounting standards
(ECB 2013). The impact of non-bank financial intermediation relates to
the use of originate-to-distribute lending models, which determine the
direct issuance of asset-backed securities and the transfers of loans to
government-sponsored enterprises (e.g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac),
a phenomenon particularly relevant before the onset of financial crisis.
Financial innovation played a key role in the early 2000s and the increas-
ing use of securitisation explains the low percentage of loans to house-
holds on banks’ balance sheets (ECB 2013). In addition, the ’shadow
banking system’ is highly dependent on the presence of finance compa-
nies, money market funds, hedge funds and investment funds, which
influenced the growth of total assets in the US financial sector during the
last decades (Shin 2012, Pozsar et al. 2012). The presence of a distinct
community is probably also due to differences in accounting standards,
which mainly involve the treatment of derivatives positions between the
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) and the Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). In particular, US GAAP
allows to report the net value of derivative positions with the same coun-
terparty under the presence of a single master agreement, thus impacting
on the size representation of balance sheets items. However, in Figure 4
we observe that the US community (similarly to the JP community) is
gradually approaching the Mixed community, and the consequences of
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the crisis seem to have enhanced this convergence. Among the possi-
ble several reasons, it is worth considering the impacts of the reform on
the OTC derivatives market (embedded in the Dodd-Frank Act) and the
Basel III new banking regulation, which may have facilitated similarities
among US institutions and their peers in the Mixed cluster.
3.3.2 Relationships between Economic Indicators and Net-
work Properties
In this Subsection we provide a preliminary investigation of the relation-
ships between banks’ economic indicators and their network properties.
In order to characterise banks, we consider three common proxies for
their classification: Return on Assets (for the Performance), Total Assets (for
the Size) and Total Debts to Total Assets (for the Leverage). Then, compa-
risons are presented against two basic network measures: the Strength
and the Average Clustering Coefficient. For each year from 2001 to 2013,
we provide some insights for these relationships by estimating for the
overall sample the correlations between banks’ economic indicators and
network measures. As explained in Subsection 3.2.4, in this exercise we
consider networks filtered according to the quality/significance of the
Louvain community detection algorithm, which helps us in the assess-
ment of the significance of our results. Below, we show some examples
to discuss how these relationships have evolved over time.
In particular, we investigate whether once the effects of the crisis have
spread throughout the financial system, the capacity of traditional eco-
nomic indicators (i.e. leverage, size, performance) to group banks re-
sulted undermined. For instance, the onset of the crisis clearly affects
the relationships between Total Debts to Total Assets and network proper-
ties. Although the correlation between Strength and Total Debts to Total
Assets remains negative during the entire sample period, the breakdown
of financial markets seems to further enhance this effect for subsequent
years (Figure 5, plot on the top). Thus, this relationship suggests that,
after the onset of the crisis, the use of leverage became on average more
anti-correlated to the Strength. This implies that banks that are more dis-
58
similar in terms of their financial statements (i.e. with lower values of
Strength) are those that turned out to be less capitalised (i.e. with higher
values of Total Debts to Total Assets). Furthermore, one might be interested
in understanding the role played by the Size which represents a typical
indicator utilised to classify banks. The correlation between Strength and
Total Assets is negative and almost flat even after the collapse of 2007-08,
while it shows an increasing trend in the recent period (Figure 5, plot on
the middle). Hence, it seems that after the outbreak of the crisis the Size
became less correlated to similarities among banks, as estimates point-
ing sharply to zero seem to suggest. We finally analyse the relationship
between Performance and network properties (Figure 5, plot on the bot-
tom). To determine the level of structure in the system we consider the
Average Clustering Coefficient which mimics how the presence/absence of
very connected groups of banks, that stand for the levels of “diversifi-
cation” in the adoption of similar business models, might be related to
economic results. Although poorly statistically significant in the early
2000s, correlations with Return on Assets exhibit a decreasing pattern be-
fore the onset of the crisis and then remain negative although slightly
erratic. The negative relationship between Average Clustering Coefficient
and Return on Assets seems to suggest that belonging to well connected
areas of the network (nodes with higher clustering coefficients) do not
foster economic performance.
These basic examples suggest that a clear investigation on the rela-
tionships between economic indicators and network properties may be
not always conclusive and there might be some cases where estimates
are poorly significant. Still, some remarkable effects arise from this in-
vestigation strategy and preliminary results point to a turning point in
the correlations across the outbreak of the financial crisis. In particu-
lar, diagrams confirm that leverage is a useful indicator for differenti-
ating banks, hence deviations to lower capitalizations are associated to
increasing dissimilarities with the rest of the system and the impact of
the crisis suggests a reinforcement of this relationship. By contrast, af-
ter the breakdown of 2007-08 it seems that size does not contribute too
much on the similarity between banks, while it played a greater role be-
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fore and during the crisis. Finally, the relationship between performance
and the structure of the system is less clear and prevents straightforward
conclusions.
Figure 5: Relationships between Economic Indicators and Topological
Properties. In these plots we present the correlations between banks’
Strength versus the Total Debts to Total Assets (Leverage) (plot at the top-
left), Strength versus Total Assets (Size) (plot at the top-right) and Cluster-
ing Coefficient versus Return on Assets (Performance) (plot on the bottom
part of the panel). The correlation is computed across the years 2001-13.
Red points stand for not significant estimates at 5% level.
The study of the correlations between network properties and eco-
nomic indicators reveals that the system has reacted against the crisis by
updating the traditional drivers that can be used to reasonably classify
banks. These preliminary findings are, therefore, intended to show that
within an almost stable set of banks (thanks to the choice of the QR),
the dynamics which drive the similarities of business models are actu-
ally influenced by the outbreak of financial markets. The identification
of economic features potentially able to characterise specific portions of
the system is addressed in the next Subsection.
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3.3.3 PCA results
Community detection shows the presence of three large clusters (Mixed,
US, and JP) and an additional quite stable and persistent but smaller
community (mostly US+EU banks). In this Section we provide a way
to describe how these communities can be represented in terms of eco-
nomic features (see Figure 4). Given the multi-dimensionality of the set
of measures utilised to build the networks, we adopt the Principal Com-
ponents Analysis to identify those measures which contribute more (less)
to the explained variance within each community. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we propose the ranking of the top (bottom) three measures for
each community during the following intervals: pre-crisis (2001-2006),
crisis (2007-2009), and post-crisis (2010-2013). In particular, for each year
we compute the contribution of the original measures to explained vari-
ance; then, we average within each sub-period and we determine the
rankings based on the mean period values. Below, we name the commu-
nity with a mixed geographical composition as C0, while we refer to the
communities with a prevalence of US, JP and EU+US banks as C1, C2
and C3, respectively.
This representation allows us to compare communities’ features over
time and across different groups. For instance, in Table 13 we observe
that Total Assets and Interest Income are quite frequent among top mea-
sures contributors, while Total Debts to Total Assets is recurrent among
measures in the bottom rankings. This is not surprising given banks he-
terogeneity in terms of the size (Total Assets) and the economic results
(Interest Income) distributions, in contrast with the tight constraints on
leverage (Total Debts to Total Assets) due to regulatory requirements. By
focusing on the top rankings we notice that C0 and C1 have fairly stable
top contributors, while communities C2 and C3 are more affected by the
wave of financial turmoil. Furthermore, bottom rankings seem to be on
average only slightly influenced by the choice of different sub-periods.
In addition, differences between mean values among the set of top three
and the set of bottom three contributors are quite stable over time with
only few exceptions, while the middle part of the distribution of mea-
sures’ contributions (not reported, available from authors upon request)
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is in general quite sparse. For these reasons, we prefer to focus on the
top and the bottom rankings to describe communities’ features.
One might be interested in how the outbreak of financial crisis have
influenced these rankings. Top composition of C1 is unaffected by the
2007-08 financial breakdown, while C0 is only partially modified by the
onset of the crisis (Interest Income is replaced by Net Interest Income). Con-
versely, C2 presents a quite different configuration during the crisis sub-
period when it exhibits a relevant role for expenses measures (i.e. Non
Interest Expenses and Operating Expenses). Similarly, income statement
measures become more relevant among top contributors also within the
C3 community. Interestingly, community C0, which is characterised by
a mixed geographical composition, and the US community (C1) reach
identical top contributors after the outbreak of 2007-08, while the JP com-
munity (C2), which shows the same top contributors as community C0 in
the first sub-period, seems to react differently during the crisis, although
in the third sub-period it shows again top contributors similar to C0 (and
to C1). By contrast, community C3 seems to present a peculiar pattern
over time.
Therefore, the crisis sub-period coincides with remarkable differences
in the top contributors, while the recent sub-period points to a renewed
tendency to get similar contributors for a wider set of banks (C0 and C1,
and partially C2). This is in line with the above discussion on community
detection results, where we highlighted a gradual proximity between
clusters over time. Hence, these results suggest that heterogeneity within
clusters is driven by similar economic measures after the crisis, although
specific differences persist. This is the case for instance of loans, which
are not present among top contributors in the US community while they
are present in the top ranking of both the Mixed and the JP community
(as expected according to the above discussion). PCA reveals that hete-
rogeneity during the crisis sub-period have been heavily influenced by
the presence of other economic dimensions than previous sub-period; in
addition, it shows how after the crisis, these economic variables are more
similar across communities; finally, peculiarities on top contributors con-
firm previous findings on geographical community detection.
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We also notice that the crisis suggests an increasing importance of in-
come statement measures in terms of contribution to the explained vari-
ance within communities. The breakdown of financial markets affected
banks’ results and this justifies the high level of heterogeneity expressed
by income statements indicators. This can be related also to the impact
of the crisis on financial statement measures and, in particular, on the
different ways banks update their balance sheet structures compared to
the recognition of economic results as reported in the income statements
items. Similar comparisons can involve also the bottom three measures,
but for conciseness we omit this part.
3.4 Discussion
This paper describes banking system through similarities among banks’
financial statements. Our main contribution is the introduction of a me-
thodology to exploit balance sheets and income statements data to con-
struct the Accounting Networks. We show some relationships between
economic indicators and network properties, which might provide some
new useful insights for banking classification practices, and we describe
the emergence of geographical communities which reacted to the 2007-
08 crisis converging to more similar banking practices. Depicting some
effects of the recent financial crisis by using a simple framework is an
encouraging sign for further extensions.
We rely on “neutral” and “naive” techniques to build the Accounting
Networks. In particular, among common approaches usually applied to
describe similarities concepts, we adopt one of the basic method, i.e. the
cosine similarity. Future works can exploit more advanced methodolo-
gies. Moreover, our selection of variables utilised to compute cosine si-
milarities assumes that each component has the same importance. This is
quite a naive hypothesis, which could be enriched by the discrimination
of economic indicators based on economic literature and/or practition-
ers perspectives. Finally, for accounting reasons we limit our study on
annual financial statements, while a more detailed description of the sys-
tem might easily involve the use of quarterly data. Despite these simpli-
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fying assumptions, our approach has the merit of introducing a novelty
in the debate on banking networks, and we believe that future improve-
ments in the directions outlined above will enforce Accounting Networks’
ability to describe the evolution of banking systems.
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Appendix B
B.1 Quality/Significance of the clustering for dif-
ferent pruning thresholds
Below, we report for each year the quality and the significance of the
configuration arising from the application of the community detection
algorithm on a pruned graph (where the thresholds are shown in the x-
axis).
Figure 6: Quality/Significance for year 2001
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Figure 7: Quality/Significance for year 2002
Figure 8: Quality/Significance for year 2003
Figure 9: Quality/Significance for year 2004
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Figure 10: Quality/Significance for year 2005
Figure 11: Quality/Significance for year 2006
Figure 12: Quality/Significance for year 2007
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Figure 13: Quality/Significance for year 2008
Figure 14: Quality/Significance for year 2009
Figure 15: Quality/Significance for year 2010
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Figure 16: Quality/Significance for year 2011
Figure 17: Quality/Significance for year 2012
Figure 18: Quality/Significance for year 2013
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B.2 Variables used in the Analysis
Table 14: Variables used in the Analysis. First column stands for the
Bloomberg codes, while second column indicates the respective definitions.
Items are splitted according to Balance Sheet variables and Income State-
ment variables.
Bloomberg Codes Balance Sheet Items
BS ACCT NOTE RCV Accounts and Notes Receivable
BS ACCT PAYABLE Accounts Payable
BS ACCUM DEPR Accumulated Depreciation
BS ASSETS UNDER MGMT Assets under Management
BS CASH NEAR CASH ITEM Cash and Equivalents
BS COMM LOAN Common Loans
BS CONS LOAN Consumer Loans
BS CORE DPST Core Deposits
BS CUST ACCPT LIAB CUSTDY SEC Customers Acceptance and Liabilities/Custody Securities
BS CUSTOMER DEPOSITS Customer Deposits
BS DEF TAX LIAB Deferred Tax Liabilities
BS DEMAND DPST Demand Deposits
BS DISCLOSED INTANGIBLES Disclosed Intangibles
BS GROSS FIX ASSET Fixed Assets
BS INVENTORIES Inventories
BS LARGE DPST Large Deposits
BS LT BORROW Long-Term Borrowings
BS LT INVEST Long-Term Investments
BS MKT SEC OTHER ST INVEST Market Securities
BS NON PERFORM ASSET Non-Performing Assets
BS OFF BAL COMMIT AND CONT Off-Balance Sheet Commitments
BS OTHER ASSETS DEF CHRG OTHER Other Assets
BS OTHER CUR ASSET Other Current Assets
BS OTHER DPST Other Deposits
BS OTHER LOAN Other Loans
BS OTHER LT LIABILITIES Other Long-Term Liabilities
BS OTHER ST LIAB Other Short-Term Liabilities
BS PFD EQY Preferred Equities
BS RE LOAN Real Estate Loans
BS RETAIN EARN Retain Earnings
BS RSRV LOAN LOSS Loan Loss Provisions
BS SH CAP AND APIC Share Capital & APIC
BS ST BORROW Short-Term Borrowings
BS SVNG DPST Saving Deposits
BS TIME DPST Time Deposits
BS TOT LOAN Total Assets
BS TOT LOAN Total Loans
INTERBANKING ASSETS Interbank Assets
Bloomberg Codes Income Statements Items
INTEREST INCOME Interest Income
IS ABNORMAL ITEM Abnormal Loss (Gain)
IS ACT LOAN LOSS NET Actual Loan Loss (Net)
IS COMM AND FEE EARN INC REO IncomefromREO
IS INC TAX EXP IncomeTaxExpense
IS INT EXPENSE Interest Expense
IS NET NON OPER LOSS NetNon-OperatingLoss(Gain)
IS OPERATING EXPN Operating Expense
IS OTHER OPER INC LOSSES Other Operating Income Loss (Gain)
IS PERSONNEL EXP Personnel Expense
IS PROV FOR LOAN LOSS Provision for Loan Loss
IS TAX EFF ON ABNORMAL ITEM Tax Effect on Abnormal Loss (Gain)
IS TOT CASH PFD DVD Total Cash Preferred Dividends
IS TRADING ACCT PROF Trading Account Profit (Loss)
MIN NONCONTROL INTEREST CREDITS Minority Interests
NET INT INC Net Interest Income
NON INT EXP Net Interest Expenses
REINVEST EARN Reinvested Earnings
OTHER ADJUSTMENTS Other Adjustments
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B.3 Summary statistics on geographical cover-
age and communities distribution
Table 15: Country Distribution. In the table we show the percentage of
institutions belonging to a certain geographical area for each year. Last col-
umn gives the percentage over the entire sample. The average number of
institutions is about 885. Country coverage is very stable in the dataset.
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
Africa 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%
Arab Countries 9% 9% 8% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 10% 9%
Asia 13% 15% 15% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 16% 17% 17% 18% 16%
Europe 20% 20% 20% 19% 20% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 20% 17% 19%
Japan 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 7% 9%
North America 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 40% 39% 41% 41%
South America 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Oceania 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3%
Table 16: Communities Distibution. First column stands for communities
with abbreviations C0, C1, C2 and C3 meaning: Mixed, US, JP and US+EU,
respectively; Others refers to all the other banks that are allocated to small
communities (on average about 30 for each year). Column Average indicates
the average proportions over the interval 2001-13. We can note an almost
stable composition over time.
Community 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average
c0 47% 47% 47% 48% 48% 47% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 49% 49% 48%
c1 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 36% 35% 34% 36% 36%
c2 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 8% 10%
c3 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3%
Others 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
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Chapter 4
Peer-Group Detection of
Banks and Resilience to
Bankruptcy
4.1 Introduction
The financial instability of recent years has put banking activities under
deep scrutiny. The contribution of banking business models to financial
performance and resilience is a major concern for regulators aiming to
monitor banking business models (BCBS 2010; BCBS 2011a). The recent
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) put in place in Eu-
rope (EBA 2014) is a direct example of business model analysis as one
of the most important component for monitoring security and stability
of the banking sector. However, the variety of funding opportunities
and investment strategies exacerbated by both financial innovation and
the deregulation process of the pre-financial crisis period (Beltratti and
Stultz 2012; Diamond and Rajan 2009) gave banks the potential strategic
advantage of differentiating their activities to boost competitiveness and
leverage their strength (Roengpitya et al. 2014). Hence, the constellation
of possible combinations of asset-liability choices makes the classification
of banking business models a complex task (Ayadi and De Groen 2015;
Bongini et al. 2015; Mergaerts and Vander Vennet 2016). This study aims
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to address this issue by exposing the true business models adopted by
banks as direct representation of their funding and investments strate-
gies rather than relying on their official specializations. We claim that
true business model identification plays an important role in shaping the
risk profile of financial institutions, and therefore constitutes a precious
ingredient for risk assessment.
The recent outbreak of financial markets of 2008 represents a unique
opportunity to test the resilience of banking institutions as a function of
their true activities. Due to the global magnitude of the financial cri-
sis, our assessment exploits one of the largest sample of financial in-
stitutions ever tested in banking literature, which includes more than
11,000 institutions, both listed and non listed as emphasized by Ko¨hler
(2015), representing more than 180 countries. This is the result of an in-
tensive merge and match of data from many different sources aimed to
create the most comprehensive state-of-the-art global banking set. This
includes a detailed list of balance sheet items collected from Bankscope
and FDIC, with macro-economic and sectoral indices retrieved from BIS,
Datastream, OECD and WorldBank, that will be used to characterize and
control banks’ business models. For the distress even list, we merge sig-
nals regarding bankruptcies and liquidations from Bankscope and FDIC,
defaults from Moody’s and S&P, distressed mergers from both Bankscope,
Moody’s and S&P and public bailouts from Laeven and Valencia (2012),
all of them with global coverage. Revealing the true banking business
models is an ambitious task, especially if extended to a global level,
where the high level of heterogeneity across countries, the multidimen-
sionality of banks characteristics and the presence of missing values,
make classification very challenging. To address this issue, we propose a
novel approach in finance for business models classification able to dis-
entangle the multi-dimensionality problem1 of peer group assessment,
which defines groups of institutions adopting the same business model.
We borrow a classification method well-established in the complex sys-
1The multi-dimensionality issue refers to the variety of different assets and liabilities
variables that can be used as individual comparison dimensions in peer group assessments.
See e.g. Ayadi et al. (2011) and Mergaerts and Vander Vennet 2016.
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tem field where i) similarities among pairs of financial institutions are
measured by the cosine similarity of their vectors of attributes (Dongen
and Enright 2012), representing a detailed list of balance sheet items, and
ii) the identification of business model is driven by a community detec-
tion algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008) based on the maximization of a mod-
ularity quantity (see e.g. Fortunato 2010 and Newman and Girvan 2004).
We find seven specific peer groups that are consistent with the three
classic business model categories discussed in previous works (e.g. Ayadi
et al. 2012; Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Huizinga 2010; Ko¨hler 2015; Mergaerts
and Vander Vennet 2016; Roengpitya et al. 2014), such as the deposit-
oriented, the wholesale-oriented and the investment-oriented models.
The interpretation of these three categories is mainly based on their fund-
ing characteristics. However, due to the mix features of the business mo-
dels we detected, we label them according to the distinctive balance sheet
characteristic that best differentiate each model from the others. Among
the specific business models that we find, three of those are persistent
over the whole period from 2005 to 2014, namely Wholesale, Commercial
and Saving models. The first is a wholesale-oriented model characterised
by dominant wholesale funding and diversified loans investments made
up of mainly Russian and US banks holdings. The second is another
wholesale-oriented model represented by a solid composition of US com-
mercial banks and European institutions characterised by decent amount
of wholesale funding and dominant commercial loans investments. The
last one is a deposit-oriented business model dominated by US, Japanese
and Indian institutions with mainly customer deposit funding and diver-
sified commercial loans investments. Furthermore, we observe a Diver-
sified Retail model with dominant deposit funding and large retail loans
investments appearing since 2008. This deposit-oriented model is com-
posed by many German and Swiss saving and cooperative banks that mi-
grated from wholesale-oriented models at the peak of the financial crisis.
In addition, we discover more unstable groups emerging for few years
only and with fewer institutions: a Long Term business model character-
ized by dominant long term funding, commercial investments and com-
posed by mainly European institutions (in particular Italian and Spanish
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banks); a Focus Retail model with diversified funding and dominant re-
tail loans investments made up of mainly Swiss saving banks and US
bank holdings; an Investment model characterized by large non-interest
income and nondeposit funding and dominated by US and UK interna-
tional broker dealers. The first two groups are wholesale-oriented mo-
dels that disappeared at the onset of financial markets in 2007, whereas
the third is the only investment-oriented model we find, although only
after 2012. Note that different accounting standards across the sample
and country-based regulations on bank specializations may have con-
tributed to shape the structure of banks’ balance sheets. However, the
normalization by total assets of the variables used to compute the cosine
similarities is intended to mitigate this issue since accounting principles
directly affect the size of balance sheet items (Roengpitya et al. 2014).
In addition to that, the choice of exploiting a wide range of variables
prevents the problem of a single balance sheet indicator (affected by ac-
counting principles) impacting on the overall similarity. Indeed, the two
main accounting standards, GAAP and IFRS, are well represented in all
the three main business models and very stable overtime. This result is
a further guarantee that our approach does not suffer from different ac-
counting standards.
To assess the performance of our classification model against the other
state-of-the-art methods we exploit a variety of tests. First, we perform
a battery of non-parametric tests and multiple pairwise post-hoc com-
parisons on peer groups differences in their business models features
to confirm that each banking group is statistically different to the oth-
ers. Second, we compare the results of our approach with other meth-
ods adopted in literature, such as the wide-diffused Ward clustering al-
gorithm (Ward and Joe 1963), and the direct classification provided by
Bankscope and used in Ko¨hler (2015). We show that our classification
provides a better clustering identification, thus supporting the use of the
resulting clusters as peer groups/business models. Last, we focus on
the stability of peer groups’ membership over time by analysing factors
that are more likely to affect the likelihood of changes in the adoption of
business models. We observe the presence of three core peer groups quite
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stable over time with a modest turnover, which confirms the existence of
a certain stickiness in changing business model. Our switching model
analysis suggests that both size of the institutions and macro-economic
environments might play a role in switching business model, although
estimates clearly highlight that those institutions that are more periph-
eral/dissimilar within their peer group tend to be more prone to change
business model.
The last part of the study investigates the contribution of specific
business models to the assessment of the risk of distress. We built a com-
prehensive list of global distress events by combining bankruptcies, liq-
uidations, defaults, distressed mergers (see e.g. Betz et al. 2014; Vazquez
and Federico 2015), and public bailouts (Laeven and Valencia 2012). We
regress these events against financial statement ratios (i.e. proxies for
CAMELS) and controlling for macro and sectoral effects using a rare-
logit model (Firth 1993) to take into account the possibility of a small
amount of distress events. We confirm that CAMELS explain well the
propensity of risk of the institutions, with high levels for ROA and liq-
uidity reducing the risk of distress while ROE increases it. In line with
the major findings in literature (Ayadi and De Groen 2015; Demirgu¨c-
Kunt and Huizinga 2010; Ko¨hler 2015; Mergaerts and Vander Vennet
2016; Roengpitya et al. 2014), we observe that both wholesale-oriented
and deposit-oriented models are prone to the risk of distress. However,
we empirically discover different driving forces contributing to that level
of instability. First of all, the size of the institution, measured in terms of
total assets, is positively correlated with the likelihood of distress only in
the wholesale-oriented models, suggesting a higher vulnerability of large
institutions adopting those business models with a much lower propor-
tion of stable funding than the deposit-oriented group. Second, ROA im-
pacts positively deposit-oriented models and negatively the wholesale
ones, suggesting that limited asset diversification of the deposit oriented
institutions would force them to concentrate their investments on fewer
product in the pursuit of higher returns, with overall higher risk com-
pared to the wholesale. Opposite result for ROE suggesting that lever-
age may exacerbate the deposit oriented institutions stable funding and
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therefore improve resilience while wholesale oriented would pay the
price of more unstable non-deposit funding growth in the pursuit of bet-
ter returns on equity. Another interesting finding is the impact of busi-
ness model volatility at the institution level measured by the number of
switches to a different business model prior to the financial crisis. We
provide supporting evidence on a consistent portion of distresses com-
ing from institutions that migrated quite often between peer groups prior
to the crisis. We confirm that the higher the volatility of business model
adopted, the higher the likelihood of distress. More specifically, among
the 204 distressed cases that we collected, almost 30% refers to institu-
tions switching peer group at least once in the three years period before
2008. Those institutions with volatile business models were more likely
to be in distress after the breakdown of financial markets.
Drawing on our results, we elaborate policy recommendations. We
find different risk drivers for banks adopting competing business mo-
dels, discouraging the one-rule-fits-all approach in favour of a more ap-
propriate targeted intervention coherent with the true banking business
models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses
the main literature on banking business models2 classification and con-
tributions to performance and resilience. The dataset constructed for the
empirical analysis is described in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 introduces the
methodology for banking peer groups classification, whereas the discus-
sion of their main features and geographical compositions is presented
in Section 4.5. The inter-temporal analysis of the behaviour of business
models is analysed in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 provides a detailed risk as-
sessment of the resilience of institutions to the distress events of 2008-10.
Final conclusion and remarks are given in Section 4.8.
2In the paper we se interchangeably business model and peer group as the result of the
clustering procedure. Due to the characteristics of the dataset, we also use banks and insti-
tutions as synonimous.
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4.2 Literature Review
Our paper covers issues related to a large number of studies that analyse
the classification criteria of banking business models and their impact on
performance and resilience to the risk of distress. Many of them con-
centrate their effort on a small subset of institutions, mainly large listed
banks of specific geographic locations, generally US and Europe with
few exceptions.
The first set of contributions focuses on performance and risk by us-
ing banks characteristics as main explanatory variables. For instance,
Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) investigates the mix of non tradi-
tional funding-investment models on a panel of 1,334 large global banks
in 101 countries from 1995 to 2007. They show a non monotonic impact
on risk where, starting from low level of nondeposit funding in combi-
nation with noninterest income activities, these non traditional banking
strategies provide risk diversification benefits, whereas further increase
in the levels of the mix enhances bank fragility. With particular emphasis
on regulatory capital requirements and liquidity buffers, Vazquez and
Federico (2015) perform a stability analysis on a large set of US and EU
banks in the interval 2001-2009. Using leverage and non stable fund-
ing ratios as main explanatory variables, they claim that high leveraged
banks with weak structural liquidity were more likely to default during
the 2008-09 financial crisis. Their econometric analysis relies on a probit
model of distress events constructed from banking activities information
provided by Bankscope and enriched by data on systemic crisis (Laeven
and Valencia 2010 and Laeven and Valencia 2012), also included in our
distress event list, and completed with macroeconomic and monetary
variables. We note that they consider the entire set of mergers as distress
events, while we circumscribe our list to a narrow definition of distressed
mergers as also suggested by Betz et al. (2014). A sub-classification be-
tween domestic and cross-border global institutions also reveals that the
first were more vulnerable to liquidity risk whereas the second were
more exposed to solvency risks due to high leverage levels. The data
sample constructed in our study is closely related to Vazquez and Fed-
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erico (2015) in terms of number of institutions and countries coverage.
The introduction of new accounting standards and the partial data avail-
ability from Bankscope up to 2004, which is discussed in Section 4.3, af-
fect substantially the consistency of balance sheet characteristics across
institutions. To deal with this issue, Vazquez and Federico (2015) pro-
pose for instance different configurations in their regression analysis. In
this study we take those issues into account by considering the period
2005-14, which provides a much larger and consistent number of balance
sheet features to deal with. Similar findings are reported by Beltratti and
Stultz (2012) who considers a panel of the largest 500 global banks to
assess the determinants of stock performance during the financial cri-
sis. On top of the positive relations between exposure to US real estate
and the likelihood of distress, banks with lower leverage, higher regu-
latory capital and deposits shown more resilience to distress compared
with those high leveraged institutions financed on short-term money
markets, where the latter were the institutions that performed very well
before the collapse of the markets in 2007. Although this analysis cov-
ers the pre-crisis period and only a small sample of banks, they provide
a detailed discussion on the resiliance of banks’ business models based
on the mix of asset-liability structures in comparison with the universal
banking model Benston (1994). Their contribution inspired the set up for
our signal models. An interesting comparison of traditional vs nontra-
ditional banking activities is presented by Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras
(2010). A panel of 752 listed global commercial banks is created to in-
vestigate banking activity impact on cost and profit efficiency estimated
by a stochastic-frontier based model. Their study shows that the inclu-
sion of nontraditional and noninterest activities increases cost efficiency
whereas mix results are found for the profit efficiency, due to environ-
mental and regulatory conditions. Lately importance has been given to
those institutions recognised as systemically important banks (SIBs). An
investigation of only systemically important global banks (SIGBs) is pro-
vided by Bongini et al. (2015) in which 70 of the world largest banks, out
of which 28 were listed as systemically important by BCBS (2011b), are
studied. Stock market reaction and therefore potential distress is shown
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to have been driven by bank capital levels rather than its classification as
SIGB, which supports our choice of extending this analysis to non SIGBs.
Betz et al. (2014) focus more on the predictability3 of banks vulnerabil-
ity by designing an early warning model on the largest European banks.
Using CAMELS rating system as main descriptive elements of banking
business models, they develop a signal model on the distress events dur-
ing the financial crisis by combining both direct bank failures (bankrupt-
cies, liquidations and defaults) with indirect events like state support of
distressed institutions and mergers in distress. They show that CAMELS
are good indicators of bank distress and that macro-financial imbalances
and sectoral indices of vulnerability improve the performance of model
predictability. Our paper is closely related to Betz et al. (2014) in terms
of the use of CAMELS variables and the enlarged set of distress events.
Our analysis can be interpreted as an extension of these works since it
relies on a large dataset of more than 11,000 global banks, both listed and
non listed, from more than 180 countries with distress events which in-
clude bankruptcies, liquidations, defaults, distressed merges and public
bailouts.
The second set of contributions focuses on the classification criteria
of bank business models and their contribution to performance and risk.
The mainstream approach to banking business models is either the direct
one provided by the institutions themselves, also called qualitative ap-
proach (Ko¨hler 2015), or an indirect, quantitative, classification where hi-
erarchical grouping algorithms are applied, most likely the Ward and Joe
(1963) together with the stopping rule on the number of identified clus-
ters based on Calin´ski and Harabasz (1974). Variables used to assess the
similarities of business models are usually balance sheet data, i.e. dimen-
sions over which banks are supposed to have a direct influence (Ayadi
et al. 2011; Roengpitya et al. 2014). As income statements characteris-
tics tend to reflect the interaction between the institution and the market,
therefore not under the direct control of the institution itself, they are
usually excluded from business model assessment and peer group iden-
3A detailed review of banking failure prediction model is given in Demyanyk and
Hasan (2010).
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tification. The above classifications are then used as additional regres-
sors to explain performance and risk as well as the likelihood of distress
events. Ko¨hler (2015) compares direct classification of listed vs non-listed
banks on a panel of 3362 European institutions in the period 2002-2011.
Listed banks tend to show more investment type model, non-traditional
activities with good proportions of nondeposit funding and noninterest
income products, while unlisted banks are mainly saving and coopera-
tive banks with more retail-based models. Ko¨hler (2015) confirm results
shown in Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) on the non monotonic ef-
fect of non traditional banking activity to risk. This study motivates our
choice to extend the sample to all possible global institutions, both listed
and nonlisted. An indirect classification of European banks business mo-
del is provided by Ayadi and De Groen (2015). They use balance sheet
data on 2,528 EU banks from 2005 to 2014 to classify them into five main
models, namely wholesale, focused retail, diversified retail (type I and II)
and investment. Whereas retail-oriented models are characterized by the
classical customer deposit-loan intermediation activity (with different le-
vels of diversification among the three groups), the wholesale and invest-
ment models depict more non traditional banking activities with heavy
reliance on interbank lending and funding (wholesale), trading assets
and derivatives (investment). More retail-oriented models show higher
distance to default (z-score used to assess risk), in particular focused re-
tail and diversified retail type I. Performance is also in favour of focused
retail banks, with the highest performance among the groups. Our model
classification resembles the same three model categories found above,
with very similar individual characteristics that we extend on a global
basis with a much larger sample (see Section 4.5). On a narrower list of
balance sheets variables, Roengpitya et al. (2014) implements the same
indirect approach as Ayadi et al. (2011), Ayadi et al. (2012) and Ayadi and
De Groen (2015) on 222 international banks, along with some subjective
judgemental element to filter the final groups. They found three major
models used globally: retail-funded, wholesale-funded and trading. Re-
tail and wholesale funded models are found to perform better during
the period 2006-2014 than trading model, while retail banks show more
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volatility in their performance than wholesale institutions. They also
analyse the transition of banking models over time, observing switches
of banks from a retail-oriented towards a wholesale type in the 2005-07
period. The transition reverts in the period 2008-13, while trading banks
look veru stable over time). We also perform an intertemporal analysis
by employing a switching analysis to study the likelihood of institutions
to migrate from a business model group to another. Due to the larger in-
stitution sample, our findings complete and expand those reported in the
above study. Alternative approaches to business model classifications
are presented in Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016). They propose a
continuous type classification method to discover business models by
employing a factor analysis among a set of large 505 EU banks in the
period 1998-2013. They find two main factors describing the continu-
ous factor loading ranges of asset, liability, income and capital structure
of the banks. The first factor represents a retail-based business model,
while the second represents a diversified model. They also find higher
long term profitability and high resilience of retail-based models com-
pared with the diversified one. However, factor analysis only provides
a description of the business models that better explain the variables set
without a direct link with the individual institutions adopting that mo-
del. This is an important limitation as it would make any direct inter-
vention by the regulators a complex task. The approach proposed in this
paper preserves the individual bank classification feature guaranteed by
indirect methods. It also advances on the accuracy of model specifica-
tions (strong point in the factor analysis) by employing the state-of-the-
art set of individual bank characteristics on the largest sample ever tested
in literature. This could be achieved by a clustering approach, which is
the Louvain method (Blondel et al. 2008), that is specifically designed for
large, sparse and complex datasets. Comparisons between our approach
and the above methods are discussed in Section 4.5.
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4.3 Data
We chose the interval 2005-14 as reference period to avoid the effects of
new accounting standards IAS-IFRS introduced in the early 2000s4. In
addition to that, the coverage of institutions in Bankscope improves sub-
stantially in 2005 with the inclusion of many European banks5. To inves-
tigate the presence of similarities across institutions in different countries
we consider a global sample covering more than 180 countries (more
than 100 countries with at least 10 institutions). Finally, our clustering
procedure is intended to overcome some of the potential limits due to
broad classifications. For this reason we include all types of peer groups
reported by Bankscope with the exception of Central Banks and Special-
ized Governmental Credit Institutions. Treatment of the data follows
suggestions present in Duprey and Le´ (2014).
4.3.1 Features used to Characterize Business Models
The procedure used to identify peer groups relies on the characterization
of financial institutions by means of balance sheet items retrieved from
Bankscope. The choice to discard income statement variables is in line
with previous literature (e.g. Ayadi et al. 2011; Roengpitya et al. 2014)
and reflects the need to identify economic dimensions over which finan-
cial institutions can have a direct influence. In our study we exploit a
detailed set of balance sheet items for both assets and liabilities, provid-
ing a very granular representation of banking activities. Table 17 reports
summary statistics of the balance sheet variables (standardized by the to-
tal assets of the respective institutions) used to compute the similarities
across financial institutions6. Annual mean values suggest that on aver-
4For a timeline of the relevant changes in IAS-IFRS, the interested reader can refer to
FASB (2016).
5For some countries the number of institutions that are present increases significantly
from 2004 to 2005. This is the case for instance of: Italy (from 49 to 674), Spain (from 58 to
165), Germany (from 1472 to 1757) and Norway (from 50 to 104). The coverage of European
institutions increases by about 40% from 2004 to 2005.
6The peer group detection is done for each year from 2005 to 2014 separately. From the
set of institutions to be classified each year we exclude institutions for which we have less
than 1/3 of the selected balance sheet items.
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age these balance sheet items do not have great variations over the refe-
rence period, except variables referred to mortgage, loans and deposits
which experienced more volatile figures. Interestingly, we notice that
within each variable there is a quite consistent variability (column Pooled
Std in Table 17) and equity seems to have one of the most dispersed dis-
tribution. To avoid distortions due to the presence of institutions with to-
tal assets ranging among different levels of magnitude, we express each
measure in the vector as a share of the respective total assets7.
4.3.2 Distress Events
In Table 18 we show the distress events definitions and the correspond-
ing sources. As emphasised in the Introduction, institutions may be un-
der distressed conditions due to several reasons, although the recent fi-
nancial crisis suggests that government bailouts and state aid had a role
in the avoidance of systemic crisis and cascade of banks failures. There-
fore, direct failures are quite rare and presenting estimates separately
for different distress events would have made the econometric estima-
tion not robust enough. For these reasons, we propose a comprehensive
set of distress events which take into account several definitions of bank
distress (for an approach similar to ours see e.g. Betz et al. (2014) and
Vazquez and Federico (2015), while Kick and Koetter (2007) distinguish
between different types of distress).
7Roengpitya et al. (2014) argue that this choice of using ratios is also useful to prevent
distortions due to not homogeneous accounting standards under different regulations.
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Table 17: Balance Sheet Variables Statistics. Column Annual Average refers
to the average across annual mean values from 2005 to 2014; column Std
(Annual Average) shows the standard deviation of annual mean values; col-
umn Pool Average indicates the average when observations are pooled across
the entire interval 2005-14; column Pool Std stands for the standard devia-
tion of pooled data; column Annual Average NAs exhibits the average num-
ber of missing values computed across annual mean values. The average
number of institutions per year is about 10400.
Balance Sheet Items Annual Std Pool Pool Annual
Average (Annual Average) Average Std Average NAs
At-Equity Investments in Associates 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 3211.60
Available for Sale Securities 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.13 4563.20
Cash and Due from Banks 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.09 218.30
Corporate & Commercial Loans 0.24 0.03 0.23 0.25 4688.80
Customer Deposits (current) 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.24 2548.20
Customer Deposits (savings) 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.19 5895.00
Customer Deposits (term) 0.28 0.02 0.28 0.25 2551.30
Deposits from Banks 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.17 2579.90
Derivatives 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 7004.50
Fixed Assets 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 125.40
Held to Maturity Securities 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.09 6975.30
Loans and Advances to Banks 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.17 952.30
Other Assets 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 16.10
Other Consumer/Retail Loans 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.21 7073.20
Other Deposits and Short-Term Borrowings 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.17 4854.10
Other Funding 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.11 7798.10
Other Liabilities 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.50 625.80
Other Loans 0.38 0.03 0.37 0.32 1428.50
Other Mortgage Loans 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.16 9816.60
Other Securities 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.15 4641.70
Repos and Cash Collateral 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.14 9295.20
Reserves for Impaired Loans/NPLs 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.18 2819.50
Reserves for Pensions and Other 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 3765.70
Residential Mortgage Loans 0.29 0.06 0.27 0.25 7453.40
Reverse Repos and Cash Collateral 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.12 9229.50
Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.22 5749.00
Subordinated Borrowing 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 5901.00
Total Equity 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.59 607.30
Trading Securities and at FV through Income 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.11 4829.70
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Bankruptcy occurs if the net worth of the bank falls below a country-
specific regulatory threshold, while liquidations concern the sale of the
bank by the liquidator as per the guidelines of the country regulations
and the distribution of its assets to claimants. These two distress events
are quite rare during the financial crisis as governments interventions
created a safe net to prevent cascade failures. For this reason, we intro-
duce additional distress definitions. Defaults occurs if the bank failed to
repay interests or principal on its financial obligations beyond any grace
period or if some of its instruments are replaced by other obligations at
a diminished value as a consequence of a distressed exchange between
counterparts. We rely on ratings from Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s
to assess the presence of a default state. In particular, we merge both
short-term and long-term ratings and only if the evaluation of bank con-
ditions is poor in both cases we consider that bank under a default event.
Moreover, forced mergers of distressed institutions have occurred dur-
ing the crisis. We define an institution as part of a distressed merger if
its coverage ratio in t-1 was negative. Coverage ratio is a typical indi-
cator used to assess banks vulnerability conditions (see e.g. Gonza´lez-
Hermosillo 1999) and is computed as the sum of equity plus reserves for
non-performing loans minus total impaired loans over total assets. In ad-
dition, we consider as distressed mergers those cases where the institu-
tions present a rating indicating a vulnerable state. Finally, we enrich the
dataset of distressed institutions by including the information of public
bailouts (Laeven and Valencia 2012) and, for the US perimeter, we inte-
grate Bankscope with bankruptcy information from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
4.3.3 Indicators of Vulnerability
We use a wide set of regressors retrieved from several sources to gauge
banks probability of distress. As suggested in literature (see e.g. Flan-
nery 1998; Gonza´lez-Hermosillo 1999), bank-specific features are expres-
sed in terms of proxies for CAMELS variables. This set of indicators
refers to the Capital adequacy (C), the Asset quality (A), the Management
88
quality (M), the Earnings (E), the Liquidity (L) and the Sensitivity to mar-
ket risk (S) of the institution. This representation helps the supervisory
authority to identify institutions that are in need of attention. Our risk of
distress model relies on proxies for CAMELS dimensions with a wider
coverage across banks balance sheets. Among the possible balance sheet
indicators we prefer to focus on those that are well-represented over time
and across different types of institutions. In particular, capital adequacy
is measured by the equity to assets ratio (Capital) and by the ratio of the
sum of equity plus subordinated borrowings over total assets (Capital
funding ratio). Capital adequacy represents the level of bank capitaliza-
tion and higher values stand for better solvency conditions, thus lower
values are expected to increase the probability of bank distress. The asset
quality is assessed through the return on assets (ROA); in principle, bet-
ter returns are negatively related to distressed conditions. We measure
the management quality by means of the return on equity (ROE) and
the ratio of operating expenses over operating income (Cost-to-income
ratio). The relationships between management quality and the probabil-
ity of distress is expected to be negative, as better management practices
should foster economic performances and institution resilience. Net in-
terest margin is utilised as a proxy for earnings and the expected sign
of the relationship with distress is negative. In addition, the earnings
dimension is approximated by the ratio of interest expenses to total lia-
bilities and, in this case, the expected relationship is positive. Liquidity
is measured by the ratio of liquid assets over customer and short-term
funding (Liquid assets to short-term funding) and by the ratio of deposits
and short-term funding over total funding (Deposits to total funding).
Usually, institutions with better liquidity conditions are more likely to
meet their financials obligations and thus are perceived as less risky. Fi-
nally, the sensitivity to market risk is measured by the share of securities
to total assets (Total security to total assets). The relationship with the
probability of distress is ambiguous since securities are a volatile source
of income but at the same time these assets can be more liquid than, for
example, loans. This feature is particularly relevant for risk assessment
during the recent crisis since the effects of fire sales, which represented a
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channel through which financial distress spread throughout the system,
made some institutions more vulnerable. All indicators are computed
with data retrieved from Bankscope.
Table 19: Measures, Data Description and Sources. This table shows for
each regressor its definition and the source from which we retrieved data. In
some specifications of the models we consider aggregated regional proxies
for macro and sector measures according to World Bank geographical clas-
sifications. Data for House Prices and Credit to Non-Financial Sector are on
a quarterly basis and then annualized. Data from Datastream are daily and
then annualized.
Measures Description Source
Capital Equity/Total Assets Bankscope
Capital Funding Ratio (Common Equity + Subordinated Borrowing)/Total Assets Bankscope
Roa Return on Average Assets Bankscope
Roe Return on Average Equity Bankscope
Cost to Income Ratio Operating Expenses/Operating Income Bankscope
Net Interest Margin Net Interest Revenues/Total Earning Assets Bankscope
Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities Total Interest Expenses/ Total Liabilities Bankscope
Liquid Assets to Short - Term Funding (Cash and other liquid assets)/(Deposits and ST Funding) Bankscope
Deposits to Total Funding (Deposits and ST Funding)/Total Funding Bankscope
Total Securities to Total Assets Total Securities/Total Assets Bankscope
GDP per capita Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita World Bank
Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) World Bank
House Price Real house prices OECD/BIS
Unemployment Share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment World Bank
FDI-Inflows Net inflows (% of GDP) World Bank
FDI-Outflows Net outflows (% of GDP) World Bank
Central Gvt. Debt Entire stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations (% of GDP) World Bank
Gvt. Long-Term Yield Long-term government bond yield Datastream
Bank NPLs to Gross Loans Nonperforming loans divided by the total value of the loan portfolio World Bank
Credit to Non-Financial Sector Banks domestic credit to non financial sector BIS
Market Index S&P Global Equity Indices (annual % change) or, alternatively, FTSE Indices World Bank/Datastream
Sector Index FTSE Financial Indices Datastream
Stock Traded Number of traded shares multiplied by their respective matching prices World Bank
In addition to the above individual banks characteristics, we con-
sider a set of country-specific additional controls for financial sector and
macroeconomic conditions (see e.g. Betz et al. 2014; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Detragiache 2005; Vazquez and Federico 2015). Since our dataset is char-
acterized by a broad classification of financial institutions, we decide to
represent the financial sector using a range of variables from banking
indicators to market measures. This group includes domestic banking
credit to non-financial sector, bank non-performing loans to gross loans,
central government stock of debt (% of GDP), long-term government
bond yield, financial sector market returns, stock market returns and
the amount of traded stocks. Moreover, we take into account macroe-
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conomic conditions by controlling for GDP per capita growth, inflation,
house price, unemployment rate and foreign direct investments (in and
out). Data are retrieved from BIS, Datastream, OECD and World Bank.
Finally, to measure the impact of business model dynamics, such as
the switch from a business model to another one, we add a categorical
variable which represents the number of times (one or two) the insti-
tution changes peer group in the period 2005-07 (we label the variable
Switch Group). We use this categorical variable to test whether a very
volatile (stable) peer group membership increases (decreases) the proba-
bility of distress.
4.4 Methodology
As discussed in the Introduction, banking business models are usually
identified indirectly by using the Ward and Joe (1963) clustering algo-
rithm, or, alternatively, by means of direct classifications such as those
provided by Bankscope. Literature based on the Ward approach exploits
balance sheet variables (Ayadi et al. 2011; Roengpitya et al. 2014) to detect
groups of homogeneous institutions. These studies test several combina-
tions of assets and liabilities items to characterize banking activities and
use euclidean distances to measure how similar financial institutions are
with respect to these dimensions. Ward algorithm is usually combined
with the Pseudo-F Index (Calin´ski and Harabasz 1974) as a stopping
rule to provide the number of clusters. The Pseudo-F Index is the ra-
tio of between-cluster variance to within-cluster variance and is used as
a metric to assess the quality of the clustering results and to discriminate
among different specifications of the algorithm setup. In particular, the
best configuration, and therefore the resulting number of clusters, is the
configuration associated with the greatest value of the Pseudo-F Index.
Typically, the selection of balance sheet items aims to preserve a balanced
representation of both the assets and the liabilities sides opting for those
variables with higher coverage among financial institutions. In our study
we use a wider list of variables than previous studies and for a larger set
of institutions globally distributed. For these reasons, we prefer to adopt
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a clustering method which, although in line with the Ward algorithm, is
designed to address in a more appropriate and elegant way the multi-
dimensionality issues, particularly severe in a large and sparse sample
like ours (see Table 17). The following subsection presents our mea-
sure of similarity among financial institutions’ balance sheet variables,
i.e. the cosine similarities, and the hierarchical clustering algorithm we
borrowed from complex system literature to identify peer groups, i.e. the
Louvain community detection method (Blondel et al. 2008). Finally, the
last subsection discusses the Penalized-likelihood logistic model utilized
to assess the risk of distress.
4.4.1 Peer Group Identification
Our classification method relies on the similarities among institutions’
financial statement attributes, collected in a vector per bank and per year
from 2005 to 2014. To determine these similarities we compute the cosine
of the angle between each pair of vectors in the inner product space and
we divide it by the vectors’ L2 norms to make it bounded between −1
and +1. The cosine similarity is a standard measure used in information
retrieval (Dongen and Enright 2012) which is typically applied for sparse
and multidimensional data (Tan et al. 2006). Given two vectors x and y,
their cosine similarity8 is computed as follows:
CosSim(x, y) =
∑
i xiyi√∑
i x
2
i
√∑
i y
2
i
=
< x, y >
||x||||y|| (4.1)
Once we have measured the pair-wise similarities among institutions
we apply a hierarchical clustering algorithm which identifies groups by
8Each component of the vector can be weighted according to the importance of that
variable to the assessment of similarities among pairs of institutions. However, we adopt
a neutral approach and we treat all information in the vector with the same importance to
avoid ex-ante manipulation for the results.
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maximizing the modularity quantity. This approach is common in com-
plex system literature where the system resembles a graph or network of
nodes (i.e. the financial institutions in our case) connected by means of
edges (which link pairs of nodes/institutions and are weighted accord-
ing to the similarities among them). Modularity measures the strength
of division of a system into clusters or communities, where groups of
densely interconnected nodes are only sparsely connected with the rest
of the system (Newman and Girvan 2004). The modularity is computed
as:
Q =
1
2m
∑
i,j
[
Aij − kikj
2m
]
δ(ci, cj) (4.2)
where Aij indicates the weight of the edge between nodes i and j
(i.e. the similarity among this pair of institutions), ki =
∑
j Aij repre-
sents the sum of the weights of the edges attached to node i (basically
it measures the similarity of institution i to the rest of the system), ci is
the cluster to which node i belongs (i.e. the peer group/business mo-
del), δ(u, v) is equal to 1 if u = v and 0 otherwise, and m = 12
∑
i,j Aij .
Among the approaches proposed in literature to optimise this quantity
(hence, to provide a better partition of the system in clusters), we apply
the Louvain method which has received an increasing interest in complex
systems literature9. This algorithm is structured in two phases. Firstly,
each institution is assigned to a single cluster, so there are as many clus-
ters as there are institutions. Hence, for each institution the algorithm
considers its neighbourhood and evaluates the gain of modularity which
can be obtained by joining a different cluster. The combination that gives
the maximum gain (if positive) is therefore performed. The process is
repeated for all institutions until no further improvements are achieved.
In particular, the gain in modularity (i.e. ∆Q) by moving an isolated in-
stitution i into a cluster c can be measured as follows:
9This part is indebted to the original paper by Blondel et al. (2008); we rely intentionally
on their formulation for presenting the main characteristics of the algorithm. For a deep
review of community detection methodologies, see e.g. Fortunato (2010).
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∆Q =
[∑
in +ki,in
2m −
(∑
tot +ki
2m
)2]
−
[∑
in
2m −
(∑
tot
2m
)2
− ( ki2m)2] (4.3)
where
∑
in is the sum of the weights of the edges (i.e the similari-
ties) within the cluster c and
∑
tot is the sum of the weights of the edges
attaching to nodes in cluster c, while ki is the sum of the weights of
the edges received by node i and ki,in is the sum of the weights of the
edges from i to nodes belonged to cluster c, and m is the total sum of the
weights of all the edges in the system. In the second phase the algorithm
builds a hierarchical partition whose nodes are the clusters identified in
the first step. Thus, the algorithm tries to re-apply the first phase to the
resulting weighted system of meta-nodes and iterates this procedure until
a maximum of modularity is achieved.
Actually, cosine similarities might assume positive or negative val-
ues (this is due to the fact that balance sheet items may be either positive
or negative). The Louvain community detection algorithm requires that
edges with higher values are assigned to stronger similarities. Therefore,
we first get a distance metrics applying the metric preserving transfor-
mation θi,j =
√
0.5(1− CSi,j), where θi,j ∈ [0, 1] and CSi,j is the cosine
similarity between i and j, which ensures that similarities range between
0 and 1 (Dongen and Enright 2012). Then, we define the value of pair-
wise similarity between (i,j) as 1− θi,j , so that pairs of institutions which
are very similar receive higher weights.
There are a couple of technical issues that are worth mentioning. First,
for each year we prune the system by removing the edges below the
0.025 and above the 99.975 percentiles of the cosine similarity distribu-
tion. Second, since the system is very dense by construction, we remove
redundant edges avoiding its fragmentation, i.e. keeping the system con-
nected. We test several specifications by filtering edges below certain
thresholds10. We recall that edges with higher values stand for higher
10In particular, we filter the system according to thresholds from 0.7 to 0.5 using a de-
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similarity between pairs of institutions and the goal of the algorithm is
to find clusters of similar institutions. We rely on the idea of finding such
dense system in an Erdos-Renyi random graph, that is we maximize H
=
∑
cMc D(pc||p), where Mc stands for the number of possible edges in
the community c (i.e. nc (nc−1)/2), pc is the density of the community c,
p is the general density of the graph and D(x||y) is the binary Kullback-
Leibler divergence (see Traag et al. 2013). Finally, among values of H
which are candidates for being the maximum, we usually prefer those
that present higher values of modularity unless it implies a tight prun-
ing of the edges.
Appendix C.2 shows results from the non-parametric equality of me-
dians tests (Kruskal-Wallis) that it is used to verify whether clusters orig-
inate from the same distribution. We consider a wide set of variables and
test non-parametrically whether clusters differentiate from each other for
each year in the interval 2005-14. Results indicate the presence of differ-
ences in medians which we have further analysed by means of post-hoc
multiple pairwise comparisons (Dunn tests).
Our choice of the algorithm to detect peer groups reflects the aim to
rely on a clustering approach that is in line with previous and established
literature on business model identification. Both the Louvain and the
Ward methods are hierarchical clustering algorithms and the quantities
which they maximize to find clusters are somehow similar (modularity
vs. between/within variances). Moreover, the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis tests to detect differences among clusters and the multiple pair-
wise post-hoc comparisons, which we use to further verify that groups
are distinct, resemble the Pseudo-F Index framework used in Ward to
identify the best configuration of clusters. Table 20 compares the Lou-
vain results with those obtained applying both the Ward method and the
direct classifications provided by Bankscope. The quality of these three
approaches is assessed using common measures borrowed from cluster-
ing validation techniques (see Halkidi et al. 2001 and Han et al. 2011),
i.e. the average clusters’ silhouettes, the Pearson Gamma coefficient and
creasing step equals to 0.025 and, for each year, we select the threshold which maximizes
the significance of the configuration.
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the ratio of the average within and the average between distances among
institutions.
Missing values represent a key issue in clustering algorithms when-
ever authors aim to accommodate the complete dataset. The absence of
certain balance sheet items is itself a sign of a business model feature and
some authors like Ayadi and De Groen (2015) replace them with zeros.
To compute the Ward algorithm we consider the entire set of variables
listed in Table 17 and we fill missing values (NAs) using four criteria to
guarantee that the complete dataset is used. First, we fill NAs with zeros;
second, we replace NAs by mean values of the corresponding variable in
the sample; third, similarly to the previous case, we use medians instead
of mean values; fourth, we use multiple imputations and we combine
the Expected Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al. 1977) used
to find the mode of the posterior distribution with a bootstrap approach
to take draws from this posterior (Honaker and King 2010). In the latter
case, we run 10 simulations for each year and we present average val-
ues for the selected clustering validation measures. However, thanks to
its elegance in dealing with sparse data sets, the Louvain method does
not require assumptions on missing values as by definition the cosine
similarity treats them as unknown and base the similarity analysis on
available data only.
For the Louvain method and the direct classification we use the result-
ing clusters from the respective approaches and, to enhance compara-
bility, we compute clustering validation measures filling missing values
using the same four criteria as seen above.
4.4.2 Empirical Approach
Banks distresses during the recent financial crisis are investigated by
means of a logit model on the cross-sectional distribution of three types
of variables prior to the outbreak of financial markets of 2007. Our em-
pirical model is:
Pr(Yi = 1|xi) = Λ(xiβ) (4.4)
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where Λ is a logistic function and Yi assumes value 1 if institution i
has been under distressed conditions between 2008-10 and 0 otherwise
(see Section 4.3.2). In particular, vector x includes bank-specific mea-
sures, financial sector indicators and macro variables. The choice of re-
lying on three types of variables is in line with other works which aim
to disentangle the effects of banks features from the impacts of sectoral
dynamics and macro conditions (see Section 4.3.3). To limit endogeneity
issues, we exploit the pre-crisis averages (from 2005 to 2007) of the ex-
planatory variables as in Vazquez and Federico (2015). Finally, due to the
presence of few distress events we decide to apply a rare event logistic re-
gression to take into account the possibility of a small amount of cases of
the rarer outcome. Hence, to reduce the small-sample bias in maximum
likelihood estimation, we apply the Firth’s Penalized-likelihood logistic
regression which is a convenient approach to obtain finite and consis-
tent estimates of regression parameters when maximum likelihood pro-
cedure suffers from complete or quasi-complete separation (Firth 1993).
Since we are interested in capturing differences in the probability of
distress across different business models we present several specifica-
tions of the main model. In particular, we run the analysis on the en-
tire sample and we compare these estimates with those computed within
peer groups separately.
4.5 Global Business Models
This Section discusses the outcomes of our classification approach by
investigating the business models we find, their characteristics and ge-
ographic compositions as well as their evolution over time. The first
subsection provides a comparison between our clustering approach and
both the Ward method and the direct classification. We then show the
balance sheet features characterizing each business model, where each
peer group is analysed in detail with respect to its composition and evo-
lution over time.
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4.5.1 Clustering Validation
First of all, we run some tests to validate our clustering approach. Clus-
tering validation is a very complex task with no easy solutions (Han et al.
2011). We choose three main measures for clustering validation (see Sub-
section 4.4.1), such as the average silhouette width, the Pearson gamma
and the average within/between ratio of the distances (see e.g. Halkidi
et al. 2001). We evaluate the Louvain approach used in our study (based
on the cosine similarity of institutions’ vectors of attributes and a mod-
ularity optimization to select the best clustering configuration) against
the two other reference methods used in literature, the Ward approach
(which uses the euclidean distance between institutions’ characteristics
to assess similarities and applies the Pseudo F-Index to select the best
clustering configuration) and the institutions direct classification, or spe-
cialization, as reported in the main tables.
Note that to clusterize the whole dataset of institutions, Ward algo-
rithm requires a complete set of values for institutions’ characteristics
to compute euclidean distances. This means that assumptions aimed at
filling missing values, which are of a substantial proportion on a sample
size and geographic coverage of this magnitude, have to be considered11.
Different assumptions on missing values would affect the clustering out-
comes, making this approach not very suitable for large, complex and
sparse samples. On the contrary, the cosine similarity we use in our
classification, i.e. the cosine of the angle of the two vectors of institu-
tions’ characteristics, threats missing values as unknown variables and
considers only the intersection of known value attributes to determine
the similarities (see eq. 4.1). This is a major advantage compared to
other approaches, such as the Ward algorithm based on euclidean dis-
tances, and motivates our choice to use the cosine similarity for this
sparse and multidimensional setting (Tan et al. 2006). Finally, we de-
cided to rely on a clustering algorithm, the Louvain method, that among
11Studies on banking business models using Ward tend to select a much smaller sample
of institutions (e.g. Roengpitya et al. 2014), mainly from the same geographic location
(Ayadi et al. 2011; Ayadi et al. 2012; Ayadi and De Groen 2015) and/or on a limited set of
characteristics to minimize the issue of dealing with missing values.
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hierarchical methodologies like the popular Ward approach, has shown
to be very appropriate and efficient for complex and sparse data samples
(Chakraborty et al. 2013; Lancichinetti et al. 2011).
Table 20 provides performance measures of each of the three cluster-
ing methodologies under four main assumptions for filling missing val-
ues (see Section 4.4.1 for details): [Z] that assigns zeros to all missing val-
ues; [A] that replaces each missing value with the average value across
the whole sample for that variable; [M] similar to the average case but
using the medians; [EM] that estimates missing values using a bootstrap
procedure for multiple imputations based on the Expected Maximization
algorithm.
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Looking at the values in each configuration across measures - a higher
metric of the former two statistics and a smaller within-between cluster
ratio provide a better fitting according to the information set - it is quite
evident that direct classification shows very poor scores in clustering in-
stitutions compared to the two indirect approaches. This is consistent
across all data configurations and validation measures. Results indicate
that institutions with the same direct specialization12 may adopt very
different business models. Therefore, this classification may not provide
a useful indication of the activities they run, in particular when consid-
ering cross-countries comparisons. On the other side, both Louvain and
Ward scores are much higher for the first two statistics and lower for the
wb ratio than the direct one by far, supporting the adoption of indirect
classifications as better methods to identify the true banking business
models.
Between the two indirect methods, we observe a very close and con-
sistent performance across the different model configurations and val-
idation measures. This comparison allows us to confirm that the Lou-
vain method adopted in our study does a job as good as the mainstream
Ward method. However, thanks to the methodological advantage on
sparse and very complex data samples, we rely on the Louvain algorithm
since it is more suitable than Ward for the task ahead. A more detailed
analysis on the emergence of peer groups and their distinct features is
discussed in Appendix C.3, where we provide evidences on differences
in balance sheet dimensions across business models by means of non-
parametrically tests.
12Bankscope provide 16 main groups/specializations: Bank Holding & Holding Com-
panies, Clearing Institutions & Custody, Commercial Banks, Cooperative Banks, Finance
Companies (Credit Card, Factoring & Leasing), Group Finance Companies, Investment &
Trust Corporations, Investment Banks, Islamic Banks, Micro-Financing Institutions, Multi-
Lateral Government Banks, Other Non Banking Credit Institution, Private Banking & Asset
Mgt Companies, Real Estate & Mortgage Bank, Savings Bank and Securities Firm.
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4.5.2 Business Models Characteristics
We focus here on the outcomes of our classification approach13. Tables
from 21 to 23 present summary statistics for the main economic aggre-
gates used to characterise and distinguish business models under differ-
ent time intervals14. The following set of dimensions belongs to the bal-
ance sheet measures usually applied in literature to identify banks’ busi-
ness models (see Ayadi et al. (2011); Beltratti and Stultz (2012); Lozano-
Vivas and Pasiouras (2010); Mergaerts and Vander Vennet (2016); Roeng-
pitya et al. (2014), among others).
As we can see when cross checking variables statistics across different
time periods, we first notice that groups’ characteristics are very stable
over time. This result, in combination with the inter temporal stability
of institutions within the same cluster shown in Table 31 (and discussed
in detail in Section 4.6), confirms our findings of stable peer groups and
supports the interpretation of their features which are presented.
Our classification approach reveals the presence of seven peer groups
representing the three business model categories also found in literature,
such as the wholesale-oriented, the deposit-oriented15 and the investment-
oriented. Models names have been chosen on the basis of the particular
characteristic that better discriminates each model against the others ei-
ther from their funding or asset side (Ayadi et al. 2012; Roengpitya et al.
2014). Detailed individual structures of each business model and com-
parisons with direct classifications are discussed in the next following
subsections (we continue to present direct classification together with
our clustering results to provide a helpful parallel to common banks de-
13As the core of this study is to discuss the economic implications of peer groups iden-
tification and their relations to the recent financial crisis, we leave the discussion of the
comparisons among different clustering methods (already introduced in subsection 4.5.1),
and in particular the parallel between our approach and Ward, to future studies.
14To provide a representation of the main features for each peer group, we prefer to rely
on aggregate variables due to the presence of missing values among the measures used to
compute the cosine similarities (for details see Appendix C.2).
15Many authors refer to this business model as retail-oriented since they focus on the
funding side. However, to avoid confusion with our retail-based models that are named
on the basis of the asset side (Retail Loans), we prefer to use this terminology as customer
deposits are what characterized the retail-funded institutions.
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scriptions). Three main business models are consistent throughout the
entire reference period 2005-14 and accounting for the largest number
of institutions. The first of these models is characterised by the largest
wholesale funding and well diversified loans investments with decent
exposure to interbank activities. Many Russian commercial banks adopt
this business model along with US bank holdings. We name this mo-
del Wholesale16. The second model is mainly represented by US national
commercial banks along with a large composition of European cooper-
ative and saving institutions. Institutions are here characterised by a
decent amount of wholesale funding and the largest exposure to com-
mercial loans investments. Due to the nature of their loan investments,
we name this model Commercial. The last model is based on traditional
customer deposits funding (the largest across models) invested in loans,
mainly commercial. Many US and Japanese commercial banks adopted
this model. We name this model as Saving group. The institutions within
each of these three core models well represent the two main accounting
standards, GAAP and IFRS, suggesting that our classification approach
does not show clear biases of accounting manipulation17.
The 2007-08 financial crisis produced what can be interpreted as a
huge earthquake in the balance sheets of institutions all around the world,
which therefore influenced the adoption of business models as also re-
ported in Roengpitya et al. (2014). Figure 19 shows the peer groups at
the beginning of our sample period. On top of our three core models
introduced above, our classification approach captures two relevant mo-
dels that were popular only in the first two years of our sample and then
disappeared at the onset of the crisis. These wholesale-oriented business
models were adopted by a smaller number of institutions as reported in
16In the paper we apply the convention to use italics for peer groups/business models
identified by our clustering approach to differentiate these groups from the ones classified
by the direct method.
17Our database includes 65.4% of institution under GAAP standards and 23.4% IFRS
in 2005 (the remaining are mainly US institutions under regulatory accounting standards),
marginally moving towards a 60% and 32% composition respectively in 2014. Both ac-
counting standards are well represented in all three core models, with a marginal pref-
erence of GAAP in the Wholesale and Saving business models and IFRS in the Commercial
one.
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Table 22. The first, which we named Long Term model, was characterized
by dominant long term funding and commercial investments. Many Eu-
ropean institutions, in particular Italian and Spanish banks, adopted this
model. Due to the close similarity to the Commercial model with regards
to their asset side, we anticipate that the majority of these institutions
migrated to the Commercial business model in 2007 with few exceptions
to the Saving model as pictured in Figure 20. The second model, which
we labelled Focus Retail, shows a diversified funding combined with the
largest exposure to retail loans investments. Institutions belonging to
this group were mainly Swiss saving banks and US local bank holdings.
Figure 19: Peer Groups in 2005-2006. Visualization of the peer groups
adopted in the period 2005-2006. Intersection sets represents the common
characteristics of the business models while the distinctive business model
characteristics are listed in the centre of each group set. Sizes of the groups
represents the popularity of business models measured by the total number
of banks. The geographic representation of the main banking specializa-
tions are reported in the squared boxes, where the specialization acronyms
from Bankscope stand for Bank Holdings (BH), Commercial (C), Coopera-
tive (Coop), Investment (I), Private Bank & Asset Management (PB&AM),
Real Estate & Mortgage (RE&M), Saving (S).
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Figure 20: Peer Groups in 2007. Visualization of the peer groups adopted
in 2007. Intersection sets represents the common characteristics of the busi-
ness models while the distinctive business model characteristics are listed
in the centre of each group set. Sizes of the groups represents the popu-
larity of business models measured by the total number of banks. The ge-
ographic representation of the main banking specializations are reported
in the squared boxes, where the specialization acronyms from Bankscope
stand for Bank Holdings (BH), Commercial (C), Cooperative (Coop), In-
vestment (I), Private Bank & Asset Management (PB&AM), Real Estate &
Mortgage (RE&M), Saving (S).
At the peak of the financial turmoil, we observe the emergence of a
peculiar and large group characterised by a business model with dom-
inant customer deposits funding, second largest after the Saving model,
and dominant exposure to retail loans investments. Figure 21 depicts this
group composed by mainly German and Swiss saving and cooperative
institutions which clusterised together after 2008 in this new business
model that persisted thereafter. Statistical information and comparisons
with the three core models are given in Table 23. Similar to the European
institutions moving from Long Term to Saving prior to the crisis, we re-
mark this interesting migration as evidence of institutions transforming
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their wholesale-oriented funding models into more traditional deposit-
based activities as also reported in Roengpitya et al. (2014).
Figure 21: Peer Groups in 2008-2014. Visualization of the peer groups
adopted in the period 2008-2014. Note that Investment group is adopted in
2012 and 2014 only. Intersection sets represents the common characteristics
of the business models while the distinctive business model characteristics
are listed in the centre of each group set. Sizes of the groups represents the
popularity of business models measured by the total number of banks. The
geographic representation of the main banking specializations are reported
in the squared boxes, where the specialization acronyms from Bankscope
stand for Bank Holdings (BH), Commercial (C), Cooperative (Coop), In-
vestment (I), Private Bank & Asset Management (PB&AM), Real Estate &
Mortgage (RE&M), Saving (S).
Finally, two small and residual models appear at the end of the sam-
ple period suggesting a slower re-organization of the financial system af-
ter the outbreak of financial markets of 2007-08 and consequent changes
in the regulatory framework as well as banking practices. Although one
of them shows a volatile composition of institutions which resembles a
transient group (making the interpretation of the adopted business mo-
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del quite difficult, see C.3.4), the second model points to specialized non-
traditional activities with low customer deposits funding, high levels of
interbank and wholesale borrowings and large exposure to both non-
interest income investment and interbank lending. We named this model
Investment, which appears only in 2012 and 2014 (Figure 22 shows peer
groups’ features before and after the onset of the crisis).
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Table 21: Peer Groups Economic Features. We report average values for ag-
gregated balance sheet variables standardized by total assets for groups Wholesale,
Commercial and Saving. Column Average refers to the average values of the entire
sample composed by the three groups. For variables definitions see Appendix C.2.
Estimates are computed over the interval 2005-14. Last row provides summary statis-
tics for Total Assets (in USD Billion).
Wholesale Commercial Saving Average
# observations 3490 2700 1915 2702
Retail Loans
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Mean 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.08
3rd Q 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.11
Corporate and Other Loans
1st Q 0.11 0.51 0.43 0.32
Median 0.35 0.65 0.55 0.50
Mean 0.36 0.63 0.53 0.49
3rd Q 0.57 0.76 0.67 0.66
Retail and Corporate Loans
1st Q 0.32 0.53 0.46 0.42
Median 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.61
Mean 0.52 0.64 0.56 0.57
3rd Q 0.73 0.77 0.69 0.73
Total Loans
1st Q 0.57 0.63 0.62 0.60
Median 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.74
Mean 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.70
3rd Q 0.87 0.85 0.80 0.85
Interbank Lending
1st Q 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Median 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.09
Mean 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.14
3rd Q 0.25 0.12 0.21 0.20
Investments
1st Q 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.06
Median 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.15
Mean 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.18
3rd Q 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.26
Customer Deposits
1st Q 0.06 0.02 0.72 0.21
Median 0.38 0.43 0.82 0.50
Mean 0.39 0.38 0.79 0.48
3rd Q 0.69 0.65 0.90 0.73
Interbank Borrowing
1st Q 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02
Median 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.10
Mean 0.23 0.17 0.06 0.17
3rd Q 0.35 0.24 0.08 0.25
Long-Term Funding
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02
Mean 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.09
3rd Q 0.15 0.16 0.03 0.13
Long-Term Funding + Equity
1st Q 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.08
Median 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.16
Mean 0.29 0.19 0.12 0.22
3rd Q 0.43 0.28 0.16 0.31
Wholesale Debt
1st Q 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.05
Median 0.25 0.22 0.04 0.19
Mean 0.32 0.27 0.08 0.25
3rd Q 0.53 0.42 0.12 0.40
Stable Funding
1st Q 0.34 0.12 0.79 0.37
Median 0.62 0.64 0.87 0.68
Mean 0.56 0.50 0.84 0.61
3rd Q 0.80 0.78 0.92 0.82
Net Liquidity
1st Q -0.76 -0.80 -0.90 -0.81
Median -0.61 -0.65 -0.83 -0.67
Mean -0.54 -0.51 -0.80 -0.59
3rd Q -0.35 -0.18 -0.73 -0.38
Total Assets (USD Billion)
1st Q 0.13 0.18 0.51 0.24
Median 0.82 0.57 1.53 0.83
Mean 22.90 15.96 18.78 19.62
3rd Q 4.43 2.39 6.05 4.13
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Table 22: Peer Groups Economic Features - Pre Crisis. We report average
values for aggregated balance sheet variables standardized by total assets for groups
Wholesale, Commercial, Saving, Long Term and Focus Retail. Column Average (I-
III) refers to the average values within the sample composed by groups Wholesale,
Commercial and Saving. Column Average (I-V) refers to the average values within
the sample composed by all five groups. For variables definitions see Appendix C.2.
For groups Long Term and Focus Retail, estimates refer to the interval 2005-06 (since
they disappear in 2007), while for Wholesale, Commercial and Saving we consider
the interval 2005-07. Last row provides summary statistics for Total Assets (in USD
Billion).
Wholesale Commercial Saving Long Term Focus Retail Average Average
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (I-III) (I-V)
# observations 3573 3007 1989 1475 535 2856 2116
Retail Loans
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.03
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.04
Mean 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.73 0.08 0.10
3rd Q 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.11 0.13
Corporate and Other Loans
1st Q 0.10 0.51 0.43 0.45 0.01 0.32 0.32
Median 0.33 0.62 0.56 0.64 0.03 0.49 0.48
Mean 0.36 0.61 0.54 0.59 0.07 0.49 0.48
3rd Q 0.58 0.72 0.68 0.76 0.10 0.65 0.64
Retail and Corporate Loans
1st Q 0.31 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.74 0.42 0.44
Median 0.58 0.63 0.58 0.64 0.83 0.60 0.62
Mean 0.52 0.62 0.56 0.60 0.80 0.57 0.58
3rd Q 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.76 0.90 0.72 0.74
Total Loans
1st Q 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.81 0.63 0.64
Median 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.78 0.92 0.75 0.77
Mean 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.87 0.72 0.73
3rd Q 0.89 0.82 0.82 0.87 0.97 0.85 0.86
Interbank Lending
1st Q 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Median 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10
Mean 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.15
3rd Q 0.28 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.22 0.21
Investments
1st Q 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.07
Median 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.15
Mean 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.19
3rd Q 0.24 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.13 0.27 0.26
Customer Deposits
1st Q 0.08 0.07 0.70 0.46 0.25 0.22 0.26
Median 0.39 0.63 0.82 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.58
Mean 0.40 0.48 0.79 0.57 0.49 0.52 0.52
3rd Q 0.69 0.75 0.91 0.76 0.71 0.76 0.76
Interbank Borrowing
1st Q 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
Median 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.10
Mean 0.25 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.15
3rd Q 0.39 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.25 0.23
Long-Term Funding
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Median 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.04
Mean 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.09
3rd Q 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.32 0.17 0.10 0.13
Long-Term Funding + Equity
1st Q 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.08
Median 0.20 0.09 0.10 0.26 0.12 0.14 0.16
Mean 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.30 0.16 0.18 0.20
3rd Q 0.36 0.17 0.16 0.44 0.22 0.25 0.27
Wholesale Debt
1st Q 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Median 0.28 0.17 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.20
Mean 0.34 0.22 0.09 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.24
3rd Q 0.55 0.30 0.15 0.38 0.31 0.37 0.37
Stable Funding
1st Q 0.32 0.21 0.79 0.74 0.36 0.39 0.44
Median 0.62 0.73 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.71 0.74
Mean 0.57 0.56 0.84 0.78 0.62 0.63 0.65
3rd Q 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.84
Net Liquidity
1st Q -0.81 -0.87 -0.91 -0.79 -0.83 -0.85 -0.84
Median -0.67 -0.80 -0.84 -0.62 -0.73 -0.76 -0.74
Mean -0.59 -0.61 -0.81 -0.61 -0.57 -0.65 -0.64
3rd Q -0.45 -0.37 -0.75 -0.49 -0.30 -0.49 -0.48
Total Assets (USD Billion)
1st Q 0.11 0.15 0.40 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19
Median 0.54 0.46 1.20 0.56 0.35 0.67 0.64
Mean 20.77 9.00 13.37 16.91 12.00 14.92 15.05
3rd Q 3.09 1.60 4.75 2.75 0.95 2.95 2.83
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Table 23: Peer Groups Economic Features - Post Crisis. We report average
values for aggregated balance sheet variables standardized by total assets for groups
Wholesale, Commercial, Saving, Diversified Retail and Investments. Column Aver-
age (I-III) refers to the average values within the sample composed by groups Whole-
sale, Commercial and Saving. Column Average (I-IV) refers to the average values
within the sample composed by the first four groups. For variables definitions see
Appendix C.2. Estimates are computed over the interval 2008-14 (excepted for group
Investments which appears only in year 2012 and 2014). Last row provides summary
statistics for Total Assets (in USD Billion).
Wholesale Commercial Saving Diversified Retail Investments Average Average
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (I-III) (I-IV)
# observations 3454 2569 1882 2183 268 2635 2522
Retail Loans
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.04
Median 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.07
Mean 0.15 0.02 0.03 0.34 0.01 0.08 0.14
3rd Q 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.45 0.00 0.11 0.18
Corporate and Other Loans
1st Q 0.12 0.51 0.42 0.16 0.00 0.32 0.28
Median 0.36 0.66 0.55 0.27 0.01 0.50 0.45
Mean 0.37 0.63 0.53 0.27 0.05 0.49 0.44
3rd Q 0.57 0.78 0.66 0.37 0.09 0.66 0.60
Retail and Corporate Loans
1st Q 0.32 0.53 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.42 0.44
Median 0.58 0.67 0.59 0.61 0.01 0.61 0.61
Mean 0.52 0.65 0.57 0.61 0.07 0.57 0.58
3rd Q 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.11 0.74 0.73
Total Loans
1st Q 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.63 0.00 0.59 0.60
Median 0.74 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.05 0.74 0.73
Mean 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.10 0.70 0.70
3rd Q 0.86 0.87 0.80 0.83 0.17 0.85 0.84
Interbank Lending
1st Q 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02
Median 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.08
Mean 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.13
3rd Q 0.24 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.33 0.19 0.18
Investments
1st Q 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.07
Median 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.23 0.40 0.14 0.16
Mean 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.43 0.18 0.19
3rd Q 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.63 0.25 0.27
Customer Deposits
1st Q 0.06 0.00 0.73 0.67 0.00 0.20 0.30
Median 0.38 0.35 0.82 0.75 0.00 0.47 0.53
Mean 0.39 0.34 0.80 0.71 0.06 0.47 0.52
3rd Q 0.69 0.60 0.90 0.81 0.08 0.71 0.73
Interbank Borrowing
1st Q 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.02 0.03
Median 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.40 0.10 0.10
Mean 0.22 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.41 0.17 0.16
3rd Q 0.33 0.26 0.08 0.18 0.60 0.25 0.23
Long-Term Funding
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Mean 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.08
3rd Q 0.16 0.19 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.12
Long-Term Funding + Equity
1st Q 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Median 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.15
Mean 0.31 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.21
3rd Q 0.45 0.33 0.16 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.30
Wholesale Debt
1st Q 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.05
Median 0.24 0.24 0.04 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.18
Mean 0.32 0.29 0.07 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.23
3rd Q 0.52 0.47 0.11 0.23 0.27 0.41 0.37
Stable Funding
1st Q 0.34 0.08 0.79 0.72 0.07 0.36 0.44
Median 0.62 0.60 0.86 0.79 0.20 0.67 0.70
Mean 0.56 0.48 0.84 0.77 0.26 0.60 0.64
3rd Q 0.79 0.77 0.92 0.84 0.41 0.82 0.82
Net Liquidity
1st Q -0.74 -0.77 -0.90 -0.89 -0.37 -0.79 -0.81
Median -0.58 -0.58 -0.82 -0.87 -0.22 -0.64 -0.69
Mean -0.51 -0.46 -0.79 -0.82 -0.24 -0.56 -0.62
3rd Q -0.31 -0.10 -0.73 -0.82 -0.05 -0.34 -0.44
Total Assets (USD Billion)
1st Q 0.14 0.19 0.55 0.31 1.97 0.25 0.27
Median 0.70 0.61 1.68 0.74 7.80 0.90 0.87
Mean 23.81 18.95 21.10 13.52 109.25 21.59 19.84
3rd Q 5.00 2.73 6.60 2.16 52.03 4.64 4.10
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Wholesale
The Wholesale business model is the most popular model in our sam-
ple, accounting on average 3,490 institutions in the period 2005-14. This
model is characterised by the largest proportion of wholesale funding,
from which it inherits the name. Wholesale funding accounts for 32% of
total assets on average for the entire reference period. The rest of fund-
ing comes from a modest amount of deposits (39%) and relevant inter-
bank borrowings (23%), which combined with 18% of interbank lending
shows an important contribution to interbank markets as net borrower.
As a result, moderate long term funding is observed (11%). The asset
side is dominated by loan investments, well spread among retail loans
(15%) and corporate/commercial ones (36%). We note a moderate expo-
sure to noninterest income investments (17%). The above figures are con-
sistent with the “Wholesale-funded”18 model discovered in Roengpitya
et al. (2014) on a much smaller global sample. We also note substantial
similarities with the “Wholesale”19 business model presented in Ayadi
et al. (2012) on a set of large European banks. Due to the important size
of nondeposit funding as well as interbank activity, the Wholesale model
presented here reflects interesting non-traditional banking activities that
could jeopardize stability in distressed scenarios (see e.g. Lozano-Vivas
and Pasiouras 2010).
This model reaches the peak of popularity in 2007 with 4,108 insti-
tutions, as displayed in Table 24. Based on the number of institutions,
Russia is the most represented country, representing on average 24%
of the institutions which are composed by almost all commercial Rus-
sian banks, followed by US institutions (10%) which are mainly bank
holdings and few investment banks, some of those forming the Invest-
ment peer group model after the crisis (see Section 4.5.2). Swiss insti-
18This model is characterised by a 65.2% of gross loans and 36.7% of wholesale debt,
along with a 63.1% stable funding and 35.6% deposits, which are in the same range as our
Wholesale model shown in Table 21. Their interbank composition is less prominent than
ours, but still consistent across other models as we will show in the next subsections.
19This model is characterised by interbank borrowings and lending (23.2% and 16.6%
respectively) very similar to ours. Their Wholesale model tends to be more exposed to
noninterest income investments and nondeposit funding than ours.
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tutions used to have a marginal contribution to this group in 2005 and
2006, accounting for 5% and 3% of total numbers, respectively. Those
were mainly commercial banks and private banks & asset management
companies. In 2007, Swiss institutions reached 10% share in the group,
due to also the migration of more than 250 Raiffeisen saving banks from
another wholesale-oriented business model, the Focus Retail model dis-
cussed in Section 4.5.2. Those institutions, along with small German
ones, switched again in 2008 to form a new peer group running a busi-
ness model named Diversified Retail, which will be discussed in Section
4.5.2. Among the other main countries represented in this group, we re-
call the Austrian Sparkasse and Volksbanks, which are saving and com-
mercial institutions by their direct specialization, and French banks, mainly
commercial.
This business model is also the largest in terms of total assets (see
Figure 23), with a total of $61tn at the beginning of the sample and an av-
erage size of almost $20bn per institution. For instance, we notice that in
2005 Russian institutions, although the most represented in numbers, ac-
counted for only a small share of total assets, not even $300bn compared
with US which represent almost one third of the total peer group’s assets.
Russian commercial banks had a small average size of less than $250mn
in 2005 and represented only half of the total Russian assets in the peer
group. The rest was covered by few large Russian investments, saving
and real estates institutions. Opposite scenario for US bank holdings that
presented average size of almost $30bn in 2005, representing almost 70%
of the whole US total assets in this group. We notice other countries not
showing up by bank number representation but quite large in terms of
total assets in the peer group, i.e. France (almost $8.1tn and average size
of $33bn in 2005, mainly commercial banks by direct classification), UK
(total assets of $9.9tn in 2005 with average size equal to $93.6bn), Nether-
lands ($2.1tn and $143.7bn on average) and Belgium ($1.9tn and $161.3bn
average size, placing them among the largest of the peer group). Finally,
we anticipate that popularity and low percentage of stable funding rela-
tive to total assets for this business model come at a price. Almost half of
the distress events we collect globally come from institutions adopting
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this model at some points in the period 2005-07 (precisely: 78 in 2005, 75
in 2008 and 92 in 2007; 64 adopting continuously the model during the
interval 2005-07). These distressed institutions, although few in num-
bers compared to the total, account for a huge portion of the total assets
of the peer group, such as $10tn in 2005 with an average institution size
of $132.2bn, seven times larger than the average size of the group (if we
restrict to institutions always belonging to the Wholesale model in the
interval 2005-07 the average size of distressed institutions is $135.5bn).
Even restricting the comparison per country (to account for country ef-
fects) we provide clear evidence that being bigger relative to average
peer group members, even from the same country, exacerbates vulner-
ability and eventually distress (see Section 4.7).
Table 24: Wholesale. Summary descriptive statistics over the interval 2005-
14. Column Country reports the main countries of membership; RoW refers
to the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for the classification
provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other marginal special-
izations. Column Average refers to the average values over the reference
period.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Obs. 3221 3390 4108 3270 3116 3484 3608 3626 3424 3653 3490
Country
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 20% 26% 22% 27% 30% 26% 24% 23% 24% 20% 24%
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 18% 15% 13% 7% 9% 9% 10% 7% 8% 6% 10%
FRANCE 8% 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 5%
AUSTRIA 7% 6% 6% 5% 4% 5% 3% 2% 2% 2% 4%
SWITZERLAND 5% 3% 10% 4% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3%
CHINA 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 5% 4% 2%
UKRAINE 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 1% 4% 1%
RoW 42% 43% 44% 50% 49% 52% 54% 56% 57% 59% 50%
Specialization
Commercial Banks 51% 54% 52% 61% 62% 61% 59% 63% 61% 62% 59%
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 17% 15% 12% 8% 9% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 10%
Investment Banks 5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 7% 5% 6%
Savings Bank 7% 6% 10% 6% 6% 5% 6% 5% 2% 4% 6%
Other 19% 19% 21% 20% 18% 19% 20% 19% 21% 21% 20%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
Concluding on banking direct specialization within this peer group,
we note interesting geographical trends. In US the wholesale model is
adopted mainly by bank holdings and few commercial banks, the latter
dominant in France and Russia. On an opposite specialization category,
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we have the Austrian case where cooperative and saving banks adopted
this business model, which is quite counter-intuitive as we would ex-
pect a more deposit-oriented business model for those banking special-
izations. A more volatile case for Switzerland where a large set of saving
banks temporarily joined commercial and investment banks in 2007. As
discussed above we just want to emphasize the issue of the direct clas-
sification approach that can lead to misleading assessments of banking
activities as it does not capture the true banking business models on a
global basis.
Figure 23: Total Assets Distribution: Wholesale Model. Red curve repre-
sents the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all Wholesale
institutions, while blue curve stands for distressed institutions only. Disper-
sion area refers to ±0.1σ. Membership is updated yearly.
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
Commercial
The second core business model discovered by our peer group assess-
ment, the Commercial one, presents a very similar liability structure to
the Wholesale group, making it another wholesale-oriented model. Table
21 confirms the second largest wholesale funding value for this group,
accounting for 27% of total assets. However, a less active participation
in the interbank market, both as borrower and lender, is observed. Com-
mercial model differs from the Wholesale group on the assets side, where
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the majority of the resources are invested in commercial/corporate loans
(the largest among all models: 63% of total assets on average, almost
twice as the Wholesale model) from which it inherits the name.
Table 25 confirms the dominant position of US institutions20, mainly
commercial banks, with an average of 23% of the total number of insti-
tutions, quite consistent throughout the entire period. German banks
used to account for the largest share of the Commercial model up to 2007,
i.e. 59% of the total in 2005-06 and 38% in 2007. They were about two
third Volksbank and Raiffeisenbank German cooperative banks and one
third Sparkasse German savings banks (only about 2% of commercial
and real estate institutions). This dominant participation disappeared
from 2008 when many of them joined Swiss institutions in what it will
be a very popular and distinctive business model, the Diversified Retail
group, which will be discussed in Section 4.5.2. The drop in percent-
ages in 2007 is justified by the widening of group composition to Ital-
ian and Spanish institutions. We note that Italy has become the second
largest country represented in this business model since 2007, when al-
most 500 Banche di Credito Cooperativo (cooperative banks) along with
some commercial and few Casse di Risparmio (saving banks) switched
from the Long Term model (discussed in Section 4.5.2) to the Commercial
model. They account for 23% of the total number of banks after 2007.
Many Spanish cooperative and saving banks (Caixas Rural and Cajas de
Ahorros) also migrated into this model in the years 2008-09.
It is interesting to note that Roengpitya et al. (2014), in their analysis
of large 222 global banks, observe a wholesale-funded model, consistent
with both our Wholesale and Commercial models, operated exclusively by
non-US banks, mainly European. In our study, US institutions adopt-
ing wholesale-oriented business models are bank holdings and national
commercial banks, that were not part of the sample in Roengpitya et al.
(2014). The extension of the dataset and the use of our indirect approach
can, therefore, clarify banking activities across a wider range of insti-
tutional specializations and depict a bigger picture to allow for a more
20Interestingly, for example in 2005 among the 597 US banks in this peer group, 585 are
US First and State banks complying with “regulatory” accounting standards.
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accurate analysis of business models both within and across countries.
Table 25: Commercial. Summary descriptive statistics over the interval
2005-14. Column Country reports the main countries of membership; RoW
refers to the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for the classi-
fication provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other marginal
specializations. Column Average refers to the average values over the refe-
rence period.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Obs 2592 2568 3861 3003 2877 2760 2692 2125 2135 2390 2700
Country
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23% 23% 15% 20% 24% 23% 22% 28% 27% 23% 23%
GERMANY 59% 59% 38% 11% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 19%
ITALY 1% 2% 16% 22% 22% 23% 23% 26% 25% 22% 18%
FRANCE 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4%
SPAIN 1% 1% 3% 5% 4% 4% 4% 2% 1% 2% 3%
SWEDEN 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 3% 1%
AUSTRIA 0% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2%
RoW 14% 13% 22% 35% 37% 37% 37% 32% 34% 39% 30%
Specialization
Commercial Banks 32% 32% 32% 44% 45% 44% 43% 41% 41% 43% 40%
Cooperative Banks 40% 40% 39% 28% 21% 23% 23% 24% 24% 23% 29%
Savings Bank 18% 18% 16% 9% 8% 9% 8% 6% 7% 8% 11%
Finance Companies (Credit Card, Factoring & Leasing) 3% 4% 4% 6% 7% 8% 10% 13% 13% 10% 8%
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 1% 1% 2% 2% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 3%
Securities Firm 6% 5% 7% 11% 14% 12% 11% 11% 10% 11% 10%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
Looking at the distribution of total assets (see Figure 24), this peer
group is much smaller than the Wholesale one, accounting for $14.8tn of
total assets in 2005 with average size of $5.7bn. Germany and France
are the most represented countries in terms of total assets, about $3tn in
2005 with, however, a very different individual contribution. German
institutions, where saving and cooperative banks represent half of the
country total assets in the peer group in 2005, are very small ($2.3bn av-
erage size, below the group average), whereas French banks (only 45 in
2005) averaged almost $70bn in size for that year. US institutions con-
tribute with a smaller share of assets ($1.5tn in 2005) with average sizes
of $2.5bn and only few very large bank holdings. Other small number of
banks with large individual contributions are the one from Netherlands
(13 with $131.9bn average size in 2005 that sums to an important $1.7tn
of total assets in the peer group) and UK (9 institutions with $64.1bn av-
erage size in 2005).
On the risk profile, we observe a smaller number of institutions in dis-
117
tress during the crisis (33, 35 and 55 distressed institution which belong
to this group in 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively; 28 belonging always
to the Commercial group during the interval 2005-07) than the Wholesale.
This result is also justified by the lower popularity of the Commercial ver-
sus the Wholesale model. However, same evidence of larger size on vul-
nerable banks compared to their peers is observed. For example, the 33
institutions in 2005 that will show distress during the crisis period are on
average 10 times bigger than their peers, even by restricting the compar-
ison within the same country of origin. They account for almost $2tn of
assets, almost 15% of the total of the group. This evidence also supports
the claim that relative size matters for vulnerability and probability of
distress.
Figure 24: Total Assets Distribution: Commercial Model. Red curve repre-
sents the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all Commercial
institutions, while blue curve stands for distressed institutions only. Disper-
sion area refers to ±0.1σ. Membership is updated yearly.
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
Saving
The Saving business model is a deposit-oriented model with the most
customer deposit-funded position of all, accounting for 79% of total as-
sets as average value over the period 2005-14. The remaining liability-
side entries are minimal (6% interbank borrowings and 3% long term
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funding) including a quite tight amount of equities (9% of total assets).
On the assets side we observe a good diversification, with exposures to
loans, mainly nonretail loans (of which 53% of corporate/commercial
ones), noninterest income investments (21%) and decent interbank lend-
ing (14%). The latter, in combination with interbank borrowings, makes
those institutions the only interbank net lenders among the three core
models as shown in Table 21. We note that Ayadi et al. (2012) find a
deposit-oriented model to be net-borrower in the interbank market as
opposed to our Saving model. Their result is actually in line with another
deposit-oriented model we find, i.e. the Diversified Retail group, that will
be discussed in Section 4.5.2. In fact, the latter shows a better European
representation than the Saving model and may justify the similarity with
Ayadi et al. (2012) as their analysis is restricted to European institutions
only. The Saving group provides on paper the most stable funding busi-
ness model due to the deposit-driven liabilities with a well-diversified
assets side. Roengpitya et al. (2014) find that their retail-funded model,
closely related to our Saving model21, presents less volatile earnings com-
pared with the other models, although it is not as cost-efficient as the
wholesale-funded one.
The geographic composition of the Saving model is very stable over
time with average size of 1,915 banks along the entire period, largely rep-
resented by Japanese and US institutions (30% and 27% respectively). As
we mentioned above regarding the migration of Swiss (from the Whole-
sale group) and German (from the Commercial group) institutions to a
new model (i.e. the Diversified Retail group), we observe a similar phe-
nomenon here with some German banks that dropped their participation
to this model in 2008. We also note the same issue with the direct bank
specialization raised for the Wholesale classification. Focusing on those
specializations, we find that among the US institutions prior to the cri-
sis, about one third is represented by saving banks while the remaining
two third is made up of commercial banks (by their direct classification).
21The retail-funded model found by Roengpitya et al. (2014) is characterized by the
largest deposit driven model with 66.7% of total assets, very high stable funding and quite
diversified assets side in line with our Saving model.
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Within those commercial banks, they are almost evenly splitted among
the “US GAAP” accounting standards and the “regulatory” principles.
Japanese institutions, however, are mainly cooperative banks (almost
80% of the total Japanese institutions) with marginal presence of com-
mercial banks (less than 20%), in line with the German Raiffeisenbank
and Volksbank institutions (cooperative) with only marginal representa-
tion of commercial ones. Another well represented country is India, with
the majority of commercial Indian banks adopting this business model.
Even though there is usually consistency among direct specializations of
institutions within the same country, less meaningful cross-country com-
parisons can be done based on the direct specialization approach.
Table 26: Saving. Summary descriptive statistics over the interval 2005-
14. Column Country reports the main countries of membership; RoW refers
to the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for the classification
provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other marginal special-
izations. Column Average refers to the average values over the reference
period.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Obs 1946 1952 2070 1708 2125 2009 1778 1901 1849 1807 1915
Country
JAPAN 31% 30% 28% 33% 27% 28% 31% 30% 30% 30% 30%
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29% 27% 26% 29% 28% 27% 24% 28% 28% 27% 27%
GERMANY 6% 7% 9% 4% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4%
INDIA 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
INDONESIA 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 2%
PORTUGAL 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 4% 5% 5% 1%
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 2% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0% 2% 1%
RoW 29% 31% 32% 28% 37% 37% 34% 29% 29% 28% 31%
Specialization
Commercial Banks 50% 50% 47% 48% 49% 47% 48% 44% 42% 43% 47%
Cooperative Banks 30% 30% 30% 30% 24% 25% 28% 26% 26% 27% 28%
Savings Bank 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 9% 6% 11% 11% 11% 10%
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 2% 3% 5% 5% 10% 11% 10% 12% 12% 11% 8%
Other 7% 7% 8% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
With more than $20tn worth of total assets (see Figure 25), Saving
model institutions are also the second largest peer group in our global
sample prior to the crisis, with average size of $11bn in 2005. Differently
from the previous two core models, the geographic representation of to-
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tal assets is in line with the model popularity, having again Japanese and
US banks contributing quite evenly to the total assets ($10.3tn and $8.5tn
in Japan and US respectively in 2005) with averages within each country
slightly above the peer group level ($17.3bn and $15.2bn in Japan and
US respectively for 2005). As we would expect, saving and cooperative
banks in both countries tend to be on average much smaller than the
commercial ones. Other remaining countries, like Germany with total
assets of $113.1bn in 2005, contribute very marginally to the total assets
of the group. The Saving group differentiates itself from the other two
core groups (and from any other wholesale-oriented as we will see in
next subsections) also on the risk attitude of the institutions. In fact, the
is no evidence of higher vulnerability of those on the right side of the
distribution of assets relative to their peers. Average sizes of distressed
institutions during the period 2008-10 in this group are perfectly in line
with their peers, with non consistent patterns to be spotted at the country
level either. This would suggest that relative size on a model with very
high stable funding does not matter for purposes of risk assessment. This
issue will be discussed in detail in Section 4.7.
Figure 25: Total Assets Distribution: Saving Model. Red curve represents
the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all Saving institu-
tions, while blue curve stands for distressed institutions only. Dispersion
area refers to ±0.1σ. Membership is updated yearly.
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
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Diversified Retail
The Diversified Retail is a deposit-oriented model mainly formed by Ger-
man and Swiss institutions which moved from the two wholesale-funded
models, the Commercial and Wholesale respectively. We recall that these
institutions are mainly German and Swiss Volksbanks and Raiffeisen-
banks (mostly cooperative institutions) along with Sparkasse-type Ger-
man saving banks. The liabilities side looks more retail-oriented than
the Wholesale group, with the customer deposits size twice as big as the
wholesale-funded models (71% of total assets) but not as large as the Sav-
ing one. Also, wholesale funding and interbank borrowings (18% and
13%) are lower than the Wholesale and Commercial models. These results
suggest a substantial restructuring process implemented by German and
Swiss institutions at the peak of the financial crisis, aiming at improving
their stable funding, which indeed increased from about 53% (average of
Wholesale and Commercial models) to 77%. The result is an hybrid liabil-
ity structure that incorporates characteristics of both Saving and Whole-
sale models. The assets side is well diversified with a relevant exposure
to retail loans (34% of total assets), corporate/commercial ones (27%),
moderate interbank lending (11%) as well as decent noninterest income
investments (23%). Following Ko¨hler (2015), Section 4.7 will discuss and
compare the impact of variations of noninterest income and non-deposit
funding to the risk of distress by focusing on the changes of business mo-
dels prior to the crisis between deposit- and wholesale-oriented ones.
Regarding the geographic composition of this group, Table 27 shows
that US, after being the second largest popular country in 2008, felt in
participation from 13% to 2%. Looking at the specialization of US institu-
tions in 2008, among the total of 257 institutions we notice a prevalence
of bank holdings (220), which present different accounting standards:
122 institutions adopted US GAAP while 98 were under regulatory prin-
ciples. The former were institutions coming from the Wholesale group
in 2007 and switching into the Saving model (50%) or remaining in the
Diversified Retail group (30%) in 2009; the latter were again institutions
which belonged to the Wholesale group in 2007 and that in 2009 migrated
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more to the Commercial model (60%) and the Saving model (40%). In ad-
dition, institutions under the US GAAP standards were basically within
the Wholesale model even in the interval 2005-06, while in the same bi-
ennium those under the regulatory accounting standards were almost
evenly splitted among the Wholesale group (40%) and the Focus Retail (see
Section 4.5.2) group (60%).
Table 27: Diversified Retail. Summary descriptive statistics over the in-
terval 2008-2014. Column Country reports the main countries of member-
ship; RoW refers to the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for
the classification provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other
marginal specializations. Column Average refers to the average values over
the reference period.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Obs 2053 2195 2233 2252 2244 2218 2086 2183
Country
GERMANY 62% 71% 70% 68% 69% 67% 68% 68%
SWITZERLAND 13% 12% 11% 11% 11% 11% 12% 12%
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 13% 2% 2% 4% 2% 3% 2% 4%
UNITED KINGDOM 3% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3%
AUSTRIA 1% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2%
FRANCE 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 2%
CANADA 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
RoW 9% 9% 10% 9% 9% 10% 9% 9%
Specialization
Cooperative Banks 40% 47% 45% 44% 44% 44% 43% 44%
Savings Bank 30% 32% 33% 36% 35% 35% 35% 34%
Commercial Banks 11% 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Other 14% 6% 7% 5% 5% 6% 6% 7%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
The popularity of this new peer group is also confirmed by the share
of the total assets (see Figure 26) at about $27tn in 2008 and average size
of the institutions of $13bn. In 2008, the main contributors were insti-
tutions from US with $6.8tn worth of total assets, followed by Germany
($4.8tn) and France ($4.5tn). Swiss banks were relatively very small with
average size of less than $2bn in 2008 compared with the US ones with
$26.5bn. We also note that few of the US bank holdings in this group in
2008 were huge institutions with total assets greater than $1tn. From 2009
onwards the US share in total assets lost 72% to a total of less than $2tn in
2009 (about $4tn from 2010 onwards) due to both a huge drop in numbers
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and the departure of big institutions. Among German institutions, we
observe a consistent dispersion in the distribution of assets in 2008, with
cooperative and saving at the lower end of the distribution (average size
of cooperative at $780mn, $3.1bn for savings) compared with few com-
mercial, bank holdings and some huge credit financial companies with
average size of almost $38bn. Few distressed companies adopted this
business model at the peak of the crisis in 2008: 15 that mainly came from
the Wholesale group (only 2 from Commercial). Those were huge com-
pared to the average size of their peers (average size of $251bn in 2008,
almost twenty times larger than the average of the group at that time).
Again we have evidence showing that relative size of their peer groups
matters in terms of vulnerability and probability of distress. However,
we note that those companies used to adopt a wholesale-oriented model
prior to the crisis and should be compared with those peer group mem-
bers in the assessment of the risk of distress (as we have shown in the
sections above).
Figure 26: Total Assets Distribution: Diversified Retail Model. Red curve
represents the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all Diver-
sified Retail institutions, while blue curve stands for distressed institutions
only. Dispersion area refers to ±0.1σ. Membership is updated yearly.
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
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Long Term
The Long Term group was a wholesale-oriented model quite popular be-
tween European banks prior to the financial crisis with an average size
of 1,475 banks. It is discovered by our classification approach only in
2005 and 2006. Italian banks are the most represented by far, accounting
for 43% and 40% in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Spanish banks are the
second most popular with 7% and 6%. Interestingly, about 80% of those
Italian and Spanish institutions are cooperative (Banche di Credito Co-
operative and Cajas Rural) and saving (Casse di Risparmio and Cajas de
Ahorros) institutions that migrated mainly to Commercial model in 2007.
The remaining are commercial banks by direct specialization.
Table 28: Long Term. Summary descriptive statistics over the interval 2005-
2006. Column Country reports the main countries of membership; RoW
refers to the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for the clas-
sification provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other marginal
specializations. Column Average refers to the average values over the refe-
rence period.
2005 2006 Average
Obs 1416 1534 1475
Country
ITALY 43% 40% 41%
SPAIN 7% 6% 7%
SWEDEN 5% 5% 5%
GERMANY 2% 4% 3%
UNITED KINGDOM 3% 3% 3%
FRANCE 2% 3% 2%
SWITZERLAND 0% 2% 1%
RoW 37% 37% 37%
Specialization
Cooperative Banks 38% 36% 37%
Commercial Banks 34% 34% 34%
Savings Bank 11% 10% 11%
Private Banking & Asset Mgt Companies 3% 5% 4%
Securities Firm 14% 14% 14%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
Looking at Table 22 we note very similar loans exposure with the
Commercial model, large positions to commercial/corporate loans (59%)
and noninterest income investments (17%). The liabilities side presents
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a large wholesale funding (26%) and modest deposits (57%) in line with
the two wholesale-funded models. However, this model discriminates
itself from the others by the largest long term funding of all, 18% of to-
tal assets, that motivates the choice of the name. It is indeed the most
long term funded model among all wholesale-oriented models. Another
interesting peculiarity of the model is the net lender position in the inter-
bank market, a characteristic we observe only in the Saving model.
This peer group was as large as the Commercial model in 2005, ac-
counting for $19.5tn of assets (it increases to $30.8tn in 2006). Institutions
in this peer group show average size of $13.7bn in 2005 ($20.1bn in 2006),
more than twice the size of the Commercial group but not as big as the
Wholesale one (see Figure 27). The geographic concentration of assets in
2005 sees Italy with a total of almost $4tn in 2005 due to the popular-
ity of this model among Italian banks, followed by UK ($4tn), France
and Switzerland ($1.6tn), Belgium ($1.5bn) and Spain (about $1bn). In
2006, UK institutions accounted for almost $7tn, followed by Italy and
France ($4.5tn), Germany, Switzerland and Belgium (about $2tn). The
risk profile here is quite peculiar: 27 institutions out of 1416 in 2005 were
under distress during the financial crisis (the number increases to 30 out
of 1534 in 2006). Those few represented a total assets of almost $5tn in
2005 ($9.7tn in 2006), almost a forth and a third of the total peer group’s
assets in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Those 27 institutions had an aver-
age size back in 2005 of $180bn ($322bn in 2006), more than 13 and 16
times the average size of their peer group members in 2005 and 2006, re-
spectively. This places those vulnerable institutions at the far high end
of the distribution of sizes.
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Figure 27: Total Assets Distribution: Long Term Model. Red curve rep-
resents the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all Long
Term institutions, while blue curve stands for distressed institutions only.
Dispersion area refers to ±0.1σ. Membership is updated yearly.
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
Focus Retail
This is another wholesale-oriented model characterized by a good pro-
portion of wholesale funding (22% of total assets), few deposits (49%)
and interbank borrowings (10%). The peculiarity of this model is the
largest exposure to retail loans, from which it inherits the name, account-
ing for 73% of total assets. Only 7% of loans are provided to corpo-
rate/commercial instruments as well as small positions in noninterest
income investments (only 9%). We also note a very small amount of
equity (4% of total assets on average) that could be justified by the in-
vestment strategy. In fact, retail loans tend to have on average lower risk
weighting than non-retail loans (especially if claims are on companies
below A- credit ratings) that would justify this result22.
22For a deeper analysis on banks capital requirements, see reports in
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm.
127
Table 29: Focus Retail. Summary descriptive statistics over the interval
2005-2006. Column Country reports the main countries of membership; RoW
refers to the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for the classi-
fication provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other marginal
specializations. Column Average refers to the average values over the refe-
rence period.
2005 2006 Average
Obs 606 463 535
Country
SWITZERLAND 46% 60% 53%
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 33% 14% 23%
UNITED KINGDOM 9% 10% 9%
GERMANY 2% 3% 3%
NETHERLANDS 1% 2% 2%
SPAIN 1% 2% 1%
AUSTRALIA 0% 1% 0%
RoW 7% 8% 8%
Specialization
Savings Bank 37% 48% 42%
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 34% 15% 25%
Commercial Banks 12% 16% 14%
Real Estate & Mortgage Bank 13% 15% 14%
Other 4% 6% 5%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
The geographic composition of this model is dominated by Swiss sav-
ing banks (Raiffeisenbanks) and US bank holdings under “regulatory”
accounting standards in 2005. It is interesting to note how accounting
standards affect the adoption of business models among the US bank
holdings. Due to their geographical restriction on local investments only,
those loan investments are mainly dedicated to retail customers, whereas
the other bank holdings on GAAP accounting standards can better diver-
sify their investment strategy and joining the peer group adopting the
wholesale model. In 2006 some of the US institutions began their migra-
tion to the other wholesale-oriented models. We note here that a large
proportion of Swiss banks moved to the Wholesale model in 2007, right
before the restructuring process of 2008 discussed in Section 4.5.2 where
they finally landed. Among the US bank holdings, most of them moved
to the Wholesale group in 2007 and then changed to the Diversified Retail
group in 2008 and again to the Commercial group in 2009. Restructur-
ing activities among those institutions could be caused by the recovering
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process of the post financial crisis. A similar analysis can be done for
the UK banks within this business model. Those where mainly UK real
estate & mortgage institutions that moved to the Wholesale model in 2007
(as the closest wholesale-oriented group). However, at the peak of the
financial crisis, all of them switched to the Diversified Retail model show-
ing a drastic and rapid funding transformation towards deposit-oriented
sources. The housing market crisis is the obvious explanation of these
transitions that pushed those institutions to reduce their wholesale debt,
probably due to the lack of funding opportunities.
Figure 28: Total Assets Distribution: Focus Retail Model. Red curve rep-
resents the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all Focus
Retail institutions, while blue curve stands for distressed institutions only.
Dispersion area refers to ±0.1σ. Membership is updated yearly.
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
This peer group does not exceed in assets size (see Figure 28) due to
its lack of popularity compared with the other wholesale-oriented mo-
dels. In 2005, the group accounted for $5.5tn of total assets ($6.9tn in
2006), mainly covered by institutions from the UK ($2.2tn in 2005 and
$2.7tn in 2006) and the Netherlands ($1tn in 2005 and $1.2tn in 2006).
The average size of the institutions in this group is $9bn ($14.9 in 2006),
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in line with the other models of this kind. However, the distribution of
assets among the main represented countries varies a lot, from large UK
real estate & mortgage banks (average $8.3bn in 2005) and a couple of
very big bank holdings (on average $374bn in 2005) to very small Swiss
saving banks ($238mn on average in 2005) and US institutions ($1.3bn
on average in 2005). As for the other wholesale-oriented models that do
not exceed in large stable fundings, the Focus Retail model shows dis-
tress events mainly among few very large institutions (13 and 12 institu-
tions that adopted this model in 2005 and 2006, respectively), accounting
about one third of the total assets of the group. Average sizes of these
vulnerable institutions (mainly from UK, the Netherlands and Switzer-
land) are $139.5bn in 2005 and $176.2bn in 2006, 15 times larger than the
average size of their group members in 2005 and 12 times for 2006.
Investment
The last business model we present here is the Investment model, which
only runs in 2012 and 2014. Table 23 shows that this model does not
belong to either deposits or wholesale oriented groups. It resembles the
characteristics of investment institutions with liabilities dominated by in-
terbank borrowings (41%), the largest position ever encountered in our
business classification. Along with a minimal long term funding (only
5%) and customer deposits (6%), the investment model shows a unique
no-stable and short term funding structure. The funding is then invested
mainly in noninterest income securities (43% of total assets), making it
the right candidate for a trading/investment oriented model consistent
with those found in Roengpitya et al. (2014)23 and Ayadi et al. (2012)24.
23They present a trading model characterized by 19% interbank borrowing, much
smaller than ours but still representing the model with the largest amount compared with
the retail and wholesale ones, as well as the largest trading position.
24Their investment model is characterized by the largest position in trading assets, simi-
lar to ours. However, they do not find evidences of either dominant interbank activities or
non-deposit funding. We note here that their sample does only consider large EU banks,
which does not provide a good match with the geographic composition of our investment
model.
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Investment model is also characterized by a 20% interbank lending, plac-
ing institutions in this group among the largest net borrowers in the in-
terbank market.
As we expected, the geographic representation of the Investment group
presented in Table 30 includes institutions located in traditional financial
markets, such as the US with 19% of total number of institutions, UK
(12%), Taiwan (8%) and Japan (7%), representing the top broker dealer
institutions. This is a very specialized peer group in size, with only 310
institutions in 2012 and 226 in 2014. All those institutions moved back
and forth from and to the Wholesale model with only very few exceptions.
Table 30: Investments. Summary descriptive statistics for 2012 and 2014.
Column Country reports the main countries of membership; RoW refers to
the Rest of the World. Column Specialization stands for the classification
provided by Bankscope; Others summarizes all the other marginal special-
izations. Column Average refers to the average values over the reference
period.
2012 2014 Average
Obs 310 226 268
Country
Country
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 21% 18% 19%
UNITED KINGDOM 11% 12% 12%
MEXICO 8% 9% 8%
TAIWAN 7% 9% 8%
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 3% 11% 7%
JAPAN 6% 7% 7%
BRAZIL 6% 4% 5%
RoW 38% 29% 33%
Specialization
Investment Banks 28% 36% 32%
Commercial Banks 24% 20% 22%
Securities Firm 23% 21% 22%
Bank Holding & Holding Companies 11% 9% 10%
Other 15% 14% 14%
Source: Bankscope, authors’ own calculation
The other distinctive characteristic of this model is the size of the in-
stitutions, way larger than any other model we discover. In 2012 the 310
banks accounted for $33.2tn of total assets with average size of $107.4bn,
at least 5 times the size of its competitor groups, with few companies
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with more than $2tn of total assets in that year. The geographic map lo-
cates UK institutions whose assets sum to $9tn, followed by US ($7.7tn)
and Japan (almost $2tn). Many of those huge institutions are bank hold-
ings and investment banks by their direct classification. We observe a
decrease in total assets in 2014 ($25.1tn) due to the reduction of 25% of
institutions present in the group with respect to 2012. However, the av-
erage size remained very high ($111.3tn) placing this model at the top
for individual total assets. As this model emerges only well after the fi-
nancial crisis, no useful information regarding the extent of risk can be
retrieved. We can only observe three large institution that survived from
a distress event during the crisis and adopted this model. Two came from
the Wholesale model and one was first in Long Term in 2005-06 and then
in Wholesale. Those institutions have average assets size pretty close to
$1tn, that might suggest high vulnerability to future crisis.
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4.5.3 Geographic Map of Business Models
This final section extends the discussion of the business models of Sec-
tion 4.5.2 by focusing on banking activities of the main countries. Figures
29-38 presents the annual composition of peer groups, both in terms of
number of institutions and total assets of each peer group, within each
main country for the whole period 2005-2014. Annual peer group sizes
are also compared with the total Bankscope spectrum of institutions for
that country in each year (black dashed line). First thing to notice is the
extremely high total assets coverage of institutions we managed to clas-
sify despite the lack of consistency of data availability for some institu-
tions that were excluded from our classification (see Footnote 6).
Figure 29: US Business Models. The plot shows the composition of bank-
ing business models in US in terms of number of banks (left) and total assets
(right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black line plots the number of
banks (left) and aggregate total assets (right) of all Bankscope dataset.
The US banking system is the largest system worldwide with total
assets exceeding $40tn in 200725. US banks experienced one main falls
at $36tn right at the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 with a sluggish
recovery affected by the US debt ceiling crisis in 2011 (Figure 29 (right)
dashed line). At the bank level, we note a constant reduction of num-
ber of banks, due to defaults and merges caused by the financial crisis,
25Values are the representation of Bankscope database, which covers more than 90% of
the total assets values VIP (2011).
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from more than 2000 institutions in 2005 to 1400 in 2014. Although the
US banking system appears to be very well diversified and balanced in
terms of business models, the fall in numbers has mainly impacted banks
adopting the Wholesale model, the largest in terms of total assets (Figure
29 (right)). Those few Focus Retails banks initially moved to Diversified
Retail in 2008 for then mainly split between the Commercial and Saving
model right after the crisis. The fall of Wholesale banks has also affected
the composition of the US total assets, promoting more traditional busi-
ness models like the Saving and the Diversified Retail from 2008. The latter
point is again evidence of relevant restructuring of banking activity to-
wards less risky strategies as also highlighted in Roengpitya et al. (2014).
We also note the emergence of the Investment models in 2012 and 2014
adopted by few very large banks previously adopting the Wholesale mo-
del.
Figure 30: Russian Business Models. The plot shows the composition of
banking business models in Russia in terms of number of banks (left) and
total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black line plots the
number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets (right) of all Bankscope
dataset.
Opposite scenario for the Russian banking system, characterized by
almost all Wholesale banks, with few Commercial and Saving institutions
emerging in the post financial crisis. Although the number of banks
fluctuated among 900 institutions in Figure 30 (left), we note a speedy
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growth in total assets from $300bn in 2005 to almost $2tn on 2013 in Fig
30 (right). Russian banks experienced a fast recovery from the 1998 Rus-
sian crisis thanks to the boom of oil price and the cash injection by the
government into the economy to promote growth (Jeffries 2011). In 2014
the sanction imposed by the US government had negative repercussion
to the banking system contributing to a fall of 20% of banks total assets
(for a broader picture, see Gurvich and Prilepskiy 2015).
Figure 31: UK Business Models. The plot shows the composition of bank-
ing business models in UK in terms of number of banks (left) and total assets
(right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black line plots the number of
banks (left) and aggregate total assets (right) of all Bankscope dataset.
In Europe, the UK banking system is the second largest in terms of
total assets with values reaching almost $30tn in 2008 in Figure 31 (on
the right), even though those assets are owned by a very small number
of institutions (380 in 2005 raising up to almost 500 in 2012 as shown in
Figure 31 left). We note that a decent share of very small UK institutions
were excluded by our classification approach due to lack of data cover-
age across balance sheet variables (see Footnote 6). This is confirmed by
the fact that the total assets coverage is extremely high (over 90%) as for
all other countries. The financial crisis hit the UK banks mainly from 2009
with a loss of 10% of assets that deepened in recent years. Like the US
system, UK banks tend to be quite diversified in terms of business mo-
dels, with predominant wholesale-oriented funding structure. Indeed,
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only few banks were adopting the Saving model (< 10%) whereas the
others were mainly on Wholesale and Commercial business models. We
note that almost half of the banks used to adopt Long Term or Focus Re-
tail models in 2005-06, for then switching to Commercial model in 2007.
Part of them moved back into the hybrid Diversified Retail model in 2008.
In terms of total assets, we note a fall in Wholesale models after having
reached the peak in 2008 with more than $20tn. The year after there was
an evident change of activity towards Commercial and Diversified Retail
models showing an important impact in assets allocation from a well di-
versified investment strategy (the Wholesale) to a more specific lending
strategy promoting just commercial and retail loans. Like the US, few
giant Wholesale institutions switched into Investment model in 2012 and
2014. Finally, a good proportion of institutions adopted in the period
2011-2013 the mixed strategy that is briefly discussed in Appendix C.3.4.
Figure 32: Swiss Business Models. The plot shows the composition of
banking business models in Switzerland in terms of number of banks (left)
and total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black line plots
the number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets (right) of all Bankscope
dataset.
The case of Swiss banks is interesting as they experienced a big trans-
formation after the 2008 financial crisis, moving from wholesale-oriented
to deposit-oriented business models. With few exceptions, all the 450
banks in Switzerland were adopting a wholesale-oriented model, mainly
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Focus Retail banks, few big Long Term and the rest Wholesale in 2005-06.
In 2007 all wholesale-oriented institutions converged together into the
Wholesale business model to then finally landing to the Diversified Retail
group (Figure 32 (left)). However, those banks represented a very small
portion of the total assets of the Swiss banking sector, mainly saving and
cooperative banks. As shown in Figure 32 (right), Wholesale model domi-
nated the 2007-2011 period in terms of total assets. Last three years show
the dominance of few huge banks adopting the Investment model (in 2012
and 2014).
Among the main Eurozone countries plotted in Figure 33, Germany
takes the lead of the largest banking sector in both number of banks (al-
most 2000 throughout the period with very low variation) and total as-
sets, experiencing a fast growth by tripling its bank assets value from
$6tn in 2005 to $18tn in 2009. As already discussed in Section 4.5.2,
German banks along with small Swiss cooperative and saving banks
that predominately used to adopt the Commercial model, joined together
a new peer group characterized by the Diversified Retail business mo-
del. This new business model became the most popular among German
banks both in terms of both number of banks adopting the model and of
total assets. French banks, as second largest banking system in the Euro-
zone, witnessed a decline in Wholesale activity towards Commercial and,
marginally, Diversified Retail, both in terms of number of banks and total
assets. Among the peripheral Eurozone countries, Italian and Spanish
banks show a decent growth in banking assets that peaked in 2009-10
at historical levels of more than $6tn each. This process reversed as the
Eurozone faced the so-called Eurozone sovereign debt crisis starting in
2010-11 with the first Greek bailout. In both countries, the majority of
banks used to adopt a Long Term model in 2005-06 period. From 2007
onwards, Italian and Spanish institutions converged to Commercial busi-
ness model. A large proportion of Spanish banks, however, moved in
2009 to a more traditional and conservative banking model, the Saving
one. This transition could be explained by the weakness of the Spanish
banking system, and the whole economy, that was experiencing deteri-
oration of banks credit worthiness, high inflation rates, unemployment
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and huge public debt. These events resulted in the Spanish bailout in
2012 (Bentolila et al. 2012).
In the Asian area pictured in Figure 34, most of the emerging coun-
tries show a fast and consisted growth over the years, led by China with
a total assets expansion over ten times during the last 10 years. Like
Russia, almost all Chinese institutions (including Hong Kong) constantly
adopted the Wholesale model. An opposite and unique business model is
adopted in Japan (with peaks of almost $30tn of total assets) and India,
in which the vast majority of institutions belong to the Saving group.
For completeness, we also report evidence of convergence to the Asian
area business model preferences in the Latin America countries (on a
much smaller total assets magnitude as plotted in Figure 35) compared
to the East European countries that share a more European business mo-
del pattern (more diversified with a large share of the Commercial busi-
ness model, Figure 36). Finally, we report quite mixed trends in both in
the Islamic countries (Figure 37) as well as the major offshore financial
centres Figure 38.
To sum up, we recall evident differences in business model prefer-
ences among countries, with the US banks being more balanced between
wholesale and deposit oriented models whereas EU countries prefer a
more wholesale oriented business strategy, in particular the Commercial
business model that seems a distinctive characteristic of European insti-
tutions. The financial crisis, however, forced banks in developed coun-
tries to invest in less risky and more traditional banking activities across
the globe, promoting more deposit oriented business models instead of
wholesale oriented. Opposite scenario in China, Russia and Latin Amer-
ican countries in which the speedy growth of banking assets was domi-
nated by institutions adopting Wholesale models.
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Figure 33: Eurozone Business Models. The plot shows the composition of
banking business models in the Eurozone in terms of number of banks (left)
and total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black line plots
the number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets (right) of all Bankscope
dataset. Countries are Germany (DE), France (FR), Spain (ES), Italy (IT).
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Figure 34: Major Asian Business Models. The plot shows the composition
of banking business models in the Asian area in terms of number of banks
(left) and total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black
line plots the number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets (right) of all
Bankscope dataset. Countries are China (CN), Honk Kong (HK), Japan (JP),
India (IN).
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Figure 35: Major Latin America Business Models. The plot shows the com-
position of banking business models in the Latin America area in terms of
number of banks (left) and total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The
dashed black line plots the number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets
(right) of all Bankscope dataset. Countries are Mexico (MX), Brazil (BR),
Colombia (CO), Argentina (AR).
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Figure 36: Major East Europe Business Models. The plot shows the com-
position of banking business models in the East Europe area in terms of
number of banks (left) and total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The
dashed black line plots the number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets
(right) of all Bankscope dataset. Countries are Poland (PL), Czech Republic
(CZ), Hungary (HU), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI).
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Figure 37: Major Islamic Countries Business Models. The plot shows
the composition of banking business models in the Islamic area in terms of
number of banks (left) and total assets (right, in $tn) from 2005 to 2014. The
dashed black line plots the number of banks (left) and aggregate total assets
(right) of all Bankscope dataset. Countries are Saudi Arabia (SA), Bahrain
(BH), Kuwait (KW), United Arab Emirates (AE).
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Figure 38: Major Offshore Financial Centres Business Models. The plot
shows the composition of banking business models within offshore finan-
cial centres in terms of number of banks (left) and total assets (right, in $tn)
from 2005 to 2014. The dashed black line plots the number of banks (left)
and aggregate total assets (right) of all Bankscope dataset. Countries are Ba-
hamas (BS), Bermuda (BM), Cayman Islands (KY), Mauritius (MU), Panama
(PA).
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4.6 Switch Analysis
In this Section we focus on financial institutions’ transitions across busi-
ness models. This analysis allows us i) to study the stability of business
models in the interval 2005-14 and ii) to advance some possible expla-
nations of institutions’ changes in their peer group membership. Know-
ing that institutions tend to run consistent business models over time, a
very low transition probability would validate our identification of peer
groups (see Appendix C.3 for a detailed analysis of year-by-year repre-
sentation of the business models).
Figure 39: Business Models Transitions. The plot shows the percentages of
institutions belonging to a certain model group in one period and switching
to another model in the next period. Plot on left refers to switches from 2005
to 2006, while plot on the right is for transitions from 2006 to 2007.
As shown in Figure 39, institutions tend to persist in the same peer
group during the biennium 2005-06, while the disappearance of both
Long Term and Focus Retail groups in 2007 determined a migration of
these institutions into the three core business models. Consistently with
their funding orientations, institutions belonging to Long Term and Fo-
cus Retail models in 2006 migrated mainly to the other two available
wholesale-oriented models, i.e. Wholesale and Commercial groups. We
note that almost all Focus Retail institutions (98.2%) moved to the Whole-
sale group, most probably for the asset side diversification that the Whole-
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sale model offers to institutions that used to have 73% of their assets in-
vested in retail loans (see Table 22). A different dynamics affects insti-
tutions in the Long Term group, which predominantly migrated to the
Commercial model due to the similarity between their assets structures.
Only 16.7% of Long Term institutions moved to the Wholesale model and,
as expected, just few (3.8%) converted drastically to the deposit-oriented
peer group.
Table 31 provides the membership stability over time, that is the per-
centage of institutions that kept the same business model from the pre-
vious year. With an average of almost 90%, membership to business mo-
del seems to be quite stable over the period 2005-14, thus confirming that
these models are basically composed by a constant set of institutions dur-
ing the reference period. This result also validates the effectiveness of our
peer group assessment on the inter-temporal dimension. We find that
deposit-oriented models tend to be more stable, with in particular the
Diversified Retail (mainly Swiss and German banks) one of the most co-
hesive model due to probably its geographic homophily. We also notice
a breakpoint in correspondence of the collapse of 2007. In this year the
three core models, and especially the wholesale-oriented groups, were
contaminated by the inflows of institutions from the other two groups. Al-
though one might argue that the resulting three groups in 2007 and here-
inafter are no longer the same as the ones emerged in 2005-06, we still
observe in Appendix C.3.2 a reasonable continuity in the distributions
of balance sheet features around the crisis of 2007. Wholesale-oriented
models are those more affected by the inclusion of institutions belonging
to different groups in the biennium prior to the crisis, however percent-
ages shown in Table 31 indicate that still in 2007 these models maintain
a high proportion of members which belonged in 2006 to the same peer
groups. Finally, it is worth underlining that stability of business models
over time in terms of balance sheets characteristics is obviously a high
desirable requirement for a reasonable clustering algorithm, although a
certain degree of variability might be due to the normal updating pro-
cess of banking activities. Since this sample period includes one of the
most significant event in the sustainability of the financial markets, it
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seems realistic that institutions reacted differently from the past against
the deteriorated market conditions and that business models have been
greatly influenced by the wave of financial turmoil. This, in turn, poses
several issues in the recognition of consistent business models and in the
assessment of the coherence of these groups over time. In particular, be-
fore the breakdown of financial market in 2007 institutions experienced
a high level of deregulation and financial innovation, while after the on-
set of the crisis the establishment of a new regulatory framework (e.g.
the Basel III regulations and the Dodd-Frank Act) as well as macro and
micro prudential decisions pointed to a more robust and regulated fi-
nancial system. Our results indicate the presence of three main business
models which persist during the entire interval 2005-14 and that present
quite stable balance sheet figures. Remarkably, our peer group assess-
ment identifies also a convergence to three main business models at the
outbreak of financial market and the departure from 2008 of a homoge-
neous group (Diversified Retail) either in term of balance sheets features
and geographic coverage.
Table 31: Model Membership Stability over Time. In this table we provide
the percentage of institutions that confirm the same business models in time
t with respect to their model in t-1.
Group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Average
Wholesale 93.08% 76.14% 92.72% 92.69% 86.99% 85.88% 88.33% 86.16% 76.34% 86.48%
Commercial 93.98% 63.47% 85.86% 81.19% 90.57% 89.83% 93.85% 91.00% 81.22% 85.66%
Saving 90.25% 84.57% 92.81% 75.46% 93.41% 92.91% 85.75% 94.22% 93.75% 89.24%
Diversified Retail 81.99% 96.53% 95.74% 94.64% 95.77% 96.88% 93.59%
Long Term 85.19%
Focus retail 95.87%
As our main goal is to recognize the driving forces behind the wave
of financial distress originated from the 2007-08 crisis, we circumscribe
the analysis to both switches from 2005 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2007. To
investigate the reasons for switching business models we propose a basic
framework similar to the one applied to study the dynamics of failures.
We rely on a Firth’s Penalized-likelihood logistic regression model (Firth
1993) to explain whether a financial institution switches model (Y = 1)
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or stays in the same group (Y = 0). We consider three potential deter-
minants: i) the size of the institution, to understand whether changes
in business model membership are more likely for instance among big
players; ii) macroeconomic conditions, to assess whether external factors
influence the likelihood to modify the respective business model; iii) the
membership to a certain business model, to understand whether being
in some peer groups could be considered a transient state. To control for
possible size effects, we consider whether the amount of Total Assets im-
pacts on the switching dynamics. We recall that the vectors of measures
used to compute the cosine similarities are normalized by institutions’
respective total assets, hence the identification of peer groups is mainly
driven by similarities among balance sheet ratios. The GDP per Capite
is introduced to verify how economic conditions influence institutions
resilience in the same group over time, or alternatively, determine the
tendency to change model. Finally, we investigate how initial business
model features affect financial institutions’ likelihood to switch model in
time t+1 by introducing the model they belong to in time t. To ameliorate
potential endogeneity problems, we rely on the averages (three years be-
fore) of the economic regressors’ values.
Since peer group membership of an institution relates to the multi-
dimensional distance between itself and the centroid of the respective
group compared to other centroids, we expect that institutions which are
farther from the core of their group in a certain time are more likely to
be candidates to switch to a different model in the next period. To mea-
sure this distance, we introduce the Group-Score (hereinafter G-Score), i.e.
within each group we compute the sum of the distances between each
observation from the mean of each measure used to compute the co-
sine similarities. Moreover, we take into account the dispersion of each
variable standardising every distance by the respective standard devi-
ation. Hence, any deviation from a well concentrated measure is pe-
nalised more than a departure from a dispersed variable. The standard-
ised score for bank i is computed within the corresponding peer group
as:
N∑
j=1
|(Xij − µj)|/σj , where N is the number of variables used to com-
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pute the cosine similarities (i.e. N = 29 balance sheet measures), Xij
refers to the observation of bank i for measure j, while µj and σj stand for
the mean and the standard deviation of measure j, respectively. Further-
more, since institutions have missing values in some of the N variables
preventing the computation of the distances in these cases, we decide to
further divide the score of institution i by the number of its non-missing
variables among the N fields to enhance comparability (the absence of
a balance sheet item can be seen itself as a sign of business model fea-
tures).
Tables 32 and 33 exhibit estimates for the transition dynamics from
2005 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2007, respectively. As expected, G-Scores
have a significant and positive effect, either within a single group or in
the whole sample. Hence, institutions that are less central in a certain
group are more prone to switch into a different one, regardless the initial
business model (as approximated by the peer group of origin). Less clear
is the impact of Total Assets. One might argue that large institutions are
more flexible in the choice of their balance sheet structures, relying on a
much more diversified spectrum of possible investments and a vast set
of funding sources, thus being facilitated whenever they plan to change
their business model. However, one might notice that these institutions
suffer from more regulatory constraints and that large banks reflect the
interests of a wider perimeter of stakeholders, making the switching pro-
cess potentially slower. From 2005 to 2006, significant estimates indicate
a positive effect of Total Assets for Commercial and Focus Retail groups,
while once we consider the entire sample estimates become not signif-
icant. By contrast, from 2006 to 2007 estimates are generally positive
and significant even in the all sample. Thus, being larger in terms of
total assets seems to slightly facilitate a switching dynamics at least be-
fore the outbreak of 2007-08. In few cases the impact of macro-economic
conditions is significant and the sign of the coefficient is in general po-
sitive although modest (with the exception of the Wholesale model, from
to 2006 to 2007, where the coefficient is significant and negative). Hence,
for institutions that are located in countries that exhibit better GDP per
Capita patterns the change to alternative business models looks easier.
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We also notice in Table 32 that institutions belonging to the Long Term
model are more likely to change their group membership from 2005 to
2006 than institutions in the Focus Retail group, as also suggested by the
transition flows shown in Figure 39. In 2007 these two models disap-
peared: Long Term institutions moved mainly to the Commercial group,
while Focus Retail institutions migrated to the Wholesale group. Finally,
Table 33 provides some insights on the impact of a previous switch. The
coefficient for the dummy Switch 2006 is positive and significant, thus
having switched model between 2005 and 2006 made those institutions
more unstable and more likely to redefine their business models in the
next period. In addition, we provide in Appendix C.1 a robustness ana-
lysis to overcome some of the potential issues related to the presence of
missing values especially for certain groups. Here, we briefly anticipate
that results on those enlarged samples support on average the findings
discussed in this Section.
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4.7 Risk Assessment
This Section analyses institutions’ resilience to the risk of distress arising
from the outbreak of financial markets in 2008. We apply a Penalized-
likelihood logistic regression to study distress events (presented in Table
18). Following Betz et al. (2014), we exploit three sets of information
as regressors, i.e. individual characteristics captured by CAMELS prox-
ies as well as macroeconomic and sectoral control variables which are
introduced in Section 4.3.3 (see Table 19). Due to the nature of these
regressors, we might suspect the presence of potential multicollinearity
issues. Table 35 shows that correlations over the period 2005-07 among
regressors do not exhibit relevant relationships, except for few cases, and
estimates are usually significant. In addition, we present different speci-
fications of the model for risk assessment, where we basically select sub-
sets of regressors to overcome potential issues related to multicollinear-
ity. Summary statistics of regressors’ distributions are provided in Table
34.
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Table 34: Regressors Summary Statistics. Values are in percentage and are
computed as averages over the interval 2005-07. For variables definitions
see Section 4.3.3.
obs min 1st qu. median mean 3rd qu. max
Capital 7906 -0.22 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.99
Capital Funding Ratio 7906 -1.19 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.99
Roa 7854 -0.24 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.36
Cost to Income Ratio 8376 0.01 0.56 0.66 0.65 0.74 5.79
Roe 7848 -1.46 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.14 1.60
Net Interest Margin 7825 -0.48 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 2.66
Interest Expenses to Total Liabilities 7769 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 14.29
Liquid Assets to Short-Term Funding 7784 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.34 0.40 7.73
Deposits to Total Funding 7857 0.00 0.84 0.96 0.88 1.00 1.16
Total Securities to Total Assets 8427 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.27 1.00
GDP per capita 8509 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.27
Inflation 8274 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.30
House Price 7322 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.31
Unemployment 8464 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.36
FDI-Inflows 8476 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.57
FDI-Outflows 8239 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.04 3.81
Central Gvt. Debt 7406 0.04 0.42 0.44 0.58 0.62 1.81
Gvt. Long-Term Yield 7495 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.15
Bank NPLs to Gross Loans 8128 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.55
Credit to Non-Financial Sector 7457 0.10 0.54 0.83 0.79 0.92 1.63
Market Index 7769 -0.05 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.74
Sector Index 7466 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.31 0.26 1.32
Stock Traded 7020 0.00 0.73 0.77 1.24 2.24 5.26
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We first focus on the association between distress events and business
models. Table 36 presents the distribution of 2008-10 distress events per
business model according to annual classifications in the interval 2005-
07. For instance, we find that 64 distress events refer to institutions be-
longing to the Wholesale group during the period 2005-07, and similarly
we get 50 and 28 distress events for institutions always belonging to the
Saving and the Commercial models in that interval, respectively. The small
proportion of distress events over the total number of institutions26 in
the sample should not be taken lightly as they account for a large pro-
portion of total assets (see e.g. Figure 40). For Wholesale group, the 64
banks under distress account of up to $10.5tn of total assets in 2007, 1/6
of the total of their peers, and average sizes of more than $160bn, almost
6 times bigger than their peers. Similar results characterize the Commer-
cial model, where those 28 distressed institutions reached a total assets
coverage of $2tn in 2007, 1/5 of the whole amount of the group with av-
erage sizes up to 15 times those of their peer group members. Different
scenario for the 50 distress institutions in the Saving group in 2005-07.
Their total assets was just $600bn compared to the $24.5tn of the whole
group in 2007, with average sizes even below the average of their peers
($12.2bn for the distressed institutions compared with the group average
of $16.8bn in 2007). Although the majority of distress events are found
in wholesale-oriented models, depicting a fragile business model as re-
ported in Roengpitya et al. (2014), Ayadi et al. (2012) and Demyanyk and
Hasan (2010), along with the largest share of total assets at stake, dis-
tress events are quite well-spread across models, which makes our task
of relating specific peer groups to resilience difficult. The remaining 62
distress events are found with institutions switching models, for example
14 Long Term institutions in the biennium 2005-06 moving to Commercial
in 2007, or similarly 11 Focus Retail institutions migrating to the Whole-
sale model and so on, with some mix results in terms of relative sizes.
26We recall that the total number of institutions considered in the model for risk assess-
ment is 8526. Institutions that have been always in the same peer group in the interval
2005-07 are: 2355 (Wholesale), 2053 (Commercial) and 1460 (Saving).
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The presence of distress events among institutions which exhibit switch-
ing patterns (and also the fact that some distress events are related to
the two marginal peer groups) motivates our next step of including the
switching attitude of institutions into the model to assess the likelihood
of distress.
Figure 40: Total Assets Distribution prior to the Crisis. Red curves repre-
sent the time series of average total assets (in US Billion) for all institutions
belonging to each group present prior to the crisis, separately; blue curves
stand for distressed institutions only. Dispersion area refers to±0.1σ. Mem-
bership refers to the entire interval 2005-07 (period 2005-06 for Long Term
and Focus Retail) to that group and is emphasized by continuous lines.
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Table 36: Distribution of Distress Events for Model Membership. Column
names refer to peer groups in year 2007; row names in bold stand for peer
groups in year 2006; finally, row names in italics refer to peer groups in 2005.
Each cell represents the number of distressed institutions referring to the
corresponding combination of peer groups membership. Row Total (2007)
shows the number of distressed institutions partitioned according to the
three peer groups in 2007; similarly, column Total (2006) stands for the total
number of distressed institutions based on classification in 2006. By Sub-
Total (2005) we indicate the number of distressed institutions for peer groups
in 2005 within partitions of 2006; to obtain the total number of distressed
institutions per peer group of 2005 we need to sum up across groups in
2006.
↓ 2006\2007→ Wholesale Commercial Saving Total (2006)
\Sub− Total(2005)
Wholesale (2005 ↓) 67 6 2 75
Wholesale 64 4 2 70
Commercial 1 1 0 2
Saving 1 0 0 1
Long Term 1 0 0 1
Focus Retail 0 1 0 1
Commercial (2005 ↓) 4 31 0 35
Wholesale 1 1 0 2
Commercial 3 28 0 31
Saving 0 0 0 0
Long Term 0 2 0 2
Focus Retail 0 0 0 0
Saving (2005 ↓) 1 0 51 52
Wholesale 0 0 1 1
Commercial 0 0 0 0
Saving 1 0 50 51
Long Term 0 0 0 0
Focus Retail 0 0 0 0
Long Term (2005 ↓) 9 17 4 30
Wholesale 2 3 0 5
Commercial 0 0 0 0
Saving 1 0 0 1
Long Term 6 14 4 24
Focus Retail 0 0 0 0
Focus Retail (2005 ↓) 11 1 0 12
Wholesale 0 0 0 0
Commercial 0 0 0 0
Long Term 0 0 0 0
Focus Retail 11 1 0 12
Total (2007) 92 55 57 204
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Table 37 shows the results of the first model specifications where we
introduce the main reference models to assess the likelihood of distress.
The first three specifications regress our dependent variable, i.e. distress
events, on each group of regressors separately, i.e. proxies for CAMELS,
the macro and the sectoral variables, respectively. As reported by Betz
et al. (2014) and in the references therein, CAMELS dimensions provide
a good representation of the resilience of an institution. Table 37 indi-
cates that negative and significant effects are associated to capital, cost to
income ratio, net interest margins and liquidity ratios, while positive im-
pacts are found with ROE, total securities to total assets and capital fund-
ing ratio. ROE is usually interpreted in terms of bank risk taking, so more
risky activities seem to imply higher probability of distress. Instead,
more liquid positions influence this risk negatively, as higher levels of
liquidity might enforce the solvency of the institution. Less clear is the
impact of capital, as more equity seems to favour safer levels, although
once considered together with subordinated debts the sign becomes po-
sitive. At the macro level, higher GDP per capita reduces the risk of
distress, so better economic conditions seem to foster financial system re-
silience, whereas inflation and FDI outflows increase the likelihood of in-
stitution’s distress. We note that the coefficient for house price has a posi-
tive and significant sign which probably outlines the role of the mortgage
market whose collapse during the recent crisis heavily influenced finan-
cial stability. Odd sign of unemployment in the Macro model disappears
when we introduce a more comprehensive list of regressors. Expected
results arise when considering the sectoral analysis, with market index
returns working in the same direction as GDP per capita, coherently with
the high level of correlation among these variables as reported in Table
35. Marginal negative effects appear for the central government debt ex-
posure and even for the proportion of domestic financial sector NPLs to
total loans. Opposite contribution to institutions’ resilience is associated
with sovereign debt yields whose dynamics might reflect the country risk
appetite by investors. The presence of sovereign instruments in banks’
balance sheets often relate to regulatory requirements and the need to
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fulfil capital constraints based on the amount of risk-weighted assets27.
Therefore, financial institutions are used to present relevant exposures to
sovereign debt, especially domestic issuances, which influence banking
practices and the likelihood of being vulnerable to distress from shocks
in sovereign debt markets (see e.g. Laeven and Valencia 2012). For com-
pleteness, we also run a specification with all regressors, even though
we note that the large number of variables compared with the number
of observations and distress events does not allow for an accurate and
proper econometric investigation. The fifth specification aims to circum-
scribe this issue by implementing a parsimonious model using half of
the regressors. The selection of variables is mainly driven by their cov-
erage within the sample and the significance of the estimates within the
single models, but still preserving the representation of all CAMELS di-
mensions as well as macro and sectoral control variables. Among the
individual regressors we notice that ROA and liquidity (deposits) fos-
ter the resilience of the institutions; an opposite contribution emerges
for ROE that suggests that excessive growth of risky investments can
cause institutions to be in distress. At the macro level, we confirm the
impact of country business cycle approximated by the GDP per capita,
while high inflation and unemployment levels contribute to deteriorat-
ing stability conditions. At the sectoral level, market index has the same
negative sign as GDP per capita as presented above. The sectoral market
index (i.e. market returns of the financial sector) however is positively
and significantly related to distress, capturing the effect of the financial
sector bubble prior to the crisis. The last model specification (Benchmark)
takes also into account membership volatility of institutions in switch-
ing business models before the onset of the crisis28. We aim at testing
27For instance prior to the crisis banks under Basel regulations usually benefit from lower
risk-weigths for positions on government bonds instead of loans. For details see e.g. BCBS
2013.
28Due to the methodological choice to use average values prior to the crisis for the re-
gressors, we focus on institutions that are present during the entire interval 2005-07 in
the models for the assessment of the risk of distress. The resulting institutions that are
discarded because they belong to vary small groups or are even singletons are just 12 (ac-
cording to the clustering of 2005). We also remove 24 institutions mainly supranational for
which macro and sector regressor values are not available.
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whether the volatility of business models adopted by institutions can be
interpreted as a sign of vulnerability which increases the probability of
distress. We observe a statistically significant coefficient of the categori-
cal variable capturing the behaviour of an institution in switching model
twice before the crisis. Note that institutions in the Long Term and Focus
Retail groups all moved to one of the three core peer groups, which does
not necessarily mean that they have substantially modified their busi-
ness models. Hence, two switches in the three year period before 2008
identify those institutions that present really unstable peer group mem-
bership and that represent a better proxy for the volatility of business
model membership.
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Table 37: Distress Assessment. The first three models refer to specifications
within the corresponding group of regressors: Camels, Macro and Sector, re-
spectively. Column All stands for the model with the entire set of regressors.
Column Selected represents a parsimoniuos model where we include about
half of the regressors according mainly to data availability and significance
of the coefficients in the single specifications of the model. Column Bench-
mark adds the categorical variable Switch Group to the Selected specification.
Switch Group assumes value 1 if the institution switches only one time in
the period 2005-07; it assumes value 2 if it switches two times, while it is 0
otherwise. For regressors definitions see Section 4.3.3. Superscripts C, A, M,
E, L, S indicate the respective CAMELS dimensions.
Camels Macro Sector All Selected Benchmark
Intercept −0.740 −2.661∗∗∗ −2.462 4.005 −0.632 −0.752
(0.459) (0.331) (1.710) (4.420) (0.473) (0.496)
CCapital −0.048∗∗ 0.024 −0.010 −0.010
(0.023) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
CCapital Funding Ratio 0.036∗ −0.038∗∗
(0.019) (0.017)
ARoa −0.017 −0.306∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗ −0.219∗∗
(0.074) (0.110) (0.098) (0.097)
MCost to Income Ratio −0.015∗∗∗ −0.009∗
(0.005) (0.006)
MRoe 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
ENet Interest Margin −0.047∗ 0.020∗∗ −0.070 −0.063
(0.026) (0.009) (0.052) (0.052)
EInterest Expenses to Total Liabilities 0.026 0.086∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.031)
LLiquid Assets to Short− Term Funding −0.004∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
LDeposits to Total Funding −0.026∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
STotal Securities to Total Assets 0.010∗∗ 0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP per capita −1.062∗∗∗ −0.223 −0.605∗∗∗ −0.592∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.579) (0.215) (0.215)
Inflation 0.560∗∗∗ 0.170 0.415∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.362) (0.080) (0.081)
House Price 0.085∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.069)
Unemployment −0.144∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.070∗
(0.049) (0.151) (0.041) (0.041)
FDI-Inflows −0.017 0.142
(0.028) (0.142)
FDI-Outflows 0.088∗∗∗ −0.058
(0.026) (0.187)
Central Gvt. Debt −0.010∗ −0.015
(0.006) (0.024)
Gvt. Long-Term Yield 0.399∗∗ −0.795
(0.166) (0.796)
Bank NPLs to Gross Loans −0.201∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗ −0.396∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.125) (0.080) (0.081)
Credit to Non-Financial Sector 0.003 −0.018∗
(0.008) (0.010)
Market Index −0.129∗∗∗ −0.133 −0.073∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.102) (0.019) (0.019)
Sector Index 0.023 −0.032 0.026∗∗ 0.025∗∗
(0.018) (0.091) (0.012) (0.012)
Stock Traded −0.004∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Switch Group = 1 −0.005 0.100
(0.256) (0.211)
Switch Group = 2 1.166∗ 0.963∗
(0.605) (0.543)
Num. obs. 7515 7251 6243 5292 6584 6584
Num. Distress Events 170 179 153 120 137 137
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.042 0.083 0.069 0.242 0.119 0.118
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo R2 0.027 0.073 0.056 0.188 0.097 0.093
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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As we have seen in Table 37, an erratic migration dynamics can favour
the probability of distress events. Thus, next analysis focuses specifi-
cally on the switching behaviour and introduces interaction effects to es-
timate whether belonging to certain business models or changing peer
group membership affect the risk of distress. Once again we rely on
a Penalized-likelihood logistic regression, but differently from previous
models here we use some proxies to fill missing values in order to bet-
ter describe the flows of institutions across peer groups29. Due to data
limitations in the number of observations and distress events, we rely
on a simpler version of the Benchmark model discussed in Table 37.
Since our focus here is the study of the switching dynamics, we pre-
fer to circumscribe the set of CAMELS, macro and sector regressors in
a very parsimonious way (similar to the ones presented and discussed
also in Table 39). Estimates in Table 38 show that the sign and the magni-
tude of the coefficients for CAMELS, macro and sectoral models are very
similar across models and in line with those presented in Table 37. For
the sake of conciseness, we refer to previous comments on the impact
of these regressors. Model A, B and C introduce the peer group mem-
bership for year 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. Interestingly, Long
Term model seems to be safer than the others, while Commercial group
appears to be affected by the re-organization of 2007 when institutions
converged to three core business models. Therefore, in Model D and Mo-
del E we specifically focus on years 2006 and 2007, just before the out-
break of 2008. Estimates among these two models are quite similar and
support the intuition that Commercial model might have reduced its vul-
nerability level with respect to the other core groups. Also, we note that
the coefficient for the switching categorical variable (=2 switches) is sig-
nificant and positive as we have previously seen in Table 37, and this is
a further confirmation that this very parsimonious framework provides
29For each group we admit the presence of one missing value in the computation of
average values for regressors, while for macro and sectoral variables we also consider
geographical aggregated proxies; in addition, we exploit additional data from FDIC for
distressed institutions. In particular, regressors for the Commercial group present several
missing values, which heavily reduce the number of distressed institutions once we use
complete cases without proxies in the regression.
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estimates similar to those obtained with a more structured setup. In ad-
dition, the presence of significant estimates for Switch Group is also in-
teresting as motivating a deeper investigation of the actual flows across
business models. Hence, Model F exhibits estimates where we decom-
pose the switches into the different combinations of migrations across
peer groups between years 2006 and 2007. We observe that changing
from the Long Term to the Commercial peer group reduces the risk of dis-
tress, while conversely a migration from Long Term into the Saving group
increases it. Although the first transition seems pretty consistent with the
structure of institutions’ balance sheets as discussed in Section 4.5.2, the
latter transition from a wholesale-oriented to a deposit-oriented model
might be a sign of funding constraints (limited availability of debt fund-
ing due to increased perception of risk of the institution that could have
caused a liquidity shortfall and a sudden reduction of wholesale funding
compared to the deposits). Furthermore, transitions into the Wholesale
group determine a worsening in the risk of distress that could depict a
process of amplification of wholesale funding that could worsen the level
of stable funding leading to potential higher vulnerability. Finally, Mo-
del G in the last column replicates the partition of institutions according
to the wholesale-oriented classification as presented in literature. Basi-
cally, we merge institutions belonging to the wholesale-oriented category
(i.e. Wholesale, Commercial, Long Term and Focus Retail) and we present a
model similar to Model F. By collapsing all models with similar fund-
ing structure, we aim at verifying whether wholesale-oriented business
models are more prone to vulnerability and distress events compared
to the deposit-oriented model or not (see e.g. Ayadi et al. 2012; Roeng-
pitya et al. 2014). Estimates point to the absence of significant effects
for both business models membership and for transitions across them,
which seems to support the intuition that traditional broad classifications
may be less likely to detect relevant effects and to differentiate the risk
among business models. This is an important contribution of the study,
since the introduction of a more detailed representation of banking ac-
tivities allows us to better discriminate among institutions and to place
them into a more accurate and suitable peer group.
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Table 38: Distress Assessment: Transition Analysis. All the model speci-
fications share the same very parsimonious selection of CAMELS, Macro and Sector
regressors. Model A, Model B and Model C add peer group membership of the in-
stitutions in year 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively; Model D includes both 2006 and
2007 peer group membership; Model E adds to Model D the switching categorical vari-
able (Switch Group); Model F considers the peer group membership in year 2007 plus
the transition dynamics across groups between 2006 and 2007. The reference group
for these models is the Wholesale model in 2006. Model G is similar to Model F but
collapsed all wholesale-oriented groups together and uses the Saving group as refe-
rence one for the categorical variable used for the switching flows. For regressors
definitions see Section 4.3.3. Due to the presence of missing values which affect the
coverage for some groups, thus preventing a proper study of the interaction effects
across them, we prefer to add some geographical aggregated proxies for macro and
sectoral variables. We also admit the presence of one missing value in the computa-
tion of average values for regressors and, in addition, we exploit additional data from
FDIC for distressed institutions. Superscripts C, A, M, E, L, S indicate the respective
CAMELS dimension.
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G
Intercept −0.929∗∗ −0.996∗∗ −1.131∗∗∗ −0.759 −0.665 −0.747 −1.404∗∗∗
(0.463) (0.454) (0.423) (0.464) (0.473) (0.469) (0.449)
CCapital −0.001 0.001 −0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
ARoa −0.258∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.067) (0.072)
MRoe 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ENet Interest Margin −0.056 −0.061 −0.074∗ −0.057 −0.055 −0.037 −0.083∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037)
LDeposits to Total Funding −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
STotal Securities to Total Assets 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
GDP per capita −0.201∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −0.132∗ −0.201∗∗ −0.206∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗ −0.104
(0.088) (0.085) (0.077) (0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.074)
Inflation 0.445∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.094) (0.085) (0.096) (0.097) (0.098) (0.083)
Gvt. Long-Term Yield −0.081 −0.073 −0.022 −0.086 −0.095 −0.117 −0.010
(0.093) (0.091) (0.080) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095) (0.077)
Market Index −0.078∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
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Distress Assessment: Transition Analysis: continued
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F Model G
Group (2005): Commercial 0.597∗∗
(0.247)
Group (2005): Saving 0.034
(0.213)
Group (2005): Long Term −0.818∗∗∗
(0.264)
Group (2005): Focus Retail 0.582∗
(0.346)
Group (2006): Commercial 0.650∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.390) (0.398)
Group (2006): Saving 0.019 0.283 0.129
(0.216) (0.408) (0.443)
Group (2006): Long Term −0.654∗∗∗ −0.014 0.129
(0.252) (0.352) (0.427)
Group (2006): Focus Retail 0.534 0.470 0.708
(0.353) (0.354) (0.434)
Group (2007): Commercial −0.384∗ −0.861∗∗ −0.817∗∗ 0.871∗
(0.199) (0.354) (0.358) (0.467)
Group (2007): Saving −0.102 −0.315 −0.170 −0.773
(0.202) (0.396) (0.430) (0.680)
Group (2007): Wholesale-oriented −0.409
(0.396) (0.852)
Switch Group = 1 −0.297
(0.286)
Switch Group = 2 0.962∗
(0.567)
Group (2006) Commercial 7−→ Group (2007) Wholesale 1.884∗∗∗
(0.634)
Group (2006) Saving 7−→ Group (2007) Wholesale 0.746
(0.884)
Group (2006) Long Term 7−→ Group (2007) Wholesale 0.689∗
(0.404)
Group (2006) Focus Retail 7−→ Group (2007) Wholesale 0.507
(0.367)
Group (2006) Commercial 7−→ Group (2007) Commercial −0.224
(0.494)
Group (2006) Saving 7−→ Group (2007) Commercial −1.747
(1.518)
Group (2006) Long Term 7−→ Group (2007) Commercial −2.104∗∗∗
(0.517)
Group (2006) Focus Retail 7−→ Group (2007) Commercial 1.441
(1.134)
Group (2006) Commercial 7−→ Group (2007) Saving 0.123
(1.688)
Group (2006) Saving 7−→ Group (2007) Saving 0.788
(0.678)
Group (2006) Long Term 7−→ Group (2007) Saving 2.351∗∗∗
(0.874)
Group (2006) Wholesale-oriented 7−→ Group (2007) Saving −0.124
(0.438)
Group (2006) Wholesale-oriented 7−→ Group (2007) Wholesale-oriented 0.351
0.841
Num. obs. 6795 6795 6795 6795 6795 6795 6795
Num. Distress Events 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.111 0.108 0.101 0.109 0.110 0.122 0.099
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo R2 0.092 0.089 0.084 0.087 0.085 0.092 0.080
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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The information of the true business model adopted by banks rep-
resents a valuable opportunity for regulators to investigate institutions’
characteristics and vulnerability to distress. This would support targeted
intervention and more accurate risk monitoring. To disentangle the im-
pact of being in a particular peer group, we analyse each business mo-
del separately by partitioning the sample according to stable member-
ship along the interval 2005-07. Table 39 focuses on a restricted case
where we discard institutions that switched business models prior to
the crisis30. Since the number of observations and, in particular, dis-
tress events under each peer group is modest, we need to consider a
Penalized-likelihood logistic regression with very few regressors. How-
ever, estimates for small groups should be taken with care due to data
limitations. We propose a simple framework with common CAMELS
variables and two basic macro regressors (GDP per capita and Infla-
tion) along with two sectoral variables which stand for market dynamics
(Government LT Yield and Market Index return). The choice of these re-
gressors is in line to the ones presented in Table 38 producing estimates
for the entire set of no-switching institutions similar to those discussed
in the Benchmark model of Table 37. This supports the selection of these
regressors for the reference model used to create specifications for each
business model, which although confined to specific peer groups mem-
bership though share the same setup to enhance comparability. In ad-
dition, we add the amount of institutions’ total assets as regressor. In
fact, as highlighted in Section 4.5 and in the discussion therein for the
single peer groups, relative size seems to matter for the event of distress
during the recent financial crisis at least for the wholesale-oriented insti-
tutions. As a result, dominant relative asset size within the peer group
exacerbates the likelihood of distress only on wholesale-oriented models,
whereas it has no significant impact for the deposit-oriented group.
Estimates indicate that Wholesale and Saving models present quite dif-
ferent risk drivers also in terms of CAMELS variables: ROE impacts pos-
itively on the likelihood of distress for Wholesale institutions and nega-
30For Long Term and Focus Retail groups we consider stable participation of the institu-
tions in these groups during the biennium 2005-06.
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tively for Saving ones (although the coefficient magnitude is quite small),
while ROA exhibits an opposite pattern and capital has a negative sign
for Saving but does not show significant effects for Wholesale. Thus, our
results seem to emphasize different forces affecting institutions’ proba-
bility of distress under wholesale-oriented or deposit-oriented models.
We might advance the explanation that institutions within the Saving
model cannot fully exploit a wide spectrum of investment choices to
boost their returns on assets. This is due to a limited, compared to the
Wholesale, range of available instruments in the assets side, which prob-
ably impacts on their ability to select profitable investments. However,
Saving institutions might find convenient to enlarge their business into
more profitable investments, which may favour more diversification on
the assets side and, possibly, facilitate even more resilience. Conversely,
institutions adopting the Wholesale model may already present higher ex-
posure on profitable and risky assets, and further investment decisions
to increase the level of ROE can worsen the sustainability of their activ-
ities. This might be due to the structure of the liabilities side: Wholesale
institutions have higher levels of debts, especially interbank debts, and
further investments are indeed likely to involve an increase on leverage,
which in turn deteriorates the resilience of their business model and,
eventually, exacerbates their risk of distress; Saving institutions on the
other side are more characterized by stable funding, namely deposits,
so the mix of funding that they can use for investment purposes is less
prone to suffer from financial market instability. The latter phenomenon
can imply contagion dynamics that are related to interbanking exposures
through which contagion may actually propagate. It is worth recalling
that the dependence on interbanking positions is a specific feature of the
wholesale-oriented business models, while during the current crisis cus-
tomer deposits, dominant funding in deposit-oriented institutions, were
not particularly affected by bank runs triggered by the lack of confidence
in banks quality. Furthermore, the interconnectivity arisen from inter-
banking exposures might have determined the need to redefine bilateral
positions during the outbreak of financial markets, to compensate for
the increasing perception of counterpart risk, resulting in more volatile
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balance sheet compositions. This might have also influenced the reallo-
cation of investments on the assets side, due to constraints on funding
sources which reciprocally affected fire sales dynamics. As mentioned
earlier, the impact of total assets is positive and significant for Wholesale,
but for the Saving group the coefficient is modest and not significant. This
supports the discussion above on the importance of relative size in the
risk assessment of distress, thus remarking that big institutions in terms
of total assets belonging to wholesale-oriented models are more likely to
have suffered from distress during the recent crisis, while distresses for
those with Saving business model seem to be not particularly affected by
institutions’ sizes.
We observe that Commercial group has few distress events mainly con-
centrated in US (22 out of 26 in the model presented in Table 39), that
might explain why macro and sectoral dimensions play a significant role
for them. This business model has also a positive and significant coeffi-
cient for the net interest margin, differently from the other core models
presented in Table 39. Due to few observations of distress events for this
peer group and the lack of appropriate coverage of balance sheet items
provided by Bankscope, here we enrich the dataset with information col-
lected from FDIC on distressed institutions; in addition, we admit the
presence of one potential missing value in the computation of average
values for the regressors and we also replace missing values for macro
and sectoral variables with geographical aggregates. This approach en-
larges the coverage of the sample and allows us to reasonably estimate
the model. In Appendix C.1 we also present estimates for the other peer
groups using similar proxies; here, we anticipate that the overall picture
is confirmed under the approximated scenario even for the other peer
groups’ specifications. Although we are aware that a proper econometric
analysis for the other two marginal groups should probably consider a
smaller list of regressors, we still estimate the model for these two groups
to provide comparisons with the three core business models. Long Term
group has negative and significant coefficients for ROA and net interest
margin, while the coefficient for total assets is positive and significant;
for Focus Retail institutions we observe less consistency with the other
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wholesale-oriented models and stronger roles for control variables. We
remark that due to the small number of observations and the absence of
a sufficient set of distressed institutions, results for the last two models
should be taken with caution. Finally, we emphasize that capital has a
significant and negative sign only for the Saving model thus supporting
the presence of an overconfidence in the importance of capital levels for
bank risk assessment at least for certain business models (a result in part
already presented in Vazquez and Federico 2015). Furthermore, simi-
lar to the previous case shown in Table 38 we add a specification which
includes all the wholesale-oriented institutions in the same group (last
column is circumscribed to the merge between Wholesale and Commer-
cial models only). Estimates reinforce the interpretation that wholesale-
oriented and deposit-oriented models present different drivers for the
risk of distress.
Our analysis confirms the importance and the sign of CAMELS di-
mensions in explaining the likelihood of distress of financial institutions
during the recent crisis and provides a solid ground for taking the true
banks business models into consideration for a more accurate risk assess-
ment and monitoring. Two addition dimensions emerge in this frame-
work: the characteristics of the business model adopted by institutions
and the volatility of that decision over time. For the first dimension,
CAMELS measures along with macro and sectoral features contribute
differently, sometimes with opposite sign, to the likelihood of distress
among institutions with a different business model. For those institu-
tions who tend to switch models very often, identifying the second di-
mension of the problem, we observe that business models instability ex-
acerbates vulnerability especially when moving across wholesale-oriented
and deposit-oriented model categories. A bank supervisor would defi-
nitely benefit from monitoring these true business model features for a
more accurate and targeted intervention in stabilizing the banking sector.
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Table 39: Distress Assessment within Peer Groups. Column All includes
only institutions that do not switch peer groups in the interval 2005-07 (in
the case of Long Term and Focus Retail the interval that is considered is
2005-06). The other columns refer to observations for institutions that do
not change peer group and that belong to that specific business model indi-
cated in the name of the column. Column Wholesale-oriented refers in partic-
ular to institutions belonging to groups Wholesale, Commercial, Long Term
and Focus Retail, admitting for transitions across these groups and never
being in the Saving group in the period 2005-07. Column Wholesale-oriented
(Restricted) is circumscribed to Wholesale and Commercial models. For re-
gressors definitions see Section 4.3.3. Asterisks stands for model specifica-
tion where we admit the presence of one missing value in the computation
of average values for regressors and we replace missing values for macro
and sectoral variables with geographical aggregated proxies; in addition,
we also exploit additional data from FDIC for distressed institutions. Super-
scripts C, A, M, E, L, S indicate the respective CAMELS dimensions. Total
Assets are in USD Trillion.
All Wholesale Commercial* Saving Long Term Focus Retail Wholesale- Wholesale-
oriented oriented
(Restricted)
Intercept −2.071∗∗∗ −1.130 −0.968 4.942∗∗∗ −3.770∗∗∗ −5.490∗ −2.564∗∗∗ −1.815∗∗
(0.497) (1.108) (1.956) (1.764) (1.385) (2.866) (0.628) (0.925)
CCapital −0.010 0.010 0.034 −0.138∗∗ −0.001 −0.234 0.006 0.018
(0.014) (0.013) (0.050) (0.055) (0.064) (0.264) (0.013) (0.012)
ARoa −0.163 −0.175∗ −0.380 0.678∗∗ −0.996∗∗∗ 1.065 −0.240∗∗ −0.252∗∗
(0.100) (0.094) (0.249) (0.286) (0.364) (2.176) (0.104) (0.105)
MRoe 0.026∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.052 −0.042∗∗ 0.007 0.028 0.038∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.040) (0.018) (0.021) (0.128) (0.011) (0.015)
ENet Interest Margin −0.093∗∗ 0.012 0.147∗∗∗ 0.169 −0.589∗∗ −0.040 −0.082∗∗ −0.025
(0.036) (0.009) (0.056) (0.166) (0.280) (0.451) (0.036) (0.049)
LDeposits to Total Funding −0.017∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.066∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.015 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006)
STotal Securities to Total Assets −0.002 0.004 0.022 −0.003 0.019 −0.090 0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.022) (0.012) (0.015) (0.066) (0.007) (0.008)
GDP per capita −0.026 −0.144 −0.966∗∗∗ −3.061∗∗∗ 0.099 0.249 0.082 −0.043
(0.093) (0.206) (0.350) (1.048) (0.213) (0.571) (0.100) (0.171)
Inflation 0.300∗∗ 0.203 1.962∗∗∗ −0.150 0.420 −2.220 0.141 0.319
(0.123) (0.220) (0.530) (0.486) (0.361) (1.644) (0.135) (0.196)
Gvt. Long-Term Yield 0.124 −0.275 −0.905∗∗∗ 0.852∗ 0.230 2.431∗∗ 0.050 −0.242
(0.128) (0.287) (0.305) (0.483) (0.411) (1.146) (0.170) (0.249)
Market Index −0.079∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.308∗∗∗ 0.088 −0.050 −0.060 −0.050∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022) (0.057) (0.062) (0.039) (0.089) (0.013) (0.017)
Total Assets 1.790∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗ 3.141∗∗∗ 0.029 2.531∗∗∗ 10.086 1.984∗∗∗ 1.531∗∗∗
(0.287) (0.476) (1.197) (1.450) (0.864) (6.424) (0.317) (0.395)
Num. obs. 6543 1867 1458 1231 907 349 4870 3450
Num. Distress Events 147 46 26 46 18 12 92 59
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.111 0.137 0.743 0.180 0.208 0.333 0.107 0.093
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo R2 0.092 0.067 0.645 0.111 0.052 0.066 0.077 0.048
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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4.8 Conclusions
The study investigates the impact of the true banking business model on
vulnerability and likelihood of distress. We employ one of the largest
sample of banks globally distributed that includes more than 11,000 in-
stitutions representing more than 180 countries. The investigation of true
banking business models is a very challenging task, which involves the
categorization of a large sample of institutions, with a vast and complex
set of balance sheets quite heterogeneous in terms of their direct special-
izations and country of origin, into few well-defined peer groups where
members run the same business model.
To overcome these issues, we use the cosine similarity measure to
compare pairs of institutions and we propose a hierarchical clustering
method, the Louvain algorithm, very popular in complex science, to de-
fine the best configuration of peer groups according to a modularity max-
imization. This approach is specifically designed to overcome limita-
tions due to large, complex and sparse datasets, preserving a superior fit
than the direct specialization well-adopted in banking literature. We also
show comparable results between Louvain and Ward, i.e the mainstream
method in literature, as hierarchical clustering techniques, although the
methodological advantage of dealing with complex and sparse data in-
puts provided by Louvain makes the latter a more suitable approach to
deal with our sample.
We find seven well-defined peer groups resembling the three main
model categories very stressed in literature: wholesale-oriented, deposit-
oriented and investment-oriented groups. Four models fall into the first
category, named Wholesale, Commercial, Long Term and Focus Retail. Al-
though all these four models are characterized by a relevant wholesale
funding, the first model dominates on this dimension while having a
well diversified investment strategy; the second still presents high level
for wholesale funding although it is characterized by dominant commer-
cial/corporate loan investments; the third is well-diversified in the assets
side as the Wholesale but shows the largest portion of long term funding
of all; the last exhibits a dominant position of retail loans investments.
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We notice that Wholesale and Commercial peer groups are the only two
wholesale-oriented models available throughout the entire period 2005-
14, whereas the Long Term and Focus Retail were present only for the first
two years and disappeared thereafter (we observe institutions adopting
these models would switch mainly to the other two models in 2007 at
the onset of the crisis). We also find two models falling into the deposit-
oriented category, namely Saving and Diversified Retail. Both are char-
acterized by dominant deposit funding. However, only Saving model
was available throughout the whole period, whereas Diversified Retail
emerges from 2008 onwards and is composed mainly by German and
Swiss saving and cooperative banks that migrated from the two main
wholesale-oriented models right at the peak of the financial crisis. Fi-
nally, only one model falls into the investment-oriented category, named
Investment, and represents a non-deposit funding model which is very
active in the interbank market as the largest net borrowing institutions
with a large exposure to nonincome investments. They appear to be
huge institutions, among the largest international broker dealers, with
asset size almost ten times the size of their peer group competitors. The
Investment model is only available in 2012 and 2014 when the majority of
those institutions migrated from the Wholesale model.
Then, we focused on the pre financial crisis period (2005-07) to test
how the additional information of the true business model specification
can help the risk assessment on the likelihood of distress events occur-
ring in the interval 2008-10. In this respect, we develop a state-of-the-art
distress event list by merging events of bankruptcy and liquidation, de-
faults, distressed merges and public bailouts from many different sources
globally distributed. Statistics of the distress events per business classi-
fication show that all business models were affected by distress events,
with dominance on the wholesale-oriented models both in numbers (due
to the higher popularity of these models over the deposit-oriented ones
in the pre-crisis period) and in average total assets sizes. This result sug-
gests that a deeper investigation within each peer group is needed to
disentangle the impact of being in a particular group on the likelihood of
distress. However, we also find a substantial number of distress events
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among institutions with a very unstable business model, i.e. those who
tend to switch peer group quite often prior to the crisis, which also re-
quire deeper investigation.
Due to the scarcity of distress events compared to the overall sam-
ple size, we employed a Firth’s Penalized-likelihood logistic regression
model to assess the contribution of institutions’ characteristics, captured
by both balance sheet proxies for CAMELS, their membership to cer-
tain business models and their stability over time, and controlling for
both macro and sectoral indicators. As expected, CAMELS dimensions
are almost all significant in explaining banks’ risk of distress, with nega-
tive contributions from capital, cost to income ratio, net interest margins
and liquidity ratios, and positive from ROE, total securities to total assets
and capital funding ratio. Macro and sectoral characteristics also affect
banks’ resilience, with GDP per capita and market index busting stabi-
lity whereas FDI-outflows, unemployment, house price and government
debt yield weakening institutions’ resilience. Instability of membership
to business models over time has a statistically significant and positive
impact to the likelihood of distress too. More specifically, we find out that
those wholesale-oriented institutions coming from the Long Term model
were more resilient to distress, showing that higher long term debt can
facilitate banks stability during market turmoil. However, a migration
from Long Term to a deposit-oriented model right before the onset of the
financial crisis had exacerbated vulnerability and risk of distress. This
depicts those institutions with potential funding restrictions in 2007 as
sign of perceived vulnerability that resulted on a reduction of whole-
sale debt compared to customer deposits. Finally, those institutions that
moved to Wholesale model in 2007, exposing themselves to more non-
deposit funding, were exposed to more risk of distress.
Last set of tests, performed by partitioning the sample according to
peer group memberships that were consistent over the period 2005-07,
aims at considering only institutions that maintained the same business
model prior to the crisis. By observing the contribution of the main
banks’ characteristics within each business model, we confirm that rela-
tive size (in terms of total assets) is a driving force only among wholesale-
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oriented models, suggesting that being more exposed to a wholesale-
oriented activities increases vulnerability. This is not the case within the
deposit-oriented group, where relative size does not play a role. We also
compare wholesale-oriented vs. deposit-oriented institutions noting op-
posite patterns for CAMELS proxies contributions to the risk of distress,
such as: a positive impact of ROE for Wholesale and negative for Saving;
opposite effects for ROA; significant and negative sign for capital only
for the Saving group, supporting the idea that capital improved stability
mainly for those institutions heavily funded by customer deposits.
To conclude, we provide evidence of how different business models
affect institutions’ vulnerability and likelihood of distress at a global level,
where the one-rule-fits-all approach for monitoring and risk assessment
can be dramatically misleading compared to a targeted and bespoke ap-
proach designed for business models true classifications. Regulator will
definitely benefit from this analysis as, on top of the CAMELS proxies
combined with macro and sectoral info that are currently used to assess
the likelihood of banks to distress, two additional information emerge
from this study as relevant for risk assessment: the characteristics of the
business model adopted by institutions in relations to their own sensitiv-
ity to distress and the volatility of that decision over time. Direct exten-
sions to this study may go to the direction of extending the sample period
by considering earlier years, with quarterly intervals to improve the es-
timation procedure and to allow for an early-warning setup. Of course,
this would require a more parsimonious set of institutions’ characteris-
tics to overcome comparability issues. The vulnerability of banks could
also be assessed by other indicators well-adopted in literature, such us
distance to defauls (z-score), SRISK, MES, DeltaCOVAR, or DIP, which
can be easily included in our framework, as well as more focused macro
and sector indicators designed for specific distress events within the ge-
ographical vs. business model space.
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Appendix C
C.1 Robustness Checks
As a control for the switching process, we run a similar analysis con-
sidering a three-year window for the computation of the averages of
regressors’ values and allowing for the presence of one missing value.
This enlarges the sample and partially circumscribes the problems aris-
ing from data availability related to the coverage of our dataset for the
initial period (for instance balance sheet data for many institutions that
are in the Long Term group in 2005 are not available for previous years,
thus reducing significantly the number of observations for this group).
Estimates (shown in Table 40) for 2005-06 confirm the relevance of the G-
Scores as a main driver in the switching process, while the impact of size
and economic conditions become less significant. The 2006-07 results are
all unchanged unless the sign of the GDP per capita in Model 1 which
becomes negative although still modest (Table 41).
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To investigate the risk of distress across different business models we
present in Table 42 the same models as shown in Table 39 but where
we admit the presence of one missing value in the computation of aver-
age values for regressors and we replace missing values for macro and
sectoral variables with geographical aggregated proxies; in addition, we
also exploit additional data from FDIC for distressed institutions. Re-
sults are in line with those shown in Table 39, with estimates slightly
more significant for macro and sectoral regressors and less for CAMELS.
Table 42: Distrees Assessment within Peer Groups using Proxies. Col-
umn All* includes only institutions that do not switch peer groups in the interval 2005-07. The
other columns refer to observations for institutions that do not change peer group and that belong
to that specific business model indicated in the name of the column. Column Wholesale-oriented
refers in particular to institutions belonging to groups Wholesale, Commercial, Long Term and
Focus Retail, admitting for transitions across these groups and never being in the Saving group
in the period 2005-07. Column Wholesale-oriented (Restricted) is circumscribed to Wholesale and
Commercial models. For regressors definitions see Section 4.3.3. Asterisks stands for model spec-
ification where we admit the presence of one missing value in the computation of average values
for regressors and we replace missing values for macro and sectoral variables with geographical
aggregated proxies; in addition, we also exploit additional data from FDIC for distressed institu-
tions. Superscripts C, A, M, E, L, S indicate the respective CAMELS dimension. Total Assets are
in USD Trillion.
All* Wholesale* Commercial* Saving* Long Term* Focus Retail* Wholesale- Wholesale-
oriented* oriented*
(Restricted)
Intercept −1.677∗∗∗ −0.245 −0.968 3.957∗∗∗ −2.560∗∗ −4.901∗ −2.338∗∗∗ −1.672∗∗∗
(0.409) (1.053) (1.956) (1.452) (1.056) (2.790) (0.476) (0.614)
CCapital 0.002 0.006 0.034 −0.102∗ −0.003 −0.217 0.010 0.014
(0.010) (0.013) (0.050) (0.052) (0.065) (0.295) (0.010) (0.010)
ARoa −0.252∗∗∗ −0.129 −0.380 0.642∗∗ −0.257 −0.044 −0.274∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.091) (0.249) (0.284) (0.318) (2.616) (0.077) (0.077)
MRoe 0.036∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.052 −0.040∗∗ 0.000 0.111 0.046∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.040) (0.018) (0.023) (0.137) (0.010) (0.013)
ENet Interest Margin −0.060 −0.027 0.147∗∗∗ 0.047 −0.791∗∗∗ 0.168 −0.049 0.013
(0.042) (0.045) (0.056) (0.168) (0.239) (0.427) (0.046) (0.009)
LDeposits to Total Funding −0.015∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.061∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.023∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005)
STotal Securities to Total Assets −0.003 0.002 0.022 −0.009 0.023 −0.052 0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.054) (0.006) (0.006)
GDP per capita −0.120 −0.039 −0.966∗∗∗ −1.471∗∗∗ −0.093 0.063 −0.065 −0.150
(0.075) (0.148) (0.350) (0.548) (0.210) (0.574) (0.083) (0.117)
Inflation 0.373∗∗∗ 0.345∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 0.494 0.845∗∗∗ −2.820∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗
(0.085) (0.205) (0.530) (0.304) (0.309) (1.633) (0.103) (0.130)
Gvt. Long-Term Yield −0.043 −0.477∗ −0.905∗∗∗ 0.221 −0.091 2.705∗∗ −0.069 −0.077
(0.081) (0.267) (0.305) (0.262) (0.190) (1.174) (0.099) (0.140)
Market Index −0.073∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.308∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.097∗∗∗ −0.074 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.057) (0.034) (0.030) (0.094) (0.009) (0.010)
Total Assets 1.752∗∗∗ 1.511∗∗∗ 3.141∗∗∗ −0.021 2.432∗∗∗ 4.044 1.897∗∗∗ 1.407∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.465) (1.197) (1.458) (0.828) (3.100) (0.309) (0.377)
Num. obs. 6795 1965 1458 1255 949 350 5063 3956
Num. Distress Events 183 55 26 47 21 12 126 103
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.123 0.078 0.743 0.169 0.228 0.315 0.129 0.145
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo R2 0.107 0.024 0.645 0.100 0.091 0.050 0.107 0.117
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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C.2 Description of the Aggregated Measures
In the study of peer groups features we employ a set of aggregated mea-
sures which synthesise balance sheet items. The selection of these mea-
sures helps the interpretation of peer groups in terms of their business
models because provides a less granular representation of balance sheet
dimensions which, otherwise, would have make the multiple pairwise
comparisons very complex. In addition, this choice partially overcomes
the issues related to the presence of missing values within the set of vari-
ables used to compute the cosine similarities. The following measures
are chosen among those usually applied in literature to detect business
models. These aggregates are computed on standardized balance sheet
variables, i.e. the constituents of each aggregated dimension are stan-
dardized by the total assets of the respective institution.
• Retail Loans = Residential Mortgage Loans + Other Mortgage Loans
+ Other Consumer/Retail Loans
• Corporate and Other Loans = Corporate and Commercial Loans +
Other Loans
• Retail and Corporate Loans = Residential Mortgage Loans + Other
Mortgage Loans + Other Consumer/Retail Loans + Corporate and
Commercial Loans + Other Loans
• Total Loans = Residential Mortgage Loans + Other Mortgage Loans
+ Other Consumer/Retail Loans + Corporate and Commercial Loans
+ Other Loans + Loans and Advances to Banks
• Interbank Lending = Loans and Advances to Banks + Reverse Repos
and Cash Collateral
• Investments = At Equity Investments in Associates + Available for
Sale Securities + Trading Securities and At FV Through Income +
Held to Maturity Securities + Other Securities
• Customer Deposits = Customer Deposits (Current, Savings, Term)
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• Interbank Borrowing = Deposits from Banks + Other Deposits and
Short-Term Borrowings + Repos and Cash Collateral
• Long-Term Funding = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordi-
nated Borrowing + Other Funding
• Long-Term Funding + Equity = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year +
Subordinated Borrowing + Other Funding + Total Equity
• Wholesale Debt = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated
Borrowing + Other Funding + Other Deposits and Short-Term Bor-
rowings + Deposits from Banks
• Stable Funding = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year + Subordinated
Borrowing + Other Funding + Other Liabilities + Customer De-
posits (Current, Savings, Term)
• Stable Funding - CORE = Senior Debt Maturing After 1 Year +
Subordinated Borrowing + Customer Deposits (Current, Savings,
Term)
• Net Liquidity = Cash and Due From Banks + Reverse Repos and
Cash Collateral - Deposits from Banks - Other Deposits and Short-
Term Borrowings - Repos and Cash Collateral - Customer Deposits
(Current, Savings, Term)
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C.3 Non-Parametric Analyis of Peer Groups
In this Appendix we compare groups according to a set of balance sheet
measures (see Appendix C.2) which we selected to study differences in
business models features. We recall that the clustering algorithm that we
use maximizes the homogeneity within clusters compared to the rest of
the system. In doing that, those institutions that are more similar in terms
of the multidimensional vector of balance sheet attributes are grouped
together. As discussed in Section 4.4, this implies the maximization of the
modularity of the resulting configuration. In this Appendix we introduce
an additional framework to verify economically whether and how these
groups differ. This is in line with literature on banks business models
identification which relies on other procedures like the Ward clustering
technique to statistically test for differences in the emerging clusters (see
e.g. the Pseudo-F index proposed by Calin´ski and Harabasz 1974). In
our case, comparisons have a dual goal: from one side they aim to sup-
port the capacity of the Louvain algorithm to group similar institutions
by testing statistically for median differences in groups’ balance sheet
measures, and from the other side these tests on a large set of measures
help the interpretation of emerging groups in terms of business models
features.
Appendix C.3.1 is based on results from the non-parametric equal-
ity of medians test (Kruskal-Wallis) which we applied to verify whether
groups originate from the same distribution. Tests are performed yearly
from 2005 to 2014, separately for each measure. Results point to the
presence of differences in medians which we have further analysed by
means of post-hoc multiple pairwise comparisons (Dunn test). In Ap-
pendix C.3.1 for each year we report1: the number of institutions belong-
ing to each group and both the values of the median and the mean of the
balance sheet measures for each group. We use the Bonferroni correction
to take into account the FWER (we also apply other approaches, not re-
1We exclude from the non-parametric tests and from the multiple pair-wise compari-
sons institutions belonging to very small group or that are even singleton. The number of
discarded institutions are: 28 in 2005, 11 in 2006, 0 in 2007, 10 in 2008, 3 in 2009, 1 in 2010, 0
in 2011, 2 in 2012, 0 in 2013 and 1 in 2014.
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ported, like Sidak and Holm corrections obtaining similar results). The
number of asterisks (*, **, ***, ****, *****) in column All refers to the statis-
tical difference of any given group from that number of other groups for
that measure/year. We use a restrictive significance level of 1% to judge
whether two groups differ or not. In addition, in order to remove some
noise due to the presence of potential outliers we repeated the same ana-
lysis by focusing only on the institutions belonging to the 2nd and 3rd
quantiles of the distribution for any given group/measure. This check
aims to study groups’ differences at the core of the distribution where
membership to that group is more likely to be stable over time (column
Core). Results show that groups on average have statistically significant
peculiar characteristics which are also quite persistent over time. This
supports the use of Louvain algorithm as a technique to identify peer
groups.
Furthermore, in Appendix C.3.2 we discuss some examples to verify
multiple comparisons tests under extreme cases. In fact, the visualiza-
tion of box-plots of balance sheet measures discloses peculiar patterns
for some groups that can affect the pairwise comparisons. In the exam-
ples we present an intuitive way to check these cases. Results even in
these scenarios are quite promising.
Finally, in Appendix C.3.3 we provide an additional description of the
emerging peer groups. In particular, for each year and each peer group
we report descriptive statistics for the average number of outlier values
and missing values related to the measures used to build the vector to
compute the cosine similarities (see Section 4.3.1). This is a further in-
vestigation of the homogeneity within each community. Results suggest
that on average the presence of outlier values is circumscribed to few
variables, while the issue of missing values is not a peculiar feature of
any group.
Below, for simplicity we refer to groups according to the following ab-
breviations: I (Wholesale), II (Commercial), III (Saving), IV (Long Term),
V (Focus Retail), VI (Diversified Retail), VII (Investment), VIII (Volatile
group not stable in time).
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C.3.2 Multiple Comparisons: examples
In this Appendix we consider some example where the distributions of
balance sheet measures exhibit quite extreme patterns (in the box-plots
we remove outliers for the sake of clarity in the representation). This
basic investigation aims to show how the presence of groups with very
peculiar distributions might influence multiple pairwise post-hoc com-
parisons.
In the first example, we consider Retail Loans in 2005 and 2006. Dis-
tributions are quite similar in both years. Group V has very different
median/mean values. We remove this group and we test multiple pair-
wise comparisons among the remaining four groups. Results confirm the
same statistically significant differences with or without the presence of
this group for the remaining groups.
Retail Loans
2005 # obs. Median Mean all core I-VI I-VI (core)
I 3221 0.00 0.15 **** **** *** ***
II 2592 0.00 0.01 **** *** *** **
III 1946 0.00 0.02 **** **** *** ***
IV 1416 0.00 0.01 **** *** *** **
V 606 0.76 0.70 **** ****
2006 # obs. Median Mean all core I-VI I-VI (core)
I 3390 0.00 0.14 **** **** *** ***
II 2568 0.00 0.01 **** *** *** **
III 1952 0.00 0.02 **** **** *** ***
IV 1534 0.00 0.01 **** *** *** **
V 463 0.81 0.76 **** ****
In the second example, we focus on Customer Deposits in 2008 and
2009. Even in this case distributions are quite similar in both years, al-
though in 2009 groups I and II have not statistically different medians
(in the I-II specification). However, we observe that group I and II are
more similar between each other than the pair III and VI, and viceversa.
Therefore, we run pairwise comparisons among this two subsets (I,II)
and (III,VI). Results are in line with those obtained in Appendix C.3.1.
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Customer Dep.
2008 # obs. Median Mean all core I-II I-II
(core)
III-VI III-VI
(core)
I 3270 0.30 0.36 *** *** * *
II 3003 0.46 0.41 *** *** * *
VI 2053 0.72 0.66 *** *** * *
III 1708 0.83 0.80 *** *** * *
2009 # obs. Median Mean all core I-II I-II
(core)
III-VI III-VI
(core)
I 3116 0.29 0.35 ** *** *
II 2877 0.41 0.37 ** *** *
VI 2195 0.74 0.71 *** *** * *
III 2125 0.81 0.78 *** *** * *
C.3.3 Description of Outliers and Missing Values within
Groups
We also analyse the distribution of potential outliers and missing values
within each community. In particular, for each year and each community
we label as outliers those institutions which fall outside a conservative
range corresponding to the mean value plus or minus 1.5 standard de-
viations (calculated within each community separately). This analysis is
computed for each variable in the vector used to determine the cosine si-
milarities (see Section 4.3.1 for the list of variables). Then, we determine
for each institution the outlier ratio as the proportion between measures
where it has outlier values over the total number of measure in the vec-
tor (excluding the number of variables where it presents missing values).
Similarly, for each institution we compute the ratio of missing values and
the total ratio, where the latter is the sum of measures where it has miss-
ing values or outliers over the total number of variables used to compute
the cosine similarities. Below, we report descriptive statistics for each
community and year (in percentage), where values are averaged among
members of each community in that specific year.
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Results show that members of each community few times have out-
lier values in their balance sheet measures and that this pattern is quite
stable over time and shared by all communities even those that emerge
rarely. This is a further proof that institutions grouped in the same com-
munity have similar economic features. In addition, we consider the dis-
tribution of missing values. As emphasized in Section 4.4 the use of our
approach is intended also to overcome issues related to the absence of
some balance sheet items due to many reasons. On average the propor-
tion of missing values does not seem to characterize any groups. This
is an additional check of our approach since one might argue that the
emergence of certain group can be related to the effects of missing val-
ues which clusterize specific portion of the system. We recall that the
choice of the balance sheet variables included in the vector is the result
of a compromise between the need to consider a wide range of mea-
sures which represent a comprehensive set of business activities and the
avoidance of too specific indicators which are hardly present in many
institutions’ balance sheets. The intuition behind this choice is that the
presence/absence of a balance sheet measure is itself a sign of a business
model feature. Our results suggest that missing values are indeed well
spread throughout the peer groups.
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Table 43: Outlier Ratios. For each group and year we report summary
statistics for outlier values identified as the proportion between measures
where institutions have outlier values over the total number of measure in
the vector (excluding the number of variables where they present missing
values). We label as outliers those institutions which fall outside a conser-
vative range corresponding to the mean value plus or minus 1.5 standard
deviations (calculated within each community separately).
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
I
Max. 0.45 0.50 0.73 0.47 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.46 0.55 0.62
Mean 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Median 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
II
Max. 0.67 0.64 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.45 0.55
Mean 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08
Median 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
III
Max. 0.67 0.55 0.50 0.55 0.64 0.58 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.50
Mean 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Median 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IV
Max. 0.50 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
V
Max. 0.69 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VI
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.75 0.67 0.64 0.55 0.56 0.54
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VII
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.36
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VIII
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 44: Missing Values Ratios. For each group and year we report sum-
mary statistics for missing values identified as the proportion between mea-
sures where institutions have no values over the total number of measure
in the vector used to compute cosine similarities.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
I
Max. 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.66
Mean 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.40
Median 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
II
Max. 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.66
Mean 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48
Median 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Min. 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.07
III
Max. 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.62
Mean 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.35
Median 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
Min. 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03
IV
Max. 0.66 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.50 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.52 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Min. 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
V
Max. 0.62 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.46 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.45 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Min. 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VI
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.66 0.62
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.40
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.41
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07
VII
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.69
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.46
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.48
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
VIII
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 45: Total (Outlier + Missing Values) Ratios. For each group and year
we report summary statistics for missing values + outlier values over the
total number of measure in the vector used to compute cosine similarities.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
I
Max. 0.79 0.83 0.90 0.79 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.79 0.83 0.83
Mean 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43
Median 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.45
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
II
Max. 0.86 0.86 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.83
Mean 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52
Median 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
Min. 0.21 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.07
III
Max. 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.76
Mean 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.40
Median 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
Min. 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03
IV
Max. 0.79 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.54 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.55 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Min. 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
V
Max. 0.83 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.50 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.48 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Min. 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VI
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.79
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.45
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.45
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14
VII
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.79
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.51
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.55
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
VIII
Max. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.00
Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.00
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
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C.3.4 Mixed Groups
We briefly comment here on the characteristics of three mixed groups
adopted by a very volatile set of institutions worldwide (see Section 4.5.3
for details.) during the periods 2011-2013. The liability side shows a well
mixed composition between wholesale and costumer deposits, in par-
ticular in 2011 and 2013, that places the funding strategy of those insti-
tutions in between a deposit-oriented and wholesale-oriented business
models. The asset side is quite peculiar in 2011 with by far the largest
exposure to interbank lending among all business models we find. This
could be the evidence of sluggish credit markets where financial institu-
tions were reluctant of investing into the real economy. As a result, large
surplus of liquidity were injected into the interbank market. This charac-
teristics tends to fade away towards 2013 in favour of a more traditional
retail and commercial loan investment strategy.
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Table 46: Mixed groups. We report average values for aggregated balance sheet
variables standardized by total assets for the Mixed groups. For variables definitions
see Appendix C.2. Estimates are computed for each year over the interval 2011-13.
Last row provides summary statistics for Total Assets (in USD Billion).
2011 2012 2013
# observations 573 1053 1424
Retail Loans
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 0.06
Mean 0.05 0.05 0.26
3rd Q 0.02 0.02 0.53
Corporate and Other Loans
1st Q 0.03 0.12 0.04
Median 0.11 0.30 0.17
Mean 0.13 0.32 0.22
3rd Q 0.21 0.49 0.35
Retail and Corporate Loans
1st Q 0.06 0.17 0.26
Median 0.15 0.36 0.48
Mean 0.18 0.37 0.48
3rd Q 0.27 0.55 0.70
Total Loans
1st Q 0.41 0.44 0.52
Median 0.65 0.65 0.71
Mean 0.61 0.61 0.66
3rd Q 0.85 0.80 0.84
Interbank Lending
1st Q 0.21 0.06 0.02
Median 0.45 0.18 0.10
Mean 0.44 0.25 0.19
3rd Q 0.66 0.39 0.29
Investments
1st Q 0.02 0.04 0.03
Median 0.11 0.13 0.11
Mean 0.17 0.17 0.15
3rd Q 0.26 0.25 0.21
Customer Deposits
1st Q 0.47 0.63 0.54
Median 0.71 0.76 0.71
Mean 0.61 0.72 0.64
3rd Q 0.83 0.84 0.82
Interbank Borrowing
1st Q 0.01 0.00 0.01
Median 0.06 0.04 0.05
Mean 0.17 0.08 0.11
3rd Q 0.25 0.11 0.15
Long-Term Funding
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean 0.02 0.01 0.06
3rd Q 0.00 0.01 0.05
Long-Term Funding + Equity
1st Q 0.07 0.08 0.10
Median 0.12 0.12 0.14
Mean 0.15 0.15 0.20
3rd Q 0.19 0.18 0.24
Wholesale Debt
1st Q 0.01 0.01 0.02
Median 0.07 0.04 0.08
Mean 0.19 0.09 0.16
3rd Q 0.25 0.13 0.21
Stable Funding
1st Q 0.53 0.71 0.64
Median 0.76 0.80 0.79
Mean 0.66 0.77 0.73
3rd Q 0.86 0.87 0.86
Net Liquidity
1st Q -0.83 -0.83 -0.79
Median -0.70 -0.71 -0.67
Mean -0.63 -0.63 -0.60
3rd Q -0.50 -0.52 -0.49
Total Assets (USD Billion)
1st Q 0.00 0.00 0.00
Median 0.23 0.27 0.27
Mean 13.17 13.71 13.91
3rd Q 1.56 1.71 1.80
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